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All around the world today, end in many fields of 
research, there is a growing interest in the scientific study 
of religion. In the older and more advanced sciences like 
physics and biology certain fundamental principles have been 
developed which are very valuable in this study. In recent 
physics the departure from older mechanistic principles of 
explanation has been welcomed by religious thinkers as a 
valuable Yfeapon in their fight against mechanism and materialism. 
But the application of biological principles in the field of 
religion has not been so lustily acclaimed. It is true that 
some sort of harmonization of biological findings with theological 
doctrines has occupied the philosophers and theologians for 
many years, but the thought that religion itself has evolved 
has not been welcomed by believers schooled in the traditional 
view. However, with the slow acceptance of the view that the 
mind of man has gradually evolved from very modest beginnings, 
the conception of the evolution of religion has also gained 
in favor.
Nowhere is the scientific study of religion more promis- 
ing than in the field of psychology. Nowhere, however, is there
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greater variety of opinion about the nature and especially about the 
origin of religion. In the psychological study of the origin of 
religion we have, therefore, a problem of the first importance, con- 
cerning which the field of contemporary thought is exceedingly con- 
fused. This is partly due to the fact that psychology is itself 
confused. As Professor Griffith says, "Many of the statements of 
fact and the formulae of science assume a point of reference or a sys- 
tem of coordinates with respect to which the facts and the formulae 
are held to be true..... It would be a great thing for psychology if 
it, too, could find a point of reference (a point of view) or a 
single system of coordinates with respect to which it could describe 
all its facts; but up to the present time, no such happy discovery 
has been made. All of the points of view or points of reference 
which psychology has hitherto used are inadequate in the sense that 
a change in the point of view changes the intrinsic nature of the 
materials being described. The survey of the schools of psychology .. 
shows that psychology has changed its whole complexion with every 
change of perspective."
In the light of this consideration it would be unscientific 
to attempt and presumptuous to claim a final solution of the problem 
discussed in this thesis. The writer makes no claim to new dis- 
coveries in the field of general psychology and no new system of 
psychology is set forth to add to the already extensive confusion.
The confusion of contemporary psychological explanations of 
the origin of religion is not due wholly to divergence of point of
1. Griffith, C.R.: General Introduction to Psychology (1928), 
pp. 124-125.
V.
view in psychology. It results partly from confusion in the field 
of religion with respect to what is signified by the term "religion." 
Suppose a learned psychologist should study an experience genetically, 
believing it to be religion, and should come to correct conclusions 
with respect to the origin of that experience. Unless what he 
studied was really religious experience, his conclusions might be 
brilliant and true and still have nothing at all to do with the prob- 
lem of the origin of religion. Some writers on religion, themselves 
non-religious, are willing to define religion in terms which would 
be unacceptable to most religious people. Any critical evaluation 
of their work must, therefore, deal with the question of the nature 
and meaning of religion so far as that question affects the genetic 
problem.
The first objective of this paper, then, is the clarifi- 
cation of the field as far as the present progress of psychology and 
the scientific study of religion give us aid. If it be urged that 
we have no right, because of the present tentative nature of conclusions, 
especially in psychology, to make such a study it may be replied 
that the need is great and a little progress is better than none at all.
We have not tried to make a "defense of religion," but 
simply to study the facts - to gather them, order them, present 
them, and explain them, as far as the findings of science permit. 
However, if our study should be regarded as contributing in some way 
to a deeper appreciation of the truth and worth of religion the 
writer would be pleased. And it is well to recognize this fact in
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the beginning. Any interest is a bias, and no matter how objective 
an observer may intend to be in the study of facts, the possession 
of any interest whatever, will dispose the observer to see in certain 
situations a significance and importance which another person, 
without the interest which the observer has, could never see. It 
may be that some of the pertinent facts in the study of religion 
would be inevitably missed by an unsympathetic observer. If that is 
true the most competent student of religion, other things being equal, 
would be the person who has a favorable attitude toward it. However, 
it must not be forgotten that the best interests of science and truth, 
and in the end, of religion itself, are to be served by the student 
who earnestly seeks objectivity in the ordering of his facts and 
who welcomes the sobering criticisms of those whose interests are 
opposite to his own.
So, the second objective of this study grows out of the 
writer 1 s interest in religion. It is desired not merely, in the 
interest of truth, to assist in bringing some order into a realm 
where confusion reigns; but it is hoped that our study may help to 
provide a more reasonable basis for the appreciation of religion 
itself.
A third reason for studying the origin of religion is its 
practical bearing on the theory and practice of religious education. 
For many years there has been considerable discussion among religious 
leaders as to what the content and method of instructing the young 
in religion should be. Many have proposed to teach religion through
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instruction in ritualistic practice, or in catechetical or factual 
Biblical material. Others have said that children need to be 
brought into an "experience of salvation." Today we are being told 
that character education is enough. We do not hope to go into this 
controversy in any exhaustive manner, but surely, a genetic study 
of religion ought to throw some light on this crucial question.
We have divided the present work into three main parts, 
respectively presenting (1) the general philosophical, psychological, 
and religious foundations underlying the study as a whole, (2) the 
critical examination of recent psychological theories of the origin 
of religion, and (3) the conclusions reached, and a short statement 
of their significance for the psychology of religion and religious 
education.
If the first part seems longer than the requisite intro- 
duction for a study of this kind normally is, the only justification 
is to be found in the desirability of having one ! s presuppositions 
explicitly stated. The nature of the subject is such that its dis- 
cussion involves important presuppositions in philosophy, psychology, 
and religion. To each of these, therefore, we have devoted a 
chapter. Of the twenty-two sections which compose the three chapters 
of Part I, the last two of Chapter I, the last four of Chapter II, 
and the last three of Chapter III, are regarded by the writer as the 
most important. Sections 20, 21, and 22 (the last three of Chapter 
III) more particularly express the point of view from which criticisms 
of other theories are made.
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Perhaps it is desirable to make some explanation of the 
organization of Part II into the six chapters there presented. 
In selecting from a great number the theories of religious genesis 
which were finally chosen to be presented in these six chapters, 
the following criteria were employed: (l) is the view of religious 
origins psychological? (2) is it representative of a recent school 
of thought? (5) does it represent a live issue in the psychology 
of religion today? (4) was it presented in a recent publication? 
(The word "recent" as used here was arbitrarily interpreted to 
mean "during or subsequent to the year, 1910.")
Relatively more space was given to psychoanalysis than to 
other schools because of its increasing popularity and growing 
prestige in the field of psychology and because, at the same time, 
it is most violently opposed to religion.
By way of explanation we wish to call attention to some 
of the mechanical features of the thesis: (l) both the chapters 
and the sections are numbered consecutively throughout the work as 
a whole; (2) a digest of each chapter is included, single-spaced 
but not indented, at the beginning of the chapter; (3) quotations, 
unless they are very short, are indented and single-spaced but not 
enclosed within quotation marks; (4) words are underlined, in 
quotations, to show that the original was in italics, otherwise, 
for emphasis or to indicate a foreign word or phrase; (5) in footnotes
ix.
the numbers in parentheses following the title of a book indicate 
the date of publication of the edition to which the writer had 
access and to which reference is made, but in some cases it is not 
the original publication date. This is given in the bibliography.
The writer wishes here to express his gratitude to 
Mrs. Jean Platt and to Miss Elaine Rushmore, both of Madison, New 
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INTRODUCTION - EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF MIND
To live is to act; and living organisms are continuously engaged 
in activities which are objectively observable as behaviour and, 
in men, introspectively observable as experience. Using the word 
activity to include both behaviour and experience the problem of 
psychology is defined as the study of the activities of living 
organisms as they adjust themselves and their environment in the 
interest of self-maintenance and self-satisfaction. Although 
the double-aspect theory is rejected, emergent evolution is 
accepted and mind is regarded as a supervenient quality of the 
life and activity of organisms, and varies according to the 
degree and quality of their integration and their relations to 
the environing world. Man is regarded as a natural entity in a 
natural world and the study of organisms gives us our most 
important clue to the nature of the whole. Accordingly the 
universe is judged to be not static and dead but dynamic, alive, 
organic, creative and responsive. Mind is not regarded as a 
function of the body but the word mind is used to signify the 
integration which conditions the individual's activity as a 
unit. Mental integration is characterized as dynamic, cumulative, 
and recapitulative and it is regarded as a scientifically per- 
missable hypothesis that the cosmic evolutionary process is 
characterized by the same unitary, dynamic, cumulative, 
recapitulative integration as is found in the mind of man.
Although the problem which we are to study lies in the 
field of the psychology of religion there are certain basic 
assumptions of a general philosophical character which we cannot 
avoid and which in the beginning we desire to make clear. Many 
of these will arise naturally in a discussion of the meaning of 
psychology. To that question, therefore, we shall now address 
ourselves.
1. The Meaning of Psychology
As an empirical science psychology seeks to observe, 
classify and explain the activities of living organisms. The 
fundamental observation from which it proceeds has been so well 
stated by Professor G. R. Griffith that we shall present it in 
his own words:
It begins with the plain fact that organisms get 
on in an environment, that every moment of their 
individual lives is spent in settling accounts, 
one way or another, with the objects, events, and 
situations round about. Animals low in the scale, 
that is, animals simple in structure and humans 
low in intelligence get on with a limited number 
of objects in a limited number of ways. Animals 
higher in the biological scale and humans with 
greater intelligence get on with a great variety of 
objects in a great variety of ways. In addition to 
the differences that belong to the order of "more 
or less" there are differences that belong to the 
order of "this kind, that kind." The amoeba gets 
on with a limited number of objects, and so differs 
from man, who gets on, in the course of a life- 
time, with an almost unlimited number of objects; 
but the amoeba gets on in its way while man gets on 
in his. And between these extremes there are 
innumerable forms of life in which the talents of 
getting on may be said to look in two directions, 
viz.. back toward amoeba and into the future toward 
man.l
This "settling accounts with environment," this "getting 
on with objects and events," this activity or behaviour of individ- 
ual living organisms, is the raw material of the science of 
psychology. This is the widest possible conception of the field of 
psychology. It includes the study of animals, of children, and of 
normal and abnormal human adults.
1. Griffith: General Introduction to Psychology (1928), p. 8.
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Since other sciences undertake the study of living organ- 
isms and of man in particular it is necessary to state more accurately 
the relation of psychology to other sciences* Professor Woodworth, 
who defines psychology as a scientific study of the activities of 
the individual, states its relationship to other sciences in the 
following words:
Psychology stands between physiology on the one side 
and social science on the other, since, while they 
also study human activities, physiology considers the 
organs that make up the individual, and social science 
studies groups composed of individuals* Physiology 
tells of the eye, the brain, the muscles and glands, 
and their interrelations in the activity of the indivi- 
dual; but psychology takes the individual as a whole, 
and describes his activities* Social science tella 
of institutions, ceremonies, customs, and the doings 
of peoples, while psychology keeps its eye fixed on 
the individual playing his part in the group.^
Of course, there are no impassable barriers between the 
domains of these sciences. The lines between them are like bound- 
aries between friendly states, and allow of much traffic across 
the border. There are no sharp divisions in nature and there can 
be no absolute lines between related natural sciences.
It may rightly be urged that defining the subject-matter 
of psychology in terms of activity raises questions of fundamental 
importance to religion* Unless it be qualified it smacks considerably 
of behaviourism. Fortunately, Professor Woodworth does qualify his 
statement so as to leave us in no doubt as to his position. He 
calls seeing, hearing, and feeling happy or sad, activities.
1. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
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Let this be our criterion: anything that can occur 
just as well when life has ceased is not an activity 
of the individual; but any process that depends on 
life is to be called activity. Unless you are ready 
to assert that a dead body sees, hears and feels, you 
will have to admit that these processes are activities, 
and include them under the definition of psychology.^
This explanation amounts to the recognition of experience
as part of the subject matter of psychology, and is a direct re-
g
pudiation of behaviourism. Experience is not merely something "in
the mind," nor something which the mind "has," nor a complex mental 
structure analyzable into simpler elements nor yet some function of 
the brain; but inner experience and overt behaviour both are examples 
of the living organism as a whole doing something. They are activi- 
ties. And these activities are the data which psychology studies, 
interprets, and explains.
Professor James Drever in defining psychology as "the science 
which takes as its field of study the behaviour of living organisms so
far as it is mentally or psychically conditioned, and can be inter-
3 
preted in mental or psychical terms," clearly adopts the objective
attitude of behaviouristic methodology, but, just as clearly, separates 
himself from the extreme behaviouristic movement. While defining the 
field of psychology in terms of behaviour in the biological sense of 
the action of the organism as a whole in relation to its environment, 
he thinks it necessary to qualify that definition by reference to the
1. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 4.
2. Professor Woodworth1 s essay in "Psychologies of 1930," is even 
more explicit* On page 331, he says, "Since experience is really 
not passive but depends on the life and energy of the individual 
we can combine experience and behaviour under the inclusive 
term, activity, and say that psychology is the study of the 
activities of the individual as an individual."
3. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 1.
5.
mental or psychical, as shown above. And in justification of this 
addition he says, "Without some such qualification our study of 
animal behaviour may be systematically developed as a science, but 
the science is not psychology. It is either physiology or a new 
branch of biological science."
With this statement it seems that the most representative 
writers of the present in the field of psychology would be in substan- 
tial agreement. The following statement try Professor G. T. W. Patrick 
is representative:
Of course, the word behavior may be used in a sense 
sufficiently broad to include all vital activity what- 
ever, visceral and glandular responses, or the stimuli 
thereto, or even organic modes, for organic modes are 
often modes of action. But this is neither the common 
nor the scientific meaning of the word behavior. In 
biology the term means the action of the organism as 
a whole in its relation to its environment. The 
organism acts as a unit in its responses to environ- 
mental factors. Behavior is the reaction of an organism 
to its environment. Evidently, if we use the term 
behavior in its accepted sense, the instinctive strivings, 
urges, impulses, and governing propensities are not 
forms of behavior.^
Surely, no one who will recognize that they exist, can deny 
that these instinctive strivings, urges, impulses, and governing pro- 
pensities occupy a position of fundamental importance in the effort 
to understand human nature or the behaviour of any living organism. 
Hence they not only cannot be ignored by the science of psychology 
but their consideration is fundamental to its value and success. 
Psychology must not be defined in such a way as to exclude considera- 
tion of man as a. wisher as well as a doer, of those interests which
1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 11.
2. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), pp. 71-72.
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Professor Patrick recognizes, of those mental or psychical determinants 
which Professor Drever emphasizes, of those feelings and mental activities 
which Professor Woodworth allows.
Therefore we may provisionally define psychology as the 
scientific study of the activities of living organisms as they adjust 
themselves and their environment in such a way as to maintain their 
integrity and satisfy their desires.
2. The TiAiHT}g Organism
Our definition assumes that the human being is a living 
organism. We take the existence of living organisms for granted, 
"permitting ourselves cheerfully to be classed among the scientists, 
the poets, the religious teachers, and practical men generally." 
And while we refuse to be drawn into any epistemological controversies 
about how we know they exist, we cannot escape the duty of stating 
what we mean to imply by the term. Professor James Drever f s definition 
of a living organism is enlightening. He says,
We may define a living organism as a self -maintaining 
system of activities or forces, which is self- 
determining both in respect of its own development 
and in respect of its reactions to the external 
environment.*
g 
In further elucidating this definition he emphasizes three
characteristics of the living organism: (1) that it is the centre of 
activity or force; (2) that as a system of activities or forces the 
living organism is self -maintaining; and (3) that the living organism
1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 7-8.
2. Ibid., pp. 8 ff.
is determined from within, even in its reactions toward external 
conditions. This last characteristic Professor Drever regards as 
the most important. He holds that it does not mean that the 
behaviour of the organism is arbitrary and lawless but that both 
its normal growth and its reaction to outside stimuli are determined 
from within according to the laws of its own nature. "As a scientist," 
he says, "the psychologist must assume absolute determination for 
each and every reaction. The determination, however, which the 
psychologist postulates, must be rightly understood. It is not the 
mechanical determination of the physical, determination from without, 
but the teleologies! determination of the living, determination from 
within, self -nietermination."
It seems that the main points of Professor Drever f s inter- 
pretation of the living organism find wide acceptance among represen- 
tative writers in psychology. Some minor suggestions and implications, 
however, may be discussed with profit. In regard to the first point 
Professor Drever rightly holds that the complexly organized material 
structure of the living organism is for psychology relatively un- 
important compared to the consideration of the living organism as a
2center of activity or force. But since the question of the relation
of mental factors to bodily organization and neural integration is 
bound to arise in later discussions it may be well to point out that 
the structure of the organism is not to be regarded, even in psychology, 
with indifference. In a recent summary of his life work Professor 
Raymond Dodge, assuming that some kind of brain action is a condition
1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 10.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
8,
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of our mental life, proceeds to ask the very important question, "Are
mental processes correlated with specific kinds of matter or with
2 
specific kinds of integration?" And he later answers this question
in the following words: "There is....no evidence anywhere that conscious- 
ness is dependent on a given kind of stuff, but rather on its peculiar
3 
systematization." This view will be considered again and somewhat
4 
amplified in discussing the question of mind without brain but it is
here presented in recognition of the importance of the structure of 
the organism.
Professor Drever 1 s second point, that as a system of activi- 
ties or forces the living organism is self -maintaining, may be 
emphasized in explanation of the phrase in our definition of psychology 
which refers to the activity of living organisms "in such a way as to 
maintain their integrity." The living organism not only maintains a 
physiological equilibrium within itself but it normally maintains a 
dynamical equilibrium between itself as a whole and its environment. 
The fundamental assumption underlying this concept is, for us, that 
the living human being as a living organism is a natural entity in a 
natural world, that he cannot be understood apart from his environment, 
that, indeed, his very life depends upon his constant interaction with 
his environment, and that, at the psychological level at least, that 
interaction is dynamical rather than mechanical.
This does not mean, however, that anything may happen;
1. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability (1931),
p. 155. 
£. Ibid., p. 158.
3. Ibid.
4. Vide infra, section 8.
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that disorder and destruction may result. The molecule is an orderly 
result of dynamic interaction of atoms without mechanical arrange- 
ments to guide them; of atoms according to their relative properties. 
The processes studied in psychology are largely if not wholly of 
this dynamical kind.
The physicist is led by observation, as well as by 
theoretical calculation, to the conclusion that, generally, un- 
disturbed dynamical interaction will produce a definite and orderly 
result. And Professor Drever, as psychologist, expresses the same 
view in his third point by an eaphatic distinction between self- 
determination and mechanical determination.
5. Impulse and Desire
We desire to emphasize the fundamental importance of those 
impulses, interests and goal-seeking activities which Professor Drever 
says are characteristic of the living organism as self -determining. 
The stimulus-response formula simply does not cover the facts. Normal 
psychology, assuming that action begins in the environment rather 
than in the actor himself, has too long concerned itself with stimuli 
and responses rather than with persons. It needed the influence of 
abnormal psychology to introduce sanity into its procedures by re- 
garding the cause-and-effect relation as starting with the person 
himself and as terminating in the behaviour that satisfies them. 
The view that action originates in the actor himself is one of the 
fundamental principles of psychoanalysis and perhaps its most im- 
portant contribution to scientific psychology. This shift of interest
10.
from the stimulus-response relation to the wants of the living
self marks the fundamental difference between the old and the new
1 
psychology.
Professor L. L, Thurstone accepts this view and expands 
the stimulus-response formula into ten stages of the psychological 
act, beginning and ending in the actor, as follows: energy-source, 
lowered threshold for stimuli, deliberate ideation, the internal 
stimulus, Imaginal hunt for external stimuli, overt hunt for external 
stimuli, the external stimulus, the consummatory overt act, overt
consequences of the act, and satisfaction to the actor and quiescence
2
at the energy source. This may be an unnecessary elaboration but it
has the merit of showing the hopeless inadequacy of the stimulus- 
response psychology. In the words of Professor Drever, "So far as
the reaction is the response of the organism, the stimulus is not
3 
its cause, but merely its occasion." Or as Professor Woodworth
says, "The stimulus does not exactly produce the response, but it
arouses or releases the response, as the blow of the trigger re-
4 
leases the charge in a gun."
4. Purpose
The question whether there is some mysterious purposive 
energy underlying those causative tendencies which we have variously
1. Of. Thurstone: The Nature of Intelligence (1924), p. xili-xiv.
2. Ibid., pp. 28-32.
3. Drevers Introduction to the Psychology of Education (1925), p. 10,
4. Woodwortht Psychology (1929), p. 227.
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referred to as impulses, wishes, interests, or goal-seeking activities, 
and which is the animating force of the body, remains only an in- 
teresting speculation. "We hear a great deal about the brain and the 
nervous system as instruments for the more and more perfect adaptations 
of the organism to its environment. We seem to know what they are in- 
struments for, but what they are instruments of has never been told. 
Can they be instruments of the wishes and interests, means for the 
realization of vital needs?"
Professor William McDougall thinks they are. He writes his
'Outline of Psychology "from the point of view of the sciences of mind,
gfor which purposive striving is a fundamental category. And toward
the end of the chapter on "the behaviour of the lower animals,"
(Chapter II) he summarizes this view and, following the suggestion of
3 
Professor T. P. Nunn, calls it the "hormic theory." "The view that
all nnimnl and human behaviour is purposive in however vague and 
lowly a degree, and that purposive action is fundamentally different 
from mechanical process, may be conveniently called the hormic theory. 
The word ! hormic f is from the Greek, f horme, f which means a vital 
impulse or urge to action. Schopenhauer's 'will-to-live,' Professor 
Bergson's f elan vital. 1 and Doctor C. G. Jung's 'libido, 1 are alter-
native expressions for the purposive or hormic energy that is mani-
4
fested in human and «nl^»l behaviour."
1. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), p. 85.
2. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), p. vii.
3. Nunn: Educations Its Data and First Principles (1920), p. 21.
4. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), p. 72,
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In his other writings also Professor McDougall champions 
the hormic theory but most thoroughly and convincingly in a recent 
essay in "Psychologies of 1950." In this essay he presents hormic 
activity as an nenergy manifestation1* and summarizes the most 
essential facts as follows? (a) that the energy manifestation is 
guided into channels such that the organism approaches its goal; 
(b) that this guidance is effected through a cognition activity, 
an awareness, however vague, of the present situation and of the 
goal; (c) that the activity, once initiated and set on its path 
through cognitive activity, tends to continue until the goal is 
attained; (d) that when the goal is attained, the activity terminates; 
(e) that progress toward the attainment of the goal is a pleasurable 
experience, and thwarting or failure is a painful or disagreeable 
experience* He then expresses the view that these essential facts 
characterize the activities of all organisms down to the single 
living cell, flormic theory, he says, "necessarily holds that hormic 
activity can be exhibited only by organisms or natural entities that 
have a certain complexity of organization, such entities as have been 
traditionally called monads* And it inclines to the view that the
simplest form under which monads appear to us as sensible phenomena
2 
is that of the single living cell."
The hormic theory as interpreted by Professor McDougall 
is very intriguing, especially to a writer on religious psychology.
1. McDougallt Essay in "Psychologies of 1950." edited by C. 
Murchison (1930), p. 15.
2. Ibid.
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But certain difficulties of this theory make the present writer hesitate 
to accept it as a working hypothesis. They may be summarized as 
follows: (l) the assumption of a fundamental dualism between mind 
and body; (2) the championing of vitalism, which is fundamentally a 
biological question, and the consequent ascription of purpose to uni- 
cellular organisms; (5) the adoption of the Lamarkian view of evolution 
and opposition to emergent theory; and (4) the ignoring of all other 
causes in the psychological realm except wishes or purposes. Professor 
McDougall's insistence on the importance of interest and purpose in 
human psychology is aHl to the good. The psychologist examining the 
phenomena manifested by an individual may find them as facts appertaining 
to that individual. And as facts observed in such inquiry they must be 
accepted and used in the science. They cannot be ignored. But it is 
certain that they may receive due recognition in dynamic psychology 
without acceptance of the hormic theory in toto. and consequently 
without involving the psychologist in the difficulties mentioned above.
With respect to the hormic theory, therefore, the writer 
recognizes the importance of its dynamic concepts without accepting 
Professor McDougall's philosophical elaboration of it. In this attitude 
the writer follows Professor Woodworth whose view, expressed in the 
same volume, is as follows:
The various hormic psychologists, exemplified by 
HcDougall and Freud, certainly operate with dynamic 
concepts, striving, wish-fulfillment, conflict, re- 
pression, transference, and a host of others. The 
difficulty is to bring these concepts down to earth 
so as to let them work along with stimulus and 
response, set, association, conditioning, learning, 
and forgetting. Dynamic psychology would certainly 
not need to include in its constitution the state-
14.
ment that purpose or striving is ultimate, and 
outside the realm of cause and effect, nor to take 
any stand on the biological question of mechanism 
versus vitalism. Nor would dynamic psychology 
postulate that all causes in the psychological 
realm consist of wishes or purposes*   Purpose 
enters dynamic psychology as a cause among causes, 
but it cannot be permitted to crowd the others
5« The Relation of Body and Mind
Now we are certainly involved already in assumptions re- 
garding such terms as mind, body, consciousness, soul, self, 
personality. It may be asked: "Since you define psychology in 
terms of activity and since you seek to avoid the acceptance of a 
dualism between body and mind, what is your view of the mind? Is 
not your definition of psychology in reality a veiled acceptance of 
a materialism which assumes that what we call the mind is merely a 
function of the body?"
In reply to this question it is necessary, first of all,
to remind ourselves of the unfortunate current confusion with respect
g
to the meaning of the word function. It is used in two senses.
One meaning refers to the peculiar office or work properly belonging 
to or assigned to any organ or part of a larger whole  Thus, in the 
economy of a plant the leaves and the roots have each their peculiar 
function or proper work as parts of the larger whole* In the economy 
of the body each particular organ has its peculiar physiological 
function or office as a part of the larger whole. For example, the
1. Woodworth: Essay in "Psychologies of 1950." edited by C, 
Murchison (1930), pp. 534-335.
2. Cf. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), pp. 107-109.
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function of the heart is to pump the blood, of the lungs to 
oxygenate it, etc. Moreover, many primary organs have each their 
peculiar functions in larger systems which in turn have their 
function or peculiar work in the life economy of the whole organism. 
For example, it is not the function of the lungs to breathe. Breath- 
ing is the function of the respiratory system considered as a unit 
within the living organism, and the lungs and other divisions of the 
respiratory system have their proper functions as a part of the 
respiratory system.
If this is what we mean by function then our question must 
be changed. It now becomes: "Is mind a function of the brain or 
nervous system?11 It may be well to approach this problem genetically 
by remembering that the diverse organs which finally arise in the more 
complex living systems are but crystallizations of certain original 
properties of protoplasm. the various unspecialized properties of 
primordial living stuff have their counterparts in extremely highly 
specialized organs and systems of organs in the more advanced types 
of living organisms. Among the more important of these original 
properties may be mentioned sensitivity to stimulating agents, con- 
ductivity of excitations from one part of the substance to another,
2 and contractility. They are respective^ represented in the more
complex living systems by the receptors, such as the eye, the ear, 
pain spots, etc., the nervous system, and the effectors or muscles
1. Cf. Northrop: Science and First Principles (1931), Chap. V, 
esp. p. £12.
2. Cf. Griffith: General Introduction to Psychology (1928), 
pp. 189-192, also pp. 140-165.
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and glands* Along with extreme specialization of the receptors and 
effectors which makes the organism's possible stimuli and possible 
responses almost limitless in number, we find that living organisms 
as they move upward in the scale of life achieve a more and more 
specialized and complicated structural arrangement for integrating the
various processes and organs of the body to produce the unitary form
1
and organization of the system as a whole* We have called that com- 
plicated arrangement the nervous system. Neural structure makes possible 
extremely complicated contacts between the various tissues, organs, 
and systems of the body. We may conclude, then, that the primary func- 
tion of the nervous system is, by means of its conductive properties, 
to maintain in living organisms which have reached the higher levels of 
evolutionary progress that unitary wholeness which is characteristic of 
all living things and which is manifested in protoplasm as the property 
of conductivity. But this is very far from the view that mind is a 
function of the brain or of the nervous system.
In the sense of the word function which we have been dis- 
cussing, it would not be proper to say that it is the function of a 
tree to grow or to bear fruit, nor could one say that it is the function 
of a man to talk, think, or plan for the future.
But there is another meaning of the word according 
to which function means the specific power or mode 
of activity of any organism as a whole or any agent 
or individual. In this sense it is the function of 
a tree to grow, and of a man to think, of an artist 
to paint pictures, and of a composer to produce 
oratorios. In this sense the function of anything 
is not what it has to do as a part of some machine 
or larger organism, but what it can do in its own ^ 
free creative activity. It is its end or fruition.
1. Cf. Sherrington: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1926)
2. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), p. 108.
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From this point of view it would not be incorrect to say that mental 
activity is the function of living organisms as they adjust them- 
selves and their environment in such a way as to maintain their 
integrity and satisfy their desires. If it be asked what it is that 
acts, we reply that it is the integrated living individual as a 
whole, as a unit. Mind is qualitative. It is not a stuff, an 
entelechy, a discrete entity to be contrasted with body. But it is 
a supervenient quality of the life and activity of organisms and varies 
according to the degree and quality of their integration and their re- 
lations to the environing world. As Professor Nunn says, "Man is not 
to be conceived as Descartes conceived him - namely, an automaton plus 
a soul, or, as Epictetus put it, f A ghost in a corpse. 1 He is, through 
and through, a single organism, a f body-mind, 1 the latest term of an
evolutionary process in which living substance has developed ever
1 
higher and more subtle functions. 11
6. Emergent Evolution and the Body-Mind Problem
We are so accustomed to think of mind as immaterial con- 
trasted with and interacting with body as material, that it is ex- 
tremely difficult both intellectually and emotionally to give any 
other view a fair chance. The fact is, however, that no solution of 
the mind-body problem in terms of dualism, materialism or psychical 
monism, is thoroughly convincing or satisfactory. We believe that 
the basis for a satisfactory solution of this problem is to be found 
in terms of emergent evolution. In his Gifford lectures Professor
1. Nunn: Education? Its Data and First Principles (1920), p. 18.
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Lloyd Morgan has given us a profound statement of the theory of
1 
emergent evolution and, while we wish to assume as the background
of this paper the main points of his treatment of emergence and 
reference, we do not wish to assume unrestricted concomitance of 
psychical and physical events. In the first series of lectures Lloyd 
Morgan sets forth three general levels of emergent evolution: 
A. Matter (with psychical correlates); B. Life (with psychical
o
correlates); and C. Mind (with physical correlates). Mind in this 
scheme is regarded as supervenient at the level of prospective
reference and below this level are psychical systems which have not
3
reached the status of mind. But in the second course of lectures
the word "psychical" is dropped and the word mind is used in an un- 
restricted sense as correlated with both life and matter. This
»
correlation (or concomitance as he now says) is "ubiquitious and
4 
universal." "Reference" is used to cover the ground formerly
occupied by "mind," but with this difference that it includes three 
levels of reference, reflective, cognitive and non-cognitive, 
whereas "mind" formerly referred to the cognitive and reflective 
levels only*
The attribution of mental correlates to physical events 
would make necessary the conception of physical events in terms of
1. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923); Life. Mind and Spirit 
(1926).
2. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923), p. 27. Cf. Section V.
3. Morganr Life. Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 8.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. Ibid., pp. 16, 131, 214, 215. Also Morgan: Emergent Evolution 
(1923), Chapter IV.
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vitality since according to the emergent scheme mind is a quality 
supervenient upon and involving life. This would seem to take from 
the scheme, as shown above, the level of matter and substitute a new
scheme of emergent evolution where emergents arise in two parallel
gorders of events, namely, physical and mental. Professor Lloyd
Morgan f s own words seem to indicate this. For example, he says,
Let it then be understood clearly that the 
hypothesis of unrestricted concomitance does 
not imply that occurrences in either attribute 
emerge from occurrences in the other. The 
hypothesis is that from the very beginning, so 
far as we can descry it, mind is concomitant 
with life. 3
A further difficulty, involved in the theory of unrestricted 
concomitance, arises when we consider the mental integration of an 
extremely complex character such as we find in man. The acceptance of 
unrestricted concomitance would here involve us in the attribution of
some sort of mind and consciousness to cellular activity in the body
4 and also to elementary neural processes. This view is characteristic
of those who hold to psycho-physical parallelism. It is admittedly 
theoretical, and it is probably not capable of disproof. Each segment 
of the spinal cord, each neuron, or even each electron may possess a 
consciousness of its own. However, such a consciousness is not only 
inaccessible to us but it is not comprehensible in terms of our con- 
sciousness. The special hypothesis of a special kind of inaccessible 
consciousness to correlate with every kind of neural process would 
seem defensible only if it could be shown that the various neural
1. Morgan: Emergent Evolution (1923), pp. 15 ff.
2. Ibid. Cf. pp. 222-223.
3. Morgan: Life. Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 12.
4. Cf. Life. Mind and Spirit f p. 223. The author says:
"There is no organ, no tissue in the body, no cellular consti- 
tuent, no chromosome or chondriosome factor, the action of which 
is without its mental accompaniment."
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processes possess those characteristics which in the cerebrum are 
the conditions of consciousness as we know it*
Not only can this not be done, but there is strong evidence 
that even in the cortex psychic elements cannot be correlated with 
physiological units or elementary neural processes. Professor Raymond 
Dodge, whose many notable researches in physiological psychology give 
him a peculiar right to be heard on this question, has this to say:
A psychic element, if there is any such thing, always 
appears as the consequence of complex neural ante- 
cedents. That is to say, a color or tone which for 
consciousness is not further analyzable, is 
physiologically still highly complex. Beginning in 
the sense organ and ending in the cortex there are 
at least three links in the chain of neural happenings. 
In the case of color the number of links is probably 
higher, and in none of the links is the process a 
simple one. In the last link it probably involves 
more or less widespread cortical disturbances with a 
complex interplay of excitations and inhibitions. 
Certainly it is not an unanalyzable event.^
So far, then, the theory seems to be contrary to the facts 
as we know them. Therefore, we cannot assume unrestricted concomi- 
tance of mental and physical events. We shall depart from the theory 
in two ways. In the first place we shall use the word mind to refer 
to that kind of integration whose objectively observable aspect is 
the behaviour of living organisms as a whole and whose introspectively 
observable aspect is the experience of human beings. And in the 
second place, we recognize that while mental process depends in a 
general way upon neural process, we do not assume any point by point 
correspondence, parallelism or correlation.
1. Cf. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability 
(1931), pp. 156-157.
2. Ibid., p. 157.
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The rejection of unrestricted concomitance does not, how- 
ever, involve rejection of the concept of emergence as Uovd Morgan
1
himself says. On the other hand it appears to strengthen the con- 
cept of emergence of the mind as a genuine novelty "by emphasizing
the fact that the simplest element of experience still involves com-
2 
plex physiological process.
As a second reservation we wish to take exception to the 
double-aspect or double-knowledge theory as a solution of the mind- 
body problem. Uoyd Morgan maintains that while man is in life-regard
a system of bioses and in mind-regard he is a system of mental events,
3 
"substantially he is one being." And again he urges that "life and
mind are manifestations of Divine Purpose, one and indivisible in God
4 
as ultimate Substance."
Resting as it does on the assumption of unrestricted con- 
comitance of psychical and physical events this theory, as Professor
1. Morgan: Life. Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 34.
2. Cf. Sellers: Evolutionary Naturalism (1922). He emphasizes 
the recent tendency in science to move away from the old 
emphasis on continuity with its mechanical implications toward 
the recognition of creative synthesis in nature with resultant 
novelty. "We are confronted with pluses. Chemical properties 
are not the same as physical properties. There is a further 
plus when we examine the functioning of organic tissues. The 
older properties are transcended and included.... Evolution 
seems, therefore, to contain two equally real elements. There 
is continuity, and there is novelty." p. 297.
3. Morgan: Life f Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 31. Cf. Chapter X.
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Drever has clearly shown, is in reality a special form of psycho- 
physical parallelism, and subject to the shortcomings of that theory. 
Furthermore its resolution of the difficulty of dualism of mind and 
body is apparent rather than real. The theory was first advanced by 
Spinoza who held that reality is not found in two substances, such 
as thought and extension, but in one substance, God, who is known 
to us under two attributes, and these attributes are thought and ex- 
tension. Descartes attempted to solve his dualism by asserting "animal 
spirits" to mediate between the two; Spinoza by asserting a "substance" 
to include them. Such a substance may be called God in order to name 
it, but it is more like a concept than like the God of religious 
experience.
If the double-aspect theory could be interpreted as a frank 
and straightforward recognition of the propriety of studying living 
organisms with various scientific techniques in order to gain as much 
information about them as possible, then certainly no fault could be 
found with it. But then it would no longer be a double-aspect theory 
but a plural-aspect theory. For it would have to recognize the right 
not only of psychology and physiology to study the living organism 
but also of the social sciences, anatomy, chemistry and even physics. 
Professor Woodworth has expressed this point so convincingly that 
the writer begs leave to quote him at some length:
1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 16-17.
2. Cf. Patrick: What is the Mind? (1929), pp. 114-115.
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There is no mind-body problem in everyday life, 
but the problem emerges when the two sciences 
(Psychology, Physiology) study the organism with 
their different techniques. The parallelism is 
not a parallelism between physiological and mental 
activities, but only a parallelism between two 
different descriptions of the same activity. Where 
the psychologist speaks of eating one's dinner, 
the physiologist, more analytically, speaks of the 
contraction of certain muscles under the excitation 
of certain nerves, etc., but he is describing the 
same identical process as the psychologist. When 
the psychologist speaks of seeing the color, blue, 
the physiologist speaks of the processes in the 
retina, the optic nerve and its brain connections. 
There is no doubt, to my mind, that seeing blue is 
identically the same process as that which the 
physiologist describes. If he were able to give 
a much more complete analytical description than 
is possible today, he would not, to be sure, ever 
find the color blue as an experience, Just because 
that experience is a total process which he is 
breaking up into parts.^
7. Taking Evolution Seriously
There are then not "two stories of one evolutionary ad-
gvance," but many stories. And each of them contributes its share
toward the understanding of the emergence of man as the flower, so 
we believe, of the cosmic process.
We believe that any adequate view of the world or any part 
of it must take evolution seriously. And this means that we must 
take two main implications of evolution as fundamental to our study. 
The first is that the world or any particular part of it is orderly 
and systematic. This assumption is the fundamental basis upon which 
science works and the success of science demonstrates its validity.
1. Woodworth: Essay on Dynamic Psychology, from Psychologies of 
1950 (1930), p. 335.
2. Morgan: Life. Mind and Spirit (1926), p. 134.
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Of course if one should hold to the point of view of one particular 
descriptive science, say astronomy, he need only assume that that 
section of the phenomenal order in which he is interested is orderly. 
But in the study of man such an isolated view is impossible, as even 
a cursory examination of the problems of biochemistry, biophysics, 
physiology, and psychology - to take only a few examples - will readily 
show. Due to the interpenetration of the various fields of scientific 
research even the scientist probably will and certainty the philosopher 
must make the assumption that that orderliness which is seen to be 
characteristic of any field under investigation is characteristic of 
the whole phenomenal order and rooted in the very nature of Reality. 
This means that there are no unrelated details kicking about loose, 
that any satisfactory account of the whole must do justice to all 
the details, and that any adequate understanding of any detail will 
throw at least some light on the nature of the whole.
The second implication of evolution which is fundamental to 
our study is that the world is a growing world. The life of organisms 
is not a mere shuffling and reshuffling of atoms and molecules in 
hit-or-miss chance fashion but a genuine progress toward integration 
and novelty. This means that we cannot hold on to a mechanistic view 
of the universe. Our scientists and our philosophers of the present 
day are turning away from mechanism. Professor Whitehead states the 
point squarely: instead of trying to interpret biology in terms of 
mechanical physics, he says it is time to inquire whether biology may 
not give us the proper cue in understanding physics. If we are to 
take evolution seriously, as involving real growth, we must, he says,
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make the notion of organism fundamental to our view of the world and 
apply it n°t only to the individuals in the process of biological 
evolution but to the total environment in which that evolutionary 
process takes place. "Science,*1 he says, wis taking on a new aspect 
which is neither purely physical, nor purely biological. It is be- 
coming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger 
organisms; whereas physics is the study of smaller organisms."
What this organismic view may mean for science and philosophy 
no one, as yet, seems ready to say. But it is not impossible even 
now to point out some of the implications which certainly concern us 
here. In the first place the maintenance of life at any level in- 
volves an exceedingly complex give-and-take between each living thing 
and its environing world. From the unicellular organism up through 
the intricate scale of living things to man, there is almost infinite 
variety in the extent, the complexity, and the richness of this 
give-and-take between living organism and environing world. And 
when one considers that every living thing has been brought to birth 
and is constantly nurtured by the environment in which it lives, one 
realizes the logic of Professor Henderson ! s insistence that the fit-
o
ness of the environment is as important as the fitness of the organism. 
In the second place, these intricately integrated centers of 
energy maintaining amazingly fluid, dynamic equilibrium in constantly 
changing environments, these living organisms, are stable. But their
1. Whitehead: Science and the Modern World (1925), p. 145. 
Of. pp. 150-164.
2. Of. Henderson: The Fitness of the Environment (1913), p. 312.
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stability is stability of pattern, of form, not of stuff. With every 
breath, with every movement even, there is interchange of stuff be- 
tween organism and environment, and streams of electrons constantly 
sweep through the living body. Stuff changes; pattern remains.
But, again, while the pattern is stable it is not static. 
It remains, but it does not remain the same. The organism grows, 
learns, changes its environment, and is changed by its environment. 
Not only that, but it reproduces itself in offspring, of like kind, 
but with variations from itself, and the offspring bears in its inte- 
grated structure the phylogenetic history of its past. If we trace 
this phylogenetic history we find that there is order and there is 
growth in extensiveness, complexity, and richness of interrelatedness 
and integration. There are now and again, in this movement of life, 
jumps or mutations, novelties emerging, novelties of form and related- 
ness.
A fourth implication of the organismic point of view concerns 
the fitness of the individual to survive. The individual must possess 
vigor, aggressiveness, a tough resiliency, a capacity for rebound, a 
persistent organization and unity which resists disintegration when 
threatened by opposing forces in the environment. The path of evolution 
is uphill, against resistance. Discomfort, struggle, meeting and 
transcending difficulties, weathering storm and calm, resourcefulness - 
these are some of the characteristics of the fit who survive.
And finally, it is never individuals alone that survive, 
but groups, families, species. Individual fitness and effort are not
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enough. There must be social life, cooperative effort, where the 
individual lives with and to some extent for the group.
All these considerations throw light upon the nature of the 
world, and upon the nature of man as a part of that world. In par- 
ticular they serve as a caution against dualistic theories of man 
which assume interaction or parallel action between mind and body, and 
against dualistic theories of the universe which assume that the 
apparent disparity between matter and spirit is fundamental and charac- 
teristic of ultimate reality.
Our view is that in the evolutionary process new unitary com- 
plexes arise; that each new unitary complex issues in qualitative 
differences which are not possessed by simpler organisms nor by the 
elements of which it is composed; that these qualitative differences
which are characteristic of the unitary complex could not be inferred
1 
from an examination of the elements; and that, consequently, these
qualitative differences depend not upon the "stuff11 of the complex but
2
upon its organization in a certain way. We believe therefore that
the world cannot be understood in terms of some ultimate substance or 
substances, whether mind, matter or both; that any effort to do so 
inevitably misses these "qualitative differences11 which make up the 
world as we experience it and are as real as anything in the world 
can be. Furthermore, we believe that the study of living organisms 
gives us a clue to the nature of the universe as a whole* And we
1. Cf. Patrick: Ufaat is the Mind? (1929), Chapter VI.
2. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability
(1931), p. 158. Cf. also Broad: The Mind and Its Place in 
Nature (1925), pp. 67-68.
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conclude that the universe, whatever else it may be, is not static and 
dead, but dynamic, alive, growing, organic, creative, and responsive.
8. The Meaning of Mind
We call those "qualitative differences" which distinguish 
normal living human beings from lower orders of life, mental qualities. 
These qualities are objectively observable only as they characterize 
behaviour and introspectively observable only as they condition ex- 
perience. They seem to arise out of an extremely complex systernatiza- 
tion or integration of some sort which we shall also describe as mental. 
Mental integration cannot be directly observed either objectively or 
introspectively, but must be studied by inference from behaviour and 
experience, that is, by inference from the activities of the living 
individual. That is why psychology must study activity.
When we study the behaviour and experience of normal human 
beings living under wholesome environmental influences we find that 
their activities may be classified according to a fairly small number 
of general types. We find that: (l) human beings grow up5 (2) they 
profit \yy past experience; (3) they observe and discriminate between 
objects in their environment, selecting certain of these objects for 
special consideration; (4) they revive and observe past experience; 
(5) they may insert effective and fruitful delays between the per- 
ception of a situation, or the awareness of a suggestion, and the 
overt response so as to make their response more appropriate; (6) 
they prepare for the future; (?) in various ways they temper their
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responses to the felt needs of the moment; (8) they direct their 
energies to definite ends; and (9) they organize their responses 
to total situations*
Most of the problems of psychology arise in attempting 
descriptions and seeking explanations of these eight types of human, 
or fewer types of animal, activity. Traditional psychology, however, 
has not used verbs but nouns to describe its problems. We may list 
them, in the same order as given above, as follows: (l) maturation; 
(2) learning; (3) sensation, perception, attention; (4) memory, or 
conservation, recognition, and recall; (5) thinking; (6) imagination; 
(?) emotion; (8) motivation, interest, effort, purpose; (9) charac- 
ter, personality. We need these nouns to gather up in shorthand 
symbols the meanings which the longer descriptions convey. Indeed 
we can hardly write or talk about psychological problems without some 
such understood symbols.
Likewise we need a word to gather up in one concept the 
totality of these descriptions of the individual as he functions as 
an organic part of his world. That word is mind. By the word mind 
we shall not mean the functioning of the individual, though we may 
speak of his activity as mental; but we intend to signify the inte- 
gration which conditions his activity as a unit. We wish again to 
emphasize the fact that recognition of the mind as an integration con- 
ditioning behaviour and experience is no more to accept a dualism 
than to recognize that constant breathing also is a condition of 
activity.
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We attribute to the mind of man certain dependable sources 
of behaviour and experience such as interests, motives, dispositions, 
capacities, skills, meanings, memories, etc. As to the exact nature 
of these mental components we have no exact knowledge. Many 
psychologists conjecture that they exist as neural patterns. But 
this is a problem for the future.
We know something more definite about the characteristics of 
mind. We may summarize them as follows: (1) Mind is an integration. 
The activity of the individual is unitary; it is the activity of a 
living being as a whole* (2) Mind is an integration that is dynamic 
in character. It is stable, but it is a stable configuration of 
energy. It changes and develops, progresses and has direction. It 
is active with respect to its environment, and its activity is 
characterized by intelligence and purpose. (3) It is cumulative. 
This can be seen in the summation of memories to which each new 
experience adds something which was not there before, in which some 
trace of each new experience becomes more or less systematized, while, 
at the same time, it leaves its predecessors more or less intact. 
(4) Mental integration is recapitulative^ This is obvious in personal 
experience. Each present experience not only leaves a trace to be 
organized in a system of memories but each new stimulus revives that 
system more or less completely. It is the individual with all his 
past experiences which hears a noise in the adjoining room, preaches 
a sermon, or flies across the Atlantic ocean. Moreover, it is not
1. Cf. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability 
(1931), pp. 158 ff. In formulating the views expressed in 
this section the writer has been greatly influenced by 
Professor Dodge.
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merely the individual with his own past experiences who does these 
things; but each new experience is recapitulative, also, in some 
degree, of summarized influences of racial experience in the long, 
complex, evolutionary advance which lies behind him.
We may ask: Where is mental integration to be found? 
Most obviously one place where mind can unquestionably be found is 
in connection with living human beings, and perhaps we might be 
justified in affirming, with somewhat less assurance, that some 
sort of mental integration characterizes all living organisms which 
make total responses to their environment in such a way as to main- 
tain their integrity and satisfy their desires. But if we press the 
question and ask just where. in or near the living individual, mind 
is to be located, we must acknowledge that in man some kind of brain 
action is a condition of mental life. For example, suppose a patient 
responds to the doctor's request to give his name. We can trace the 
course of the nervous impulse with considerable assurance through 
the big eighth nerve to the ganglia at the base of the brain, and 
through the basal ganglia to the appropriate projection area of the 
temporal convolution. From this point to the transmission of the 
efferent impulse we are unable to trace with equal assurance the 
physiological process. But we may be quite certain that fairly wide- 
spread cortical activity is involved, that this activity is of an 
orderly character, and that the peculiar fluid integration which we 
call consciousness is closely related to this orderly and widespread 
cortical process.
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But let us press our question even further and ask at the 
various levels whether consciousness resides there. We answer in 
the words of Professor Dodges
We shall make the somewhat disconcerting discovery 
that consciousness resides nowhere in the neural 
chain. It can hardly be in the ear, for if the 
ear is isolated from the brain there is no aware- 
ness of sounds. For a similar reason it is not 
in the big eighth nerve, nor in the basal ganglia, 
nor even in the relevant temporal convolution. 
Each of these links is essential, but each may be 
intact without awareness of sounds if it is isolated 
from the rest of the nervous system. Something 
occurs in each link of this chain of neural events 
that is much like what occurred in the preceding 
one. In no link is consciousness found, yet some- 
thing happens in the final one that is capable of 
being included in that form of integration which 
we call consciousness and in the relatively more 
permanent and more inclusive integration which we 
call mind. There is no necessity for this inclusion. 
It is more or less completely absent in sleep and 
under the influence of such narcotics as chloroform 
or ether.-^
Now, refusing to be satisfied with the crude doctrine 
that mental process is in some way conditioned by brain action, let
us be very persistent and asks What kind of action in the brain
2
actually conditions mental events? Remembering, as shown above,
that even cortical disturbances, if isolated, do not give rise to
experience or behaviour we may reply, in the words of Professor
g 
Dodge, "Apparently, the answer must be that not the brain itself
but some form of integration that may go on there is the real con-
4 
dition of mental processes."
1. Dodges Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability 
(1931), pp. 157-158.
2. Cf. supra, section 6.
3. Cf. supra, section 2.
4. Dodge: Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability 
(1931), p. 160.
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If now we have discovered that mental integration depends 
not upon a particular kind of stuff but upon its peculiar system- 
atization we may ask, as a final question, whether there is any 
evidence that elsewhere in the universe there are conditions for a 
similar form of systematization of any factors whatsoever. In reply 
to this question Professor Dodge states what he calls "the great 
hypothesis." He says:
Dynamic cumulative integration is a common phenomenon 
within the limits of our knowledge. Recapitulation 
is certainly rarer. It apparently recurs in the 
development of the embryo and possibly in some astrono- 
mical events. The hypothesis is not entirely fantastic 
that each embryo, as it grows and develops, recapitu- 
lating the history of its race, represents a conscious 
moment in some supra-individual mindt and that each 
developing nebula conditions an idea in some spirit of 
the universe.1
Professor Dodge thinks that with our present state of 
scientific knowledge we may go no farther than this. But we 
wonder whether in the light of the view of evolution which we 
attempted to present above, we may not be justified in suggesting 
that, in the cosmic evolutionary process, viewed as a whole, 
and of which we are self-conscious parts, we may find that unitary, 
dynamic, cumulative, recapitulative integration which we find 
characteristic of the mind of man.





The role of the instincts in motivating the activity of organ- 
isms is recognized, they are defined in terms of urges rather 
than action-patterns, and Drever f s psychological classification 
of them is adopted. Although in instinct-experience the meaning 
of an object or situation is at first only affective, with 
successive presentations it becomes systematized with cognitive 
and conative elements of experience in such a way that when 
certain elements of the associative system so formed (signs or 
symbols) are presented or re-presented in consciousness they 
tend to re-activate the whole system to which they belong 
(meaning). Perry f s view that interest creates value is re- 
jected and interest is held to be instrumental, at the per- 
ceptual level of mind, in apprehending value, but, on the 
conceptual level its efficacy as an instrument of apprehension 
is transcended by rational insight. The energies of the 
organism may be marshalled in support of an impulse which en- 
counters an obstacle in the way of its expression and so give 
rise to an unpleasant state of tension which, if the obstacle 
is not surmounted, gives rise to prolonged emotional discom- 
fort, or, if it is, flows off in joyous activity* One or more 
emotions may be associated with an idea or group of ideas to 
form a mental disposition (sentiment) of such a character that 
when the ideational core is re-activated some or all of the 
associated emotions re-appear. When the object of a sentiment 
is understood, consciously accepted, and defines for the self 
a goal it becomes an ideal and as such receives the support 
of the whole self in its realization. Three levels of mental 
activity are distinguished: (l) the perceptual level (the level 
of moment-to-moment existence), (2) the ideational level (the 
level of memory and imagination, (3) the conceptual level 
(the level of reflective thought). Personality is the whole 
mental system, conscious and unconscious while the self is 
the harmoniously organized and accepted dominant system with which 
consciousness is associated.
The previous chapter was devoted to the consideration 
of certain basic assumptions of a philosophical nature which are 
fundamental to the point of view of our study. The present 
chapter deals with its psychological groundwork.
35.
9« Native Tendencies
Let us suppose that we are watching a novice as he tries 
to build up a conditioned reflex in a dog. He brings in his dog, 
sounds an electric bell and at the appropriate time shows the dog 
some meat. We notice that the dog appears quite indifferent to 
the sight of food and the attempt to condition the salivary 
secretions to the sound of the bell entirely fails. We discover 
later that the dog had just had his dinner. The stimulus does not 
seem to be the only important factor. Motivation is necessary. 
Again and again in Pavolov's writings we come across the phrase
"hungry dog." And one has only to look into Thorndike's or
2
Koehler 1 s writings to realize the tremendous importance of moti- 
vation in experimenting with animals. As we have already seen in
3 Chapter I, this motivation comes from within. And it is not
only the condition of all activity in animals but of all activity 
and of all experience in men. Professor Drever suggests that if 
a developed intelligence suddenly fell passionless, moved t>y no 
desire, felt no pleasure or pain, hoped nothing, feared nothing, 
loved nothing, hated nothing, it would surely die, "for it could
never cognize a single object, it could never perceive, and it is
4 doubtful how far it could even experience."
These interests and motives can be modified, blended with 
one another in new combinations which are genuine novelties, and
1. Thorndike: The Original Nature of Man (1913).
2. Koehler: The Mentality of Apes (1927).
3. Vide supra, section 3.
4. Drever: Instinct in Man (I9?l), p. 133.
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perhaps increased or decreased in strength; but they can neither
be acquired nor lost. They belong to our inheritance; they are
1 
native tendencies. With Professor McDougall and Professor
2 3 
Drever we may call them instincts; or with the behaviourists
4 
we may call them habits; or with Professor Woodworth we may call
them dependable motives; or we may select some other name from the 
long list which Professor Patrick has collected* "Instinctive 
striving, purposive striving, connotation, will, wish, libido, 
desire, appetite, craving, impulse, sex, hunger, longing, the 
drive, the biological interests, the non-reflexional elements of 
experience, the 'energy influences seething and bubbling in the 
organism. 111 The very richness of our language in such terms is 
an indication of the importance of those native tendencies which 
they more or less inadequately signify.
In recent years a great conflict has raged around the 
questions of the existence and definition of instinct. There are 
two meanings of the word which are often confused. It may mean
the impulse to a certain type of activity or it may mean an inherited
6 
behaviour pattern or action system. A bird has an impulse which
leads to nest-building activity. And the various movements required 
in the building of the nest are largely determined as to form and
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918).
2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921).
3. Watson: Behaviourism (1930).
Allport: Social Psychology (1924).
4. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), Ch. VI; See pp. 246 ff.
5. Patricks What is the Mind? (1929), p. 67.
6. Ibid.,p. 70. Cf. also Drever: Psychology of Education 
(1925), p. 47.
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sequences by inherited behaviour patterns. When the psychologist 
is discussing the activities of animals low in the scale of life 
it makes little difference whether he views instinct in terms of
impulse or behaviour pattern. But at the human level it makes a
1 2 3 
great deal of difference. McDougall, Drever, and Woodworth
45 6 
define instinct in terms of impulse; James, Shand, and Thorndike
in terms of behaviour pattern, or definite response to definite 
situations. We believe that this definiteness is illusory and mis- 
leading because specific responses are not characteristic of a
7 
child's behaviour in the same way as that of a young animal.
We, therefore, take the position that instinct, if it is 
to be meaningful as a concept in human psychology, is best under- 
stood in terms of impulse, guiding cognition and accompanied by
8 
interest. Professor Drever has stated the position squarely:
Prom the bottom of the scale of life to the top we see 
unmistakable indications in an organism's behaviour 
of an impulsion or urge from within, driving the 
organism towards actions which are biologically 
essential. It is thus this inner urge that is 
characteristic of instinct at §11 levels. It is 
not a stereotyped series of actions, for which innate 
provision is made from the beginning, since this shows 
itself in the vaguest and most fragmentary manner at 
the higher levels.
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 30.
2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Chap. I, Esp. pp. 13-20.
3. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), Chap. VI.
4. James: Principles (1890).
5. Shand: Foundations of Character*
6. Thorndike: Original Nature of Man (^913).
7. Drevert Instinct in Man (1921), p. 155.
8. Ibid.,p. 20.
9. Drever and Drummond: Psychology of the Pre-School Child 
	(1930), p. 14.
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So long as we keep this distinction in mind there seems to be no 
good reason for giving up the word instinct.
Naming and classifying the instinctive tendencies of 
man has been one of the most difficult problems of psychology. 
James, Thorndike, McDougall and Drever have probably made the 
most notable contributions toward the solution of the problem. 
We have just pointed out one clear distinction which separates 
the point of view of James and Thorndike from that of McDougall 
and Drever. Drever departs from McDougall in three ways. In the 
first place he gives a psychological definition of instinct whereas 
McDougall f s original definition is physiological. McDougall de- 
fines an instinct as
an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition 
which determines its possessor to perceive, and 
pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to 
experience an emotional excitement of a particular 
quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act 
in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at , 
least, to experience an impulse to such action.
In his "Outline of Psychology," written after Drever 1 s "Instinct 
of Man" was published, McDougall drops the word "psycho-physical" 
and says in a footnote that one might qualify the word "disposition"
by mental, neural, physiological, or psycho-physical and expresses
g a preference for the latter. Drever takes a tentative view
similar to McDougall f s and defines an instinct as
an innate impelling force guiding cognition, 
accompanied by interest or emotion, and at 
least partly determining action.^
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 20
2. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), p. 110.
3. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 20.
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This, he contends, is a psychological definition whereas 
McDougall 1 s, which defines an instinct as a psycho-physical dis-
f
position, is physiological* The point is well taken and 
apparently recognized by McDougall as a just criticism since 
in later writings he drops the objectionable phrase.
Another difference between McDougall f s and Drever's 
view of instinct depends upon their conception of the relation of 
instinct to emotion* McDougall says that an instinct has three 
parts: an afferent part consisting of cognitive activity; a cen- 
tral part consisting of affective activity; and an efferent part 
consisting of conative activity. The cognitive and conative aspects 
of the instinct are capable of modification but the affective aspect 
is not. Therefore emotion is the most fundamental part of instinct. 
"Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of 
emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it; 
and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the
affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal in-
2
stincts may be called a primary emotion." Drever holds that cer- 
tain of the most powerful and fundamental human instincts are usually 
accompanied by emotional disturbances but that this association is 
not invariable; that generally emotion is greater when the instinct 
mechanism does not work smoothly; that the central core of instinct 
is interest which may develop an emotional phase; and that there
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 53 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 49. Cf. James: Principles (1890), Ch. XXV.
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are some instincts for which there are no accompanying emotions in
1 
the true sense of the word. He therefore classifies certain
instincts as "emotional" and with regard to these his views are 
similar to, though not quite the same as McDougall ! s, since he
recognizes the bipolarity of all affective activity. We shall re-
2 turn to this question in the section on emotion.
A third characteristic which distinguishes Drever 1 s treat- 
ment of instinct from that of McDougall, and others, is that he 
classifies instincts on a psychological basis. Since we accept
Professor Drever1 s view as the basis of our study it remains only
3
to present his list and classifications:


















1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 51-57. Cf. also
Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Ch. VII. 
?. Vide infra, section 12. 





















Professor Drever has clearly shown that meaning in
instinct-experience is, on its first appearance, affective rather
gthan cognitive. This interest, or "feeling of worthwhileness,"
constitutes primary meaning which may be distinguished from secondary 
meaning or significance. Significance is a "pointing forward of the
present experience to some other coming and related experience or
5 experiences." It implies synthesis, involving psychic integration,
1. We have taken the liberty of substituting the word "escape" 
here for the word "flight" which appears in the list which 
is otherwise reproduced without change from Drever 1 s "Intro- 
duction to the Psychology of Education." Our reason for 
making the substitution is the fact that Drever himself does 
so in a later work. See Drever and Drummondr The Psychology 
of the Pre-School Child (1950), pp. 24 ff.
2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Ch. VI.
3. Ibid., p. 131.
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and hence past experience. Whereas primary meaning is affective 
only, secondary meaning is both affective and cognitive, and in- 
clusive of significance. Meaning is a relation, and instinct 
interest, or primary meaning, is the felt relation of an object 
to an impulse which it determines. And secondary meaning "is 
essentially based upon primary meaning, both as regards its affec- 
tive, and as regards its cognitive aspect, for a whole is a whole 
and a part a part, in cognitive meaning, only through the funda- 
mental relation to the self, that is, through primary meaning or
g 
interest." We shall have occasion again to note the importance
of interest when we come to consider the topic of value.
The phrase "secondary meaning" is a short-hand symbol 
for the fact that some detail or fragment of an antecedent situation 
may become adequate to touch off a consequent of the type formerly
evoked by the more complex antecedent of which the now potent frag-
5 
ment was then but a part. Thus signification or secondary meaning
has four factors: (l) the present cue or item which we may call the 
sign; (2) the instigative potency, stimulus value, or signifying 
power of the sign; (5) the response or consequent, the significance, 
which the present cue instigates; (4) the former context, the signi- 
fied, for which the present sign is a surrogate, and of which it was
4 
a partial or concurrent detail.
1. Cf. Morgans Emergent Evolution (1923); Ch. IV.
2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921). p. 141.
3. Hollingwortht Psychology (1928), p. 5; Cf. also Ch. H.
4. Ibid,, pp. 146-147.
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Professor Hollingworth points out how the classical 
theories of meaning have each exalted one or another of these 
factors.
The transcendental 1 theory noted the very 
important fact that the present item functions 
for something larger than itself. The 'fringe 1 
theory noted that the term 'context' is al?/ays 
applicable to a meaningful situation. The 
'motor 1 theory observed that the consequent 
often is actually an overt movement on the part 
of an organism. The 'suggestion 1 theory 
correctly observed that meaning always does in- 
volve sequences, in which one event instigates 
another. The 'soul structure' theory noted, 
what is actually a fact, that that which gives 
the sign its significance is not usually any 
describable present pattern in nature, and yet 
it is effectively registered. But this theory 
located the effective context 'in the soul' 
rather than in the part.
These theories usually proceed as though the one exalted 
factor described the fullness of meaning. But meaning does not 
consist of one or another of these factors in isolation. If the 
mind is a dynamic, cumulative, recapitulative integration, then 
the presentation of any cue or sign revives the whole past more or 
less completely and issues in activity which may be preponderantly 
conative, affective, or cognitive, but never exclusively one nor
another. Depending upon the manner of its former organization in
g the field of experience a recurring fragment may arouse emotion,
suggest an image, or stimulate overt activity of some sort as in 
the case of sentiments, associated ideas, and habits. And on a 
still higher level meanings are organized into systems which we 
call ideals, concepts, and purposes.
1. Hollingworth: Psychology (1928), p. 147.
?.. Koehler: Gestalt Psychology (1929), Ch. VIII; esp. p. 300.
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Such organization would be Impossible without the use 
of symbols. Any cue or sign possessing instigative potency or 
signifying power by virtue of its organization as a fragment of 
previous experience is a symbol. Some symbols act as dynamic 
centers of growing systematizations of ideas, interests, emotions, 
impulses, action patterns, etc. Such symbols may be of various 
kinds, as objects, motions, postures, words, etc. An individual 
may and usually does have private symbols, understood and used by
himself alone to represent systems of meaning which are more or
1
less personal and private. Probably most of our symbols are
understood and used by groups. Examples of such socially accepted
symbols are ceremonies, flags, languages, etc. Ogden and Richards
in an interesting study of the science of the symbolism of language
have shown that it has two major functions, namely, the represen-
g
tation of facts and the expression of attitudes. These are called,
3 
respectively, the symbolic and the emotive use of language. This
is an extremely important distinction in the study of religion and 
we shall have occasion to return to it more than once in our dis- 
cussion.
1. Of. Hollingworth1 s description of a general planning a 
campaigns As he stands before the map, having noted the 
position of the enemy and of his own troops, "a slow 
backward movement of the hand conveniently represents a 
steady retreat." Ejye movements and right and left have 
their various meanings, etc. Psychology (1928), p. 138.
2. Ogden and Richards: The Meaning of Meaning (1923), pp. 356 ff,
3. Of. Wieman: Religious IJbcperience and the Scientific Method 
(1926), Ch. II, pp. 48 ff. 
Of. also Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), p. 307.
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11. Value
There seems to be no doubt at nil that primary meaning
and primary value, as qualifying experience at the perceptual
1 level, are both rooted in interest or the feeling of worthwhileness.
2 This view is ably defended by Professor Perry who expands it into
a general theory of value and argues that interest constitutes 
value. He writes?
Interest is not an immediate cognition of value 
qualities in its object, but is made of the 
organism, enacted, sensed, or possibly felt, 
and qualifying the object through being a 
response to it. To like or dislike an object 
is to create that object's value. To be aware 
that one likes or dislikes an object is to 
cognize that object*s value. But this aware- 
ness is no more (or no less) an interest than 
any other awareness whatsoever. And even if 
it be an interest it is not that interest which 
is its value-object.
Or as he phrases his view in a later work, "Value in the generic
4 sense attaches promiscuously to all objects of all interests."
In opposition to Professor Perry's general theory,
5 Professor John Laird raises two pertinent objections. In the
first place, he urges the importance of the principle of non- 
indifference in nature below the level of consciousness and
1. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), Ch. VI, p. 133.
2. Perry: The Definition of Value. Jrnl. Phil. Psych., 
Vol. II (1914). 
Perry? General Theory of Value (1926).
3. Perryt The Definition of Value r Jrnl. Phil. Psych., Vol. II 
(1914), p. 153.
4. Perry: General Theory of Value (1926), p. 28.
5. Lairds The Idea of Value (1929).
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therefore below the level of interest, and he calls this the 
principle of Natural Election. Then he asks whether, since 
natural election admittedly provides the context for psycholog- 
ical interest, it may not constitute the value in which
psychological interest may indeed participate but which need
g
not be mental at all.
Mr. Perry thinks that the very meaning of value 
reveals something notably characteristic of man; 
and Mr. Prall (also an advocate of the Interest 
theory)* has a predilection for values which are 
notably characteristic of cats. Yet why should 
either of them stop where he does? If cats why 
not beetles, and if beetles, why not potatoes, 
and if potatoes why not magnets and filings? 
Magnets do concern filings; and if it does not 
matter whether or not we are aware of our likings, 
why should it matter whether or not there are any 
likings at all. If things are consumed with and 
take account of, one another, is not that enough? 
So far as I can see it is a mere dogma that values 
are peculiarly characteristic either of men or 
of cats. 4
Professor Laird 1 s second objection to Perry's view is 
that Perry's standards of value cannot really be derived from a 
subjective principle of preference without presupposing rational 
insight into values, or timblogy.
Clearly, preference is a fact, whether the 
preference be psychological or in the way of 
natural election. In considering the undoubted 
fact of it, however, we are faced with the 
entire problem with which this book has been 
occupied. Is the fact of preference mere brute
1. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), pp. 92 ff. Professor 
Laird quotes from Bacon and from Whitehead: Science and 
the Modern World (1925), p. 52.
2. Ibid., p. 106.
3. Prall: A Study in the Theory of Value.
4. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), p. 107.
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circumstance and nothing more, or can certain 
preferences be justified in a rational way? 
Our conclusion was that our preferences are 
justified if we prefer what is a greater 
excellence in the timological sense. Other- 
wise they simply express the brute circumstance 
of private or racial constitution.-^-
Both these objections against the view that interest 
constitutes value seem to be entirely justified. The appreciative 
view is a half-way house between natural election and timology, 
and it cannot be a satisfactory basis for a general theory of 
value. And yet interest is in fundamental relation to the generic 
meaning of value. This relation we believe is not understandable 
apart from the evolutionary standpoint. We had occasion to point 
out at some length in Chapter I the fitness of the environment, 
and the importance of the organic view of the universe. At the 
level of natural election things take account of one another and
make a difference to one another in measurably, though not entirely,
2 
predictable ways. At the perceptual level of life interest is
emergent and we believe that at this level interest is the means 
through which an organism becomes aware of values5 not that interest 
constitutes values. Perhaps even at the perceptual level there is 
not a one to one correlation between values and interests. If 
there were, what need would there be for evolutionary advancement?
On the reflective level interest is still active but it 
is supported by an invaluable ally, namely, intelligence or reason. 
At the perceptual level, affective-volitional experience or interest
1. Laird: The Idea of Value (1929), p. 359.
2. For discussion of levels of mental activity see below, 
section 15.
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is the only means which the organism has of apprehending value. 
But at the conceptual or reflective level of mind, values are 
open to apprehension by rational insight. But as everyone knows, 
when a person is in a situation the values of which he tries to 
see and to judge objectively by way of reason, he finds that his 
interests constantly tempt him to prejudicial conclusions and 
tend to trip him up in his logic. This shows quite clearly that 
interest is not superceded by reason.
On the other hand, things not interesting in themselves 
come to possess value as means to an end which is judged as worth- 
ful; and other things which are interesting in themselves de- 
crease in value because of the harmful results which we learn to 
associate with them. At the reflective level, according to Lloyd 
Morgan, objective values have emergent status in the evolutionary 
advance of reference, and appreciation has emergent status in 
the evolutionary advance of enjoyment. Furthermore any system 
which has intrinsic value is said to possess worthwhile the items 
which go together to make up the system are said to possess ob- 
jective value in virtue of their relation to the worthful systems 
as a whole. And these worthful systems may go together with other 
related systems in the richer unity of a higher synthesis, taking 
their places as values in the larger worthful system. Applying 
this principle we work up by successive steps to that system of
49.
practical endeavour or of thought which has greatest and most
1 
dominant worth.
We believe that this view harmonizes the views of 
timology, psychological interest, and natural election, and 
supports the view of the universe as possessing a rational and 
objective system of value.
12. Emotion
Since the publication of William James 1 famous article
2 
on "What is an Emotion?" in "Mind11 in 1884 and of the translation
5
of G. C. Lange's physiological study of the emotions about the
same time, much speculation and some experimentation regarding the 
nature of emotion has been carried on, and some progress has been 
made toward the solution of this important question. James says,
The bodily changes follow directly the perception 
of the exciting fact, and...our feeling of the 
same changes as they occur is emotion.
Lange argues that emotion consists exclusively of the functional 
disturbances of the body, that if you take away the bodily symptoms 
of a frightened person no fear is left, and that emotions can be 
brought on by physical means, for example by drinking alcohol.
1. Morgan: Life. Mind and Spirit (1926), Sec. 45, pp. 261 ff.
2. James: What Is An Emotion? Mind, 1884, Vol. IX, pp. 188- 
205. Reprinted in Psychology Classics, Vol. I.
3. Lange: The Emotions. A Psychophysiological Study. 
Reprinted in Psychology Classics, Vol. I.
4. James: What Is An Emotion? Psychology Classics, Vol. I, p. 13.
5. Lange: The Emotions. A Psychophvsiological Study. 
Psychology Classics, Vol. I, p. 67.
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If the James-Lange theory were true then emotion could 
be properly described in terms of sensation, i.e., sensations of 
an organic state. But certain experiments make the theory seem 
extremely doubtful. Sherrington found that by cutting certain 
nerves he could deprive a dog of nearly all sensations from the
interior of the trunk but that the dog f s emotions after the
1 
operation were as evident as ever. Cannon cut the sympathetic
nerves in a cat thus rendering impossible the whole organic state
dependent upon these nerves and still the cat showed all the evi-
2 
dences of anger just as before. Furthermore, Cannon and Maranon
injected adrenalin into human subjects thereby artificially in- 
ducing the organic state which prevails in emotion; but although
some of the subjects reported a feeling of excitement, the actual
3 
emotion was not produced. Cannon has shown that the organic states
characteristic of anger and fear also occur in strenuous muscular 
activity such as running a race, and that the presence of such a 
state does not condition the feeling of emotion. So the evidence 
seems to be conclusive that emotion does not depend upon sensation 
of an organic state, nor upon the existence of the organic state,
although the existence of the organic state may "set the stage,"
4 so to speak, for the appearance of the emotion.
1. Sherringtons Integrative Action of the Nervous System 
(1906), p. 259.
2. Cannon: Neural Organization for Emotional Expression, 
Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 262.
3. Cannon and Maranon: American Journal of Psychology (1927), 
Vol. 39, p. 106.
4. Cf. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 308.
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Claparede has suggested a modification of the James- 










III, Modified Peripheral Theory
1. Perception
2. Attitude (of flight)
3. Feeling (of danger)
4. Organic Reactions
5. Emotion (fear)
IV. Flight Without Emotion
1. Perception
2. Attitude (of flight)
3. Feeling (of danger)
4. Flight
This schematic presentation reveals at once two im- 
portant points for our theory of emotion. One is that when 
escape from a dangerous situation is both immediate and entirely 
successful such reaction may occur without arousing any feeling 
of emotion at all. The second important point is his view of 
the relation of emotion to feeling.
Let us discuss these two points in the order given. 
First, prompt and successful escape may occur without arousing
1. Claparede: Feelings and Emotions. Wittenberg Symposium 
(1928), p. 133.
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fear. The presumption then is that if escape is either delayed 
or difficult then the emotion of fear will almost certainly develop. 
This is exactly the view which Claparede maintains: "Emotion occurs 
only when action is not possible," he says. He then proceeds to 
criticize McDougall f s theory that every instinct has a primary
emotion as its core and says that it is more just to say that emotion
2
is the miscarriage of conduct. Similar views are widely held. In
the Wittenberg Symposium, Howard, following Kantor, says, "Emotion
3 means frustration of adaptive behaviour." Carr refers to an
emotional situation as "one for which there is no appropriate response
4 or one to which we are unable to respond for the time being." With
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Carr's view Woodworth, Drever, and Cannon would be in agreement.
Concerning the nature and function of emotion, Cannon, 
through psycho-physiological experiments, has shown that: (l) The 
muscular and neuro-visceral arrangement for the display of the 
emotions has its central control in or near a phylogenetically 
ancient part of the brain, the dptic thalamus; (2) When the cortical 
government is set aside, the subordinate activities, released from
1. Claparede: Feelings and Emotions. Wittenberg Symposium 
(1928), p. 126.
2. Ibid., p. 127.
5, Howard: A Functional Theory of the Bnotiona. Wittenberg 
Symposium (1928), p. 141.
4. Carr: The Differentia of an Emotion. Wittenberg Symposium 
(1928), p. 234.
5. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 309.
6. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 157.
7. Cannon: Neural Organization for Emotional Expression,, 
Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 258.
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inhibition, become prominent, and the emotion becomes intense; 
(5) Neural mechanisms for the primitive emotions operate in a 
region outside the range of consciousness, which is associated 
with the functioning of the cortical neurons. (This explains 
emotional seizures, emotional dissociation); (4) Emotion as given 
in consciousness does not result from sensations received from
the viscera but arises by irradiation from the thalamus, or by
1 
direct connections.
Thus we conclude: (1) that emotion serves as a bodily 
preparation for activity and a reinforcement of impulse and in- 
terest; (2) that this reinforcement is needed (a) where an obstacle
is to be surmounted, or (b) where a prolonged course in finding
2the appropriate reaction is necessary; and (3) that it may be so
intense as to cause dissociation of one impulse from the other
3 
impulses and from intelligent guidance of activity.
We may now return to the second point suggested by
Claparede f s schema, viz., that the difference between feeling and
4 
emotion is one of degree. If he suggests it, Pieron says it.
This question of the relation between feeling and emotion is one 
to which much attention has been given by psychologists. Probably 
no better treatment of it can be found than Professor Drever f s.
1. The Wittenberg Symposium (1928), pp. 263-269, Cf. the 
much extended evidence also in his second edition of 
Bodily Changes (1929); esp. Chs. XVIII and XIX.
2. Drever: Instinct in Man (1921), p. 161.
3. Ibid.,p. 271.
4. Pi4ron: Emotions in Animals and Man, Wittenberg Symposium 
(1928), p. 286.
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The most elementary form of affective experience, he says, is 
subjective, bipolar excitement qualified as pleasant or un- 
pleasant. Emotion differs from elementary affective experience:
1 
(1) in complexity, because it involves conative elements and
sensation elements due to organic resonance (Claparede calls it
2
the gestalt of complicated bodily response); and (2) in dis- 
sociation as distinguished from inhibition by drainage. But 
emotion is like elementary affective experience in its bipolar!ty. 
The instinct-feeling may pass immediately into the emotional phase 
but is still bipolar, "exhibiting one polarity or the other, 
according as the conative impulse moves freely and rapidly towards 
its satisfaction, or is retarded or obstructed." Joy and sorrow 
are the bipolar forms of affective experience in its emotional
phase as pleasure and unpleasure are the bipolar forms of elementary
3 
affective experience.
By way of summary we may present the following schema, 
which may be compared with Claparede 1 s: 
I. Emotional Situation:
1. Perception, involving
a. Cognition of significant stimulus
b. Impulse (to escape)
c. Feeling (of value or worthwhileness)
2. Conflict, delay or difficulty
3. Emotion (of fear), involving
a. Tension (reinforcing impulse of flight)
b. Dissociation
c. Bodily responses
1. Cf. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 387, footnote.
2. Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 128.
3. Drevert Instinct in Man (1921), pp. 269-272.
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4. Unexpected escape
5. Relief, or the joy phase of emotion 
II. Unemotional Situation:
1. Perception, involving
a. Cognition of significant stimulus
b. Impulse (to escape)
c. Feeling (of value or worthwhileness)
2. Immediate and satisfactory escape 
If intelligence entirely fails and emotional dis- 
sociation becomes complete, overt activity is turned into a 
blind struggle. Such an extreme form of emotion is probably 
always harmful and never valuable, especially in human life.
But milder forms of emotion may involve just enough dissociation
2 to keep an important situation in the focus of consciousness,
or to enable a person to throw himself with abandon into overt
5 
activity; and they may give rise to bodily changes which "are
directly serviceable in making the organism more effective in
the violent display of energy which fear or rage or pain may in-
4 volve." The bodily changes are valuable as preparations even
5 if not properly directed in activity.
But just here is one of the most difficult and important 
questions of psychology, ethics and religion, viz., the systemati- 
zation and direction of the emotional life. We shall return to
1. Pilron: Wittenberg Symposium (1928), p. 291.
2. Of. Dr. Morton Prince's remarks, Wittenberg Symposium (1928), 
p. 148. Also, The Unconscious (1914), pp. 452-454.
3. Woodwortht Psychology (1929). p. 309.
4. Cannons Bodily Changes (1929), p. 226.
5. Ibid,, p. 241.
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this question in our discussion of sentiment (section 15). It
is only necessary to summarize here some of the more important
1 
types of situations in which emotion is likely to appears
(1) during fever or intoxication, when the cortex is partly 
thrown out of function; (2) when the organic state is strong and 
lively; (3) when the situation is unclear, so that observation 
gets no facts to guide action; (4) when the goal has been reached 
and there is nothing to do but to burst forth in joy; (5) when 
the situation cannot be handled successfully and failure ensues; 
(6) where resistance is encountered; and (7) when the object of 
a complex or sentiment is involved,
15. Sentiment
One of the most important facts of psychology is that 
emotions with their conative forces become linked with ideas. 
This association is important with respect to ideas because it 
gives them power; and with respect to the emotions because it is 
the means of their organization and control. "Without the im- 
pulse of a linked emotion ideas would be lifeless, dead, inert,
gincapable of determining conduct." But the force derived from
an associated emotion makes for their stronger registration and 
conservation in memory and gives them intensity and conative in- 
fluence. At the same time, the organization of emotions is
1. Cf. Woodworth: Psychology (1929), p. 509.
2. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 450.
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essential for self-control and regulation of conduct, and becomes
1 
a safeguard against mental, physiological, and social chaos.
The association of an idea with an emotion arises out 
of experience and is preserved as a mental system. This disposi- 
tion born of one or more experiences with a certain object and
tending to the arousal of a certain pattern or combination of
2 
emotions is termed a sentiment. Shand first pointed out that
the word "sentiment" should be reserved in psychology for mental
systems or dispositions involving the association of one or more
5 
emotions with an object. And he is followed by many psychologists
4 56 including McDougall, Morton Prince, Drever, and others. Shand
does not, however, seem to be clear with respect to one point which 
the following quotation from Professor Drever clears up: "It is 
only when it functions in conscious process that any sentiment can
be described as an idea associated with emotional tendencies. The
7emotional idea is function, not structure." Of course, the senti- 
ment as disposition, giving rise to emotion when activated, is re- 
garded as structural in character. The emotional accompaniment is 
functional.
1. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 451. Cf. McDougall: 
Social Psychology (1918), p. 164.
2. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 55.
3. Shand: Character and the Emotions. Mind, Vol. V., (1896), 
pp. 217 ff. Also, Foundations of Character (1914), Ch. IV.
4. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 126, 164.
5. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 449. (Prince says that a 
sentiment is an idea linked with an instinct, by which he means 
to emphasize the conative as well as the affective aspect of 
the system).
6. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 76.
7. Ibid., p. 112. Cf. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), 
pp. 126 ff.
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Sentiments may be classified either according to
1 2X affective and conative tendencies (McDougall and Shand ) or
5 according to the nature of their objects (McDougall). In the
former classification there are three types of sentiments, namely, 
the love or approach type, the hate or aversion type, and respect. 
Sentiments of the first type involve a favorable attitude toward 
and liking for an object. Sentiments of hate express aversion. 
And respect is like love except that it includes no tender emotion 
and is principally composed of the positive and negative self- 
tendencies. McDougall f s classification of sentiments according 
to the nature of their objects also includes three types: Con- 
crete particular, concrete general, and abstract, illustrated 
respectively by love of a child, love of children in general, and 
love of justice or virtue. Later writers on the subject have 
apparently found the classification of sentiments according to 
their conative tendencies more useful and our discussion will 
follow that scheme rather than the second.
As we have already suggested, sentiments have a life 
history. They arise out of experience. An emotional experience, 
of fear, for example, may be so violent that afterwards even the 
thought of the object about which the experience was centered will 
give rise to the emotion. In such a case we say that a sentiment 
has been formed by one experience. But the origin of a sentiment
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 165.
2. Shand: Foundations of Character (1914), pp. 57 ff.
3. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 167.
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is normally more gradual and its development requires many ex- 
periences in which the emotion and object are associated. The 
rule is that "when any one of the emotions is strongly or re- 
peatedly excited by a particular object, there is formed the
1 
rudiment of a sentiment." A further stage is reached where
the mere idea of the object becomes capable of producing the 
same effects as its presence. Drever holds that it is only at
this stage or level (the ideational level) that an emotional com-
2 
plex should be called a sentiment. Whether we use one name for
emotional complexes on the perceptual and ideational levels or 
use different names, to distinguish between them, is a matter of 
terminology. But the distinction is valid and important and we 
shall maintain Professor Drever 1 s usage except where special 
attention is called to the departure. McDougall himself says that
a sentiment will not long exist in its rudimentary state, but
5 
tends to develop into a more complexly organized state/
McDougall ! s description of the development j>f the senti- 
ment of parental love has deservedly become a classic and since it 
is so important in developing our point of view with respect to 
the development of the religious sentiment, the writer begs leave 
to quote him at length:
By reason of its helplessness, its delicacy, its 
distresses, the young child evokes sooner or later 
the tender emotion of the parent, if he is at all
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 168.
2. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 75-76.
5. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 167.
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capable of this emotion; and if the parent does 
not, through laziness or under the influence of 
a bad tradition, restrain the protective impulse, 
it finds its satisfaction in a series of tender 
acts. Each time the emotion and its impulse are 
brought into operation by this particular object 
they are rendered more easily excitable in the 
same way, until the mere idea of this object is 
constantly accompanied by the emotion, however 
feeble. This gives the object a special power of 
attracting and holding the attention of the parent, 
who therefore constantly notices the child's ex- 
pressions; and these evoke by sympathetic reactions 
the corresponding feelings and emotions in the 
parent. Thus all the tender and attracting emotions 
are repeatedly aroused by this one object, either 
singly or in combination - pity, wonder, admiration, 
gratitude, as well as sympathetic pain and pleasure, 
and quick anger at injury or neglect of the child 
by others....... But this is not all: the parent
is apt to identify the child with himself in a 
peculiarly intimate way, for he knows that the 
world in general regards its qualities and its de- 
fects as, in a sense, his own; and so his self- 
regarding sentiment of respect or of pride becomes 
directly extended to the child; whatever is admirable 
about it brings satisfaction to his positive self- 
feeling; whatever is defective humbles him, excites 
his negative self-feeling; its shame or disgrace is 
his shame, its triumphs are his triumphs...... To
all this must be added yet another factor - every 
effort and every sacrifice made on the child's be- 
half, every pain suffered through it, adds to the 
strength of the sentiment, for with each such inci- 
dent we feel that we put something of ourselves into 
the object of the sentiment, and this sense of the 
accumulation of our efforts and sacrifices gives it 
an additional value; we come to regard it as an 
investment in which we have sunk our capital bit by 
bit, to lose which would be to lose that which em- 
bodies our past efforts. In this way the child 
becomes identified with ourselves, so that, as with 
any other thing, such as a work of art, or science, 
to the shaping of which our best powers have been 
devoted, approval of it gives us pleasure and dis- 
approval pain, equally with approval or disapproval 
of ourselves.^
1. McDougallr Social Psychology (1918), pp. 170-172.
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The parental sentiment, growing thus out of a developing 
experience which is itself conditioned upon the growing sentiment 
for and the response of the child which is its object, comes to 
fruition in its completest form in the fusion of the altruistic and 
the self sentiments. It may exist, however, as wholly or at least 
predominantly of one or the other of the two types. McDougall 
suggests that the mother of a mentally defective child may not be 
able to take any pride in it and yet may cherish it with an emotion 
which is almost purely tender. And a father 1 s sentiment for his 
children may be little or not at all tender but merely or pre- 
dominantly an extension of his self-regarding sentiment. Sentiments 
are thus seen to vary according to the different emotions which
enter into their composition and according to the relative strength
2
of the various component elements.
5 
From our study of the function of emotion it is clear that
when any sentiment is awakened by a stimulus its conative force is 
discharged in three directions: (l) it tends to reinforce the im- 
pulse to a certain kind of activity; (2) it generally excites 
visceral functions preparing the body for activity; (3) it tends 
to inhibit the conflicting conative forces of such other emotions 
as would enforce activity in antagonistic directions. It is probable 
that rarely does any situation awaken only one impulse to activity 
without conflicting tendencies. The secondary tendencies are often
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 172.
2. Conklin: Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 66.
3. Vide supra, section 12.
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so weak as to create no serious problem, the rule being stated by
Morton Prince as follows: "Any affective state may be suppressed
1 
by conflict with another and stronger affective state." Many
illustrations of this rule might be given. Even a timid mother has 
no fear for herself when her child is threatened. Love may be 
suppressed by jealousy or anger; anger by parental instinct; respect 
by hatred; fear by anger, curiosity, or wonder; sex by anger or 
fear; anger, fear, self-assertion, play, etc., by the intense 
emotions of the religious sentiment. From these observations it can 
be easily seen that the organization of the emotions into sentiments 
is of extreme importance in the regulation of our conduct and forms 
the fundamental basis upon which all our judgments of the character 
and probable conduct of others are based. Our characters are 
qualified by the manner in which our instinctive and emotional ten- 
dencies are organized and the relative strength of the various 
components of our many sentiments and mental systems. The questions 
of conflict and systernatization will be further discussed in the 
section dealing with personality (section 16).
14. Ideals
Take now the ideal. How is it related to the 
sentiment? It is the sentiment raised to a higher 
self-conscious level. A sentiment, say, of love of 
justice - how developed it is not necessary here 
to inquire - becomes an ideal of justice, when 
the abstract idea of justice defines for the in- 
dividual an end, which he consciously accepts for
1. Prince: The Unconscious (1914), p. 455.
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himself and identifies with the self in the 
sense already explained, (i.e., when he has 
the belief and intention that so far as in 
him lies he is going to carry out a certain 
line of action^).
 
As instincts and crude emotions are operative at the perceptual 
level and sentiments with their attached affects and conative 
impulses at the ideational level, ideals with the emotional tone 
and volitional power of the whole self are operative at the 
concept!onal level.
Professor Charters defines an ideal as "a trait (i.e., a
characteristic or quality of character) which has become the ob-
3 
ject of desire." But obviously, one may desire a certain
character trait without intending to achieve it and believing 
that one will do so, i.e., without identifying, in imagination, 
the self with the ideal desired. To define ideal in terms of 
desire is to leave it on the ideational level, whereas our con- 
ception of an ideal involves the conscious understanding and 
acceptance of a certain type of activity as desirable and the
identification of the self with that activity with the intention to
4 achieve it. It thus becomes, in Professor Hadfield*s words
1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), p. 138.
2. Ibid., p. 136.
3. Charters: The Teaching of Ideals (1928), p. 33.
4. Cf. Amesr The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), 
p. 285. "That which makes an end or ideal of action 
moral is the fact that it is accepted with awareness; 
that it is compared with other ends; that it is analyzed; 
and that it is voluntarily chosen as good."
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"the adequate stimulus of the will, the stimulus which is
peculiarly adapted to arouse the self into activity," and at
1 
least promises to lead to the satisfaction of the whole individual.
By means of the individuals ideals his conscious intelli- 
gence becomes operative in his own development, self-criticism and 
remaking. In them he supplies himself with the solutions of ex- 
tremely intricate and difficult problems of conduct even before 
the situations involving these problems are confronted. When 
highly developed they involve the most complex and profound emotion 
and command the entire conative power of the whole organized self. 
When activated they are able to inhibit the activity of un-allied 
instincts and sentiments and sometimes are in such conflict with 
native tendencies and emotional complexes that they suppress the 
latter and even expel them from the organization of the self, 
giving rise to those conditions of repression which are the sources 
of the phenomena with which pathological psychology deals. Their 
satisfaction is the source of that deep and lasting joy, which we 
call happiness and their failure of the profound sorrow which is 
unhappiness.
In view of our problem in the next chapter of defining 
the nature of religion it is necessary here to develop a little 
more in detail the relation between ideals and sentiments. We 
may ask whether a sentiment, say, of love for another person, is
1. Hadfield: Psychology and Morals (1923), Ch. XI, p. 76,
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capable of development on the conceptual level and whether if 
it is it should still be called a sentiment; i.e., is love 
always a sentiment or may it be also an ideal?
It is the view of the writer that love may be an ideal, 
that its highest form is natural to the conceptual level of life. 
Just as the sentiment of the love of justice becomes an ideal 
when the idea of justice becomes a consciously accepted end iden- 
tified with the self, so the sentiment of love for a person becomes 
an ideal when the welfare of the beloved person defines for the 
lover an end consciously understood, desired, accepted, and 
identified with himself. This is ideal love (conceptual level) 
as contrasted with sentimental love (ideational level). Senti- 
mental love is blind; it cannot see the faults of the beloved 
because the perception of them is suppressed by admiration, tender- 
ness and pride. That the beloved one is perfect is a cherished 
illusion which renders almost impossible any real community of 
mind or any progress in self-knowledge and development of the 
partners through mutual understanding and criticism, and which 
threatens the very permanence of the sentiment itself, since the 
suppressed criticisms gather force and tend to erupt in a manner
which is likely to overthrow the sentiment altogether or to destroy
g 
its value.
Ideal love, on the other hand, cherishes no illusions, 
but gazes with frank and open eyes at the whole life of the
1. For discussion of mental levels see below, section 15.
2. Wieraan: Religious Experience and the Scientific Method 
(1926), p. 92.
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beloved - the individual of the past, present and future, of 
many times and places. In the beloved, love sees the best be- 
neath the apparent worst and has the power to awaken the best 
and to make it live and grow in recreative power; and in the 
beloved when he is at his best, love also sees the worst and 
through sharing its consequences overcomes its power. The 
standard which ideal love understands, accepts, and works for 
in the beloved, is the harmony and complete development of the 
person. Love of persons thus takes on, at the conceptual level, 
creative and transforming impulse and power. It becomes the 
way of salvation and of life.
For its fullest and most complete realization ideal 
love requires the long continued and intimate association of 
two people living together in personal affection. It requires 
a life-time of thoughtful and well-disciplined devotion for its 
perfection. It requires also that two such individuals must 
share the great problems of life and death in the bonds of 
affection and active sympathy. And the third requirement for 
the perfection of ideal love is that two such people in the 
snaring of the great problems of life and death must have some
object which is precious to them both, and to which their lives
1 
are committed. Not only the individual but love itself must
lose itself in order to find itself.
Ideal love is sentimental love grown intelligent, 
i.e., raised to the conceptual level. It is the response in
1. Wieman: The Issues of Life (1930), Ch. II.
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terms of mature emotion and intelligent conduct to a person re- 
garded as an end in himself, cognized as valuable on the timdlogical 
level of rational insight. Admiration which appears in the sentiment 
of love as a blending of wonder and negative self-feeling appears in 
the ideal of love in the form of active contemplation or worshipful 
thinking which uses all the results of science but adds something 
which science does not have. For example, as Wieman says:
The genetic psychologist can never know the 
child as the parent knows him, unless the 
psychologist can also love and contemplate. 
The genetic psychologist may assist the 
parent to know his own child, but it is the 
parent and not the psychologist who will 
know the child most profoundly, providing 
the parent is willing to learn from the 
psychologist. And this will not be due to 
the fact that the parent has more constant 
association with the child and so will learn 
much from trial and error. We refer to 
something very different. We refer to that 
receptivity to the concrete experience of the 
child which goes only with the contemplative 
attitude. We refer, furthermore, to that 
response of innumerable impulses in the parent 
to the child, which are not awakened in the 
psychologist. All this wealth of experience 
and response in the parent will not necessarily 
yield correct knowledge. The parent may be 
subject to the most grotesque illusions con- 
cerning the child. But if the parent is willing 
to learn from the psychologist, to have his 
errors corrected and his ideas clarified, then 
he can know the child as the psychologist 
never can.2
At the sentimental level love is primarily a way of feeling but on 
the higher level of ideals it is a way of knowing and a way of
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 129
2. Wiemans Religious Experience and the Scientific Method 
(1926), pp. 72-73.
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acting quite equal to or surpassing the importance of its way of 
feeling.
15. Levels of Mental Activity
The notion of planes or levels of mental development and 
activity is an extremely important one for the psychology of religion. 
It should be remembered that the higher level never supercedes the 
lower level upon which it supervenes, and which is involved in the 
higher systematization. However, it is equally important to remem- 
ber that in the higher level there is genuine novelty and that the 
whole activity of the higher level depends upon this new emergence 
and synthesis. In this statement we follow the principle of emergence, 
In emphasis it is slightly different from Professor Drever's view 
that "nothing emerges at any stage, the germ of which was not present 
at an earlier stage; nothing that is present at any stage, but is
carried on in some form or other into later stages." Otherwise we
g
follow the principles of his discussion. On the cognitive side
the levels may be designated respectively as (l) perceptual, (2)
*
ideational, and (5) rational or conceptual. The affective aspect of 
mental life may be regarded as involving the levels of (l) immediate 
feeling or crude emotion, (2) sentiment, and (3) ideal or principle. 
The levels of conation are (1) impulse, (2) desire, and sentiment- 
determined impulse, and (3) purpose.
It Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 61-62. 
2. Ibid^ pp. 61-64.
69.
16  Personality
As we have already seen (Chapter I) "mind" refers to 
that integration and coordination of the activities and strivings 
of living organisms, and is directly observable only as it finds 
expression in behaviour or in experience. Although mind may in 
some sense be attributed to all living creatures which adjust 
themselves or their environment in such a way as to maintain their 
integrity and satisfy their desires, there are different levels 
of mental life and at the highest level it takes on the character- 
istics which we signify by the term "personality."
Even at the perceptual level - the level of moment-to- 
moment experience where ideas are not yet possible - we must assume 
that there is some sort of psychological entity corresponding to 
the sentiment of self on the ideational level, and the organized 
or ideal self on the rational level. Whatever this psychological 
entity may be, it occupies a privileged position among the mental 
systems of this level which with Professor Drever we may call 
complexes. This psychological entity we may call the self-complex, 
and since a mechanics of complexes interacting with one another is 
quite inadequate to explain the behaviour of the living being, we 
ascribe to it a privileged position, from which, by virtue of self- 
tendencies and self-feelings of a rudimentary sort, it possibly 
exercises some measure of influence and control over other instinctive
1. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), Ch. VII. The 
argument in this section follows Drever ! s exposition 
except where other references are given.
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tendencies and complexes.
When the ideational level is reached the normal self- 
complex becomes the self-sentiment with the integrating factor 
of the idea of the self. Whether the self-complex at the per- 
ceptual level has power to inhibit or reinforce other tendencies 
we may not be entirely certain, though the presumption is that it 
must have some such power. But of the power of inhibition and 
reinforcement at the ideational level there can be no question. 
We have already seen (section 13, above) the effect of conflicting 
tendencies. Tendencies and complexes and even other sentiments 
may come into conflict with the self-sentiment and either be tem- 
porarily suppressed and inhibited or suffer complete and permanent 
repression. It is only in the latter case when they are completely 
and permanently expelled from consciousness that they may continue 
active as subconscious processes and give rise to pathological 
phenomena.
The normal way for a tendency, complex or sentiment to 
function is, as it were, with the approval and cooperation of the 
self - i.e., through the psychological entity, on whatever level, 
which represents the organized mental life of the organism. It is 
with this mental organization that consciousness (which may be de- 
fined as awareness) is associated as a supervenient quality which 
makes a difference in the total life of the individual and in the 
functioning of any impulse or tendency. At the ideational level the
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consciousness of self makes its appearance and it is about the 
idea of the self that the self sentiment is formed.
Something like consciousness and even a rudimentary self- 
consciousness may accompany the functioning of systems of tenden- 
cies and complexes which have been expelled from the normal self 
organization» Morton Prince has shown that violent emotional com- 
plexes may be expelled (i.e. dissociated) from the normal self 
organization and, consequently, from the influence of consciousness 
and that they may carry on more or less independent existence, or 
may serve as dynamic centers for subconscious organization, and may 
even develop a rudimentary consciousness comparable to the conscious- 
ness which is associated with the normal self. Such dissociated 
factors may find expression in dreams, amnesia and various functional 
disorders, or if the subconscious organization (the secondary or 
cononscious personality) is sufficiently strong it may even temporarily 
or permanently supplant the normal conscious organization and function 
as the principal consciousness. In this case there is complete 
amnesia in each coconscious system for the experiences of the other.
But the repression and permanent dissociation of a complex 
or of a coconscious system does not eliminate it. Instead of 
functioning normally through the self it functions abnormally and in- 
dependently of the self, that is to say, it functions outside the 
limits of recognition by the self in the unconscious in various de- 
grees. So far as it is repressed it cannot determine behaviour 
directly but gives rise indirectly to projection, rationalization,
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defense and compensatory behaviour, or various other sorts of 
symptomatic expression.
On the rational or conceptual level the self takes on 
a more complete and rational character than is possible at the 
lower levels. The transition from the sentiment of self at the 
ideational level to the rationally accepted or ideal self on the 
conceptual level is similar to the development of love from a 
sentiment to an ideal (section 14). Intelligence becomes a factor 
in the organization of knowledge, emotion, and activity. Self- 
development of a new order becomes possible. The individual may 
now understand the situations of life in even wider and more 
meaningful contexts, to some extent rationally control his emotional 
associations and responses, and redirect his impulses toward more 
significant personal and social ends. This possibility is the 
basis of all culture and civilization, and underlies the achieve- 
ment of personal and social harmony and happiness. Furthermore, 
it is the basis of mental therapeutics, underlying such principles 
as sublimation, analysis and re-education.
A whole lifetime is far too short, at the present state 
of our knowledge, for the achievement of the complete self. Many 
people, perhaps most people, get but a little way beyond the 
ideational level - the level of sentiment - either in love or in 
s elf-development, and consequently in religion. There are in most 
of us many dissociated, unharmonized mental factors and dispositions
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which influence our personalities, but which we do not accept as 
belonging to our selves. And for this reason there is a 
difference between the self and the personality. The personality 
is the whole mental system, conscious and unconscious. The self
is the harmoniously organized and accepted dominant system within
1 
the personality. The ideal is that the complete self and the
complete personality should be one, and among all our dispositions 
there should be harmony and peace.
1. Cf. Hadfield: Psychology and Morals (1923), Chs. VIII to XIII.
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Chapter III 
THE NATURE OF RELIGION
Although religion may not rightly be regarded as an 
instinct, it has its roots in that which is generically 
human. Neither can religion be identified with one 
particular aspect of experience because religious ex- 
perience is always cognitive, affective, and conative, 
all three, and not exclusively one nor another. And 
it is a mistake to define religion as experience in an 
inclusive sense because to do so is to neglect the con- 
sequences of experience which certainly belong to the 
concept of religion. But to define religion as an 
attitude is to make the opposite mistake of neglecting 
the antecedent experience of which the attitude is the 
consequence. Both must be included in an adequate con- 
ception of religion. It is defined as consisting primarily 
of the activities of individuals or communities through 
which they seek a satisfactory relationship to God as they 
conceive him, and secondarily of the conserved products 
of those activities, in the individual in the form of 
religious dispositions, and in the community in the form 
of social institutions. Existing religious dispositions 
and institutions at any given moment partly condition the 
religious experience ensuing and are in turn modified by 
that experience. Two types of religious disposition are 
discussed. The religious sentiment as characteristic 
of the ideational level is relatively uncritical while 
the religious ideal, which is possible on the reflective 
level, makes use of reflective thought and is typical of 
the most advanced religious development.
In the present chapter we shall examine certain typical 
and current views regarding the nature of religion which from the 
point of view of psychology appear inadequate, and then formulate, 
if possible, a more satisfactory psychological conception of 
religion.
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17. Religion and Instinct
From the time of Augustine f s classical introspection 
garding the restlessness of the man who has not found his rest in 
God to the present time it has been popular to view religion as a
native impulse. Even Starbuck assumes without argument that
1 
religion is an instinct. And recently Professor W. P. Paterson,
of Edinburgh, in opposition to McDougall who denies that religion
2 
is an instinct, asserts not only that man is endowed with "a moral
instinct," but that "man, however he has acquired them, is cer-
3 
tainly moved now by religious tendencies of the instinctive sort."
4 
Thereafter he speaks of the religious instinct. Accepting
McDougall's definition of instinct Professor Paterson says:
In virtue of an innate disposition man has been 
determined to pay attention to a class of divine 
or sacred objects, he has experienced a peculiar 
emotional excitement, a.nd he has been instigated 
to act in a characteristic way.... Man has a 
general sense of the existence of a higher world 
which promises him satisfaction, while the 
spiritual appetite may also be quickened by the 
perception of objects possessed of what Otto has 
called the numinous quality, in which he has 
recognized the presence or manifestation of the 
Divine.... There is a religious feeling which 
contains something more than is found in fear, 
or awe or reverence..... The conative reaction 
characteristic of the religious instinct is the 
impulse to draw near to the divine object for 
the satisfaction of desire, but as in the case 
of hunger this primary impulse may be overborne 
by other influences and the results may be in- 
difference or even repulsion.^
1. Starbuck: The Psychology of Religion (1900), p. 7.
2. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 91-92, 309.
5. Patersont The Nature of Religion (1928), p. 99.
4. Ibid^ Ch. Ill, section III.
5. Ibid, p. 101.
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Professor Paterson quotes Lloyd Morgan to the effect 
that "the moral and religious sentiments so widely prevalent in
mankind, though they assume varied conditions, have an instinctive
1 
basis in the human constitution." If Professor Paterson means
only to maintain that the religious sentiment (in the accepted 
psychological usage of the word "sentiment") has an instinctive 
basis, then certainly we must agree with him. But when he goes 
on to call religion an instinct of the appetitive sort comparable 
to hunger, he is taking up a position which can be satisfactory 
to neither psychology nor religion. From the psychological point 
of view it is assuming a simplicity in religion which is not sub- 
stantiated in the observation of experience and from the point of 
view of religion it makes simplicity and clearness impossible just 
at the point where they are most urgently needed, i.e., in the
 
understanding of the nature and meaning of religion. Fear is in- 
stinctive in character and can be identified in a white mouse or 
an African bushman or a civilized Anglo-Saxon. But religion cannot 
be so identified just because it is an exceedingly complex ex- 
perience which varies with the number, relative strength, and mode 
of organization of its various components.
When one reads the whole of Professor Paterson 1 s en- 
lightening and inspiring discussion of "The Nature of Religion," 
however, one feels very uncertain that criticisms offered above
1. Paterson: The Nature of Religion (1928), p. 100.
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really touch the main points of his argument. Toward the close of 
the introductory chapter he writes, "Finally, it may be observed, 
and the present course of lectures will be largely concerned with 
sustaining and developing the thesis, that religion has made a 
many-sided appeal to man, and has laid hold of human nature in the 
multiplicity and manifoldness of its interests and principles of 
action." One suspects that in discussing religion as instinct 
Professor Pater son's language is intended to be more lively and 
figurative than coldly scientific. For example, he speaks of the 
religious instinct as a form of appetite akin to hunger and thirst 
and says that "a want and craving of this appetitive kind is
implied" in the following words of Jesus: "He that cometh to me
2 
shall not hunger, etc." And he goes on to speak of "bodily and
5 
spiritual appetittfl« n One gains the impression that Professor
Paterson does not mean the same thing here by the word appetite 
that, let us say, Drever means by it in "Instinct in Man." For 
Drever has shown that instead of organizing or being organized with 
the multiplicity and manifoldness of the interests and principles
of action of human nature, the appetitive tendencies are exactly
4 
those which are incapable of such organization. It is unthinkable
that Professor Paterson would reduce religion to the level of an 
appetite and interpret it as a pleasure-seeking principle. If it
1. Paterson: Nature of Religion (1928), p. 28.
2. Ibid., p. 101.
3. Ibid., p. 28.
4. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 126 ff.
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be objected that he intends to indicate a spiritual appetite in 
contrast to the bodily appetites, the reply is that there is no 
other kind of appetite but spiritual or mental. Hunger is a 
psychological experience although it may be an experience of a 
physiological condition. There are bodily conditions but there 
are no bodily appetites.
Of course one can acquire an appetite for the pleasurable 
accompaniments of any intense emotional experience. And, no doubt, 
many people do cultivate and acquire such appetites, even the 
appetite for religious excitement. But one does not imagine that 
Professor Paterson can mean this, and even if he did mean such a 
thing by the word appetite it would not be instinctive but acquired.
If Professor Paterson and others have used unfortunate 
terminology in calling religion an instinct, at least all such 
iterations have the merit of calling attention to the important fact
that religion is related to the essential nature of man. Professor
1 
Conklin, following Coe, rejects the instinct theory of religion.
He says:
Religion cannot be attributed to a single basic 
drive coordinate with the others, which is but 
another way of saying that religion cannot be re- 
duced to an instinct even when instinct is thought 
of in terms of the drive concept. Certain rather 
over-ardent analysts of human nature have sought 
to reduce all these drives to one fundamental 
drive. Even if that were achieved, it would not 
justify the assertion that religion is the ex- 
pression of an instinct, but rather that religion, 
along with all other human behaviour, would be
1. Cf. Goer The Psychology of Religion (1916), Ch. XIX.
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thought of as one among many manifestations 
of that one fundamental drive or instinct.
It is our belief that religion is not an instinct, that 
it does not emerge until the ideational level of mind is reached, 
that it then comes into being as an organization of instinctive 
responses, and that at that level it exists as a sentiment. The 
restlessness which impels men to religion is the restlessness of 
mental disorganization and discord.
Various attempts have been made to define religion in 
terms of one of the instincts such as sex, gregariousness, self- 
assertion, etc. These cannot be discussed here but will be dealt 
with in some detail when we take up the theories of the origin of 
religion.
18* Religion and Experience
Innumerable attempts have been made to define religion 
in terms of one or another of the three major aspects of experience, 
viz., the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects. This is 
probably due to the fact that the religious experience finds ex- 
pression (l) intellectually, in theological systems; (2) emotionally,
in forms of art; and (3) practically, in strong character and codes
g 
of high moral conduct. Whatever else may be said of religion it
cannot be denied that there is in the religious experience an 
element of curiosity, of wonder, resulting in an effort to under-
1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 27,
2. Cf. Ibid., Ch. VI, pp. 71 ff.
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stand a fundamentally unclear experience. Since the dawn of 
history man has sought a system of thought in terms of which he 
could explain his religious perceptions and feelings. No generation 
has been without its leaders who have pondered the intellectual 
formulations of the past, and it is only natural that those who 
were philosophically inclined should come to regard these in- 
tellectual expressions of religion as constituting religion.
Religion finds expression, too, in various forms of 
art - in music, drama, ritual, ceremony, painting, sculpture, 
architecture, etc. Religious emotion may also find expression in 
the various phenomena of crude excitement which sometimes accompany 
religious revivals. The feeling of relief resulting from the dis- 
sociating effect of strong emotion has often led to the development 
of an appetite for the enjoyment of the excitement induced by these 
forms of religious expression and by emotional mysticism of an 
extreme sort, and consequently to the valuing of them as ends in 
themselves and to the conception of religion as essentially emo- 
tional in character.
Likewise, the appreciation of character and the develop- 
ment of conduct codes has led on to the development of legalism and 
definition of religion in terms of the conative side of life.
And it is not only among believers that such misconceptions 
arise, but also among those who scorn religion. Some of the most 
vigorous opponents of religion have seen the emptiness of worn-out
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theology, or have become satiated with emotional excitement, or 
have become weary and disgusted with the prudery and hypocrisy 
of a shallow moralism associated with religion; and they have 
reacted violently against these experiences in the blind belief 
that they were opposing religion.
On the other hand, exactly this over-emphasis on one 
aspect of experience in religion to the neglect of the others has 
provided the setting in which the reconstructive work of the 
great prophets of religion has always been carried out. Amos 
opposing an empty and immoral ritualism with a religion of
righteousness, and Hosea f s indictment of an impossible legalism
1 
in the interest of a religion of love, are examples.
These periodic styles in the definition of religion, em- 
phasizing one or another of the aspects of experience, or "depart- 
ments of the mind," as comprising its essence are not without their 
parallels in our day. In the eighteenth century the rationalistic 
view dominated the theology of the West. This period was succeeded 
by a revival of emotionalism. The Wesleyan revivals, Schleiermacher 1 s 
writings in the field of theology, the evolutionary hypothesis em- 
phasizing the importance of feeling and conation associated with 
instinct, and the emphasis on conversion in religious psychology 
since the publication of Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion," have 
all contributed at different times and in various ways to the con- 
ception of religion in terms of feeling and emotion.
1. Mr. Von Ogden Vogt in his "Art and Religion" (1921), gives a 
most valuable discussion of the alternation between the 
periodic emphases of the various aspects of experience in the 
religions of Judaism and Christianity. See especially Ch. VI.
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More recently the writings of Ames, Jevons, Irving King, 
Durkheira, and others of the same school have drawn attention to 
the importance of the social or ethical element in religion and 
even go so far as to define religion in terms of moral ideals or 
social consciousness. It is probable that the emotional inter- 
pretation of religion which we have noticed was a reaction against 
the cold intellectualism which preceded it and that the social 
interpretation was a reaction against the individualism of the 
nineteenth century.
A given experience may be predominantly cognitive, 
affective, or conative but it cannot be exclusively one nor another 
of these three. These three phases or aspects of experience are 
abstractions of qualities of a larger whole and have no existence 
apart from the whole to which they all belong. They are not elements 
of experience. An element of experience would certainly have to in- 
clude cognition of an object or idea, a feeling (at least of interest 
or worthwhileness) with respect to that object or idea, and some 
activity (even if only a set or attitude of the organism) as a result.
It is with due regard to the principles of modern psychology
that Dr. Kenneth Edward, in his Kerr Lectures, defines religion in
2terms of experience. In explanation of his use of the word
"experience" he says:
1. Cf. Amest The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910). 
He says that religion "consists in" social consciousness, 
(p. 168). Again: "If religion is identified with the most 
intimate and vital phase of the social consciousness, then 
the distinction between morality and religion is not real."
2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 18.
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I may say that I select the term experience because 
of its breadth - because I require a term.... that 
should include the whole religious life, including 
its activities, its beliefs, its thoughts as well 
as its feelings.^
Whether the word experience is the best word for Dr. Edward's 
purpose some may doubt, but it seems abundantly clear that any 
definition which attempts to identify religion exclusively with 
any one of its expressions, such as theology, ritual, or con- 
duct codes, or with any one phase of experience, such as knowing, 
feeling, or acting, cannot possibly stand the critical examination 
of modern psychology. Religion may be thought of as experience, 
but as experience it is always cognitive, affective, and conative; 
and not one of these alone without the others.
Of course a given experience may be predominantly in- 
tellectual, emotional or conative. For example I may have an 
experience of a bear as I observe him quietly sleeping in his cage; 
or, alone and unarmed in the woods, I may experience a bear as he 
rushes toward me in a furious attack; or again, I may experience a 
bear as I stand, club in hand, between him and my wife or child. 
In the first instance my experience would be principally cognitive; 
in the second, overwhelmingly emotional; and in the third, pre- 
dominantly conative, though probably highly emotional also.  
The difference between these experiences seems to depend 
on the relation of the object to our values. Any object which bears 
an important relation to us or to something which we prize is
1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 20.
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inevitably viewed with increased interest. If the relation grows 
critical to such an extent that our habitual modes of response are 
broken down and we can think of no new plan of adjustment to re- 
lieve the tension, our emotional response may become extremely 
violent even to the extent of dissociating cortical influences 
and our behaviour may become a blind instinctive struggle.
Since the strength of the emotional and conative aspects 
of experience so obviously depends upon the relationship of an 
object to our values, it is important in defining religion as 
experience to say not only what it is an experience of but to 
indicate whether it may have any important bearing upon our values. 
Dr. Edwardf s definition only partly answers this need. He says 
that religion is "an experience of God and of our relationship with 
him." But he does not define the concept of the Religious Object 
in such a way as to indicate how important that relationship may 
be. Professor Pratt's definition which we take up in the next 
section serves as a valuable suggestion at this point.
Our serious objection to defining religion as experience 
is that it gives us no clue to the solution of the problem of 
religious development. If religion is an experience, then what is 
the relation of that experience to our sentiments, ideals, habits, 
character? In what sense may a person be said to be religious? Is 
it because he had once a religious experience or because he 
habitually has religious experiences? How is religious experience
It Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 18.
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propagated? How developed in the young? How developed in the 
race? These are fundamental questions of pressing importance 
which such a definition seems to leave unanswered. And they are 
questions for the solution of which any adequate conception of 
religion must certainly provide the basis.
Another objection to this definition is that it seems 
to draw an unnecessary distinction between religious behaviour 
and religious experience, between objective activity and sub- 
jective activity, and to identify religion only with subjective 
activity or "inner" experience. This cannot be satisfactory to 
those who regard both objective activity and subjective activity, 
or behaviour and experience, as activity of the whole individual 
in dynamic interaction with his environment. This view we have 
presented at some length in the introduction and needs no further 
comment here.
19. Religion as Attitude
Among some writers who have sought a new psychological 
concept adequate to symbolize the meaning of religion without 
identifying it with one of the traditional departments of the 
mind the word "attitude" has become popular. For example,
1. The general objections raised in this section are
applicable also to the views of Dr. E. S. Waterhouse as 
expressed in his admirable volume entitled "The Philosophy 
of Religious Experience" (1923).
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Professor James Bissett Pratt defines religion as
the serious and social attitude of individuals 
or communities toward the power or powers which 
they conceive as having ultimate control over 
their interests and destinies.
The word attitude is intended to cover the responsive side of 
consciousness which is found in "attention, interest, expectancy, 
feeling, tendencies to reaction, etc." Religion
is not a doctrine nor a law nor an hypothesis but 
an attitude, and essentially an attitude of 
expectancy. Its real and basal question is not, 
What is the Cause or the Ultimate Nature of the 
World? but What is going to become of me - or of 
us - and what is the attitude of the Determiner of 
Destiny toward us and our interests?^
Professor Pratt enumerates the advantages of defining 
religion as an attitude as follows:
It shows that religion is not a matter of any 
one 'department 1 of psychic life but involves 
the whole man. It includes what there was of 
truth in the historical attempts to identify 
religion with feeling, belief or will. And it 
draws attention to the fact that religion is 
immediately subjective, thus differing from 
Science (which emphasizes f content 1 rather than 
f attitude f )> and yet it points to the other fact 
also that religion involves and presupposes the 
acceptance of the objective. Religion is the 
attitude of a self toward an object in which 
the self genuinely believes.
Defining religion as an attitude is certainly better 
than calling it an instinct, an emotion, a belief, or an ethics. 
But there are many kinds of attitudes, favorable and unfavorable.
1. Pratt: The Religious Consciousness (1920), p. 2.
2. Ibid.,p. 6.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
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Professor Pratt says that religion is a serious and social attitude. 
By using the word serious he means to contrast the religious atti- 
tude with frivolous matters. Religion is important, serious; it 
deals with the great values, with matters of life and death. By 
saying that religion is a social attitude Professor Pratt does not 
intend to suggest that religion must have a personal object; but 
that it must not be mechanical nor coldly intellectual. "It must 
have some faint touch of that social quality which we feel in our 
relations toward anything that can make response to us. It is only 
in this incipient way that the religious attitude need be social. 11
But even with these qualifications the definition is open 
to serious objections. In the first place it does not enable us to 
distinguish religion from magic. One might be ever so serious, and 
ever so expectant of response from the Determiner of Destiny and 
still seek to make the superhuman order his slave instead of his 
ally. In the second place an attitude of avoidance or fear under 
this definition is as truly religious as an attitude of love. Caliban 
is religious no less truly than the Christian. Devils also believe 
and tremble but are they on that account religious? The third ob- 
jection is that it defines religion in terms which are secondary. An 
attitude is the consequence of experience, and the best established 
attitudes are the product of much experience of a particular kind. 
"One must be cautious about defining religion as fundamentally an
o
attitude lest one define religion in terms of that which is secondary."
1. Prattt The Religious Consciousness (1920), p. 3.
2. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 36.
88.
In spite of these shortcomings, however, Professor Pratt's 
definition is extremely suggestive. It involves five points which 
deserve careful attention in any adequate definition of religion:
(1) it emphasizes the importance of the psychological factor (the 
"inner life") rather than the objective "content" of experience;
(2) it identifies religion with the whole life of the person rather 
than with an isolated aspect of experience; (3) it represents religion 
as involving a serious concern for the great values; (4) the religious 
subject is conceived as believing these values to be related to the 
nature of the Universe - that is, that they have superhuman signi- 
ficance; (5) the religious subject is thought of as expecting the 
Universe, the Determiner of Destiny, or Religious Object to make a 
response to him.
20. A Psychological Conception of Religion 
In the preceding sections of this chapter we have examined 
several conceptions of religion expressed in psychological terms 
and noted some of their values and shortcomings. We now seek a more 
satisfactory psychological definition. For such a definition two 
large sources of data are available, namely, the data obtained by 
the direct observation of human activities and the data obtained 
from the study of institutions which are the result of human 
activities. For the direct observation of human activity two methods
1. It will be remembered that in the writer f s usage the word 
activity embraces behaviour and experience.
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have been developed, the introspective method and the objective 
method. Of these the introspective method is by far the most 
important in the study of the psychology of religion because the 
objective method has thus far been applied with so little success 
in the study of religion that it has yielded practically no 
material of any importance. A vast amount of data of an auto- 
biographical and psychologically inexact sort is available as a 
result of the recorded introspections of religious men and women. 
And this material, as Starbuck, James, Pratt and others have shown, 
reveals the general trend and nature of religious experience and 
conduct. The institutional sources of our data are found in 
theologies, religious writings, rituals, lives of the saints, modes 
of religious organization, and the expression of religion in 
symbolism and art of various kinds.
The psychologist must form his conception of religion after 
examination of the data from all these sources, i.e., he must use 
the data available in the results of the other sciences. The truest 
conception will be the one which is the most adequate to the inter- 
pretation of all the data. Many definitions of religion have been 
generalizations from only one phase of religion, or one section of 
the available data. For example, a definition of religion in terms 
of sacred forms and ceremonies is manifestly erroneous since it 
ignores entirely the data from religious experience in favor of the
1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), 
pp. 40-45.
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institutional source. A corresponding error is made in the opposite 
direction when one defines religion in terms of feeling without due 
regard to the institutional products of religious activity. Professor 
Conklin goes so far as to say that "a psychological definition of 
religion must include both the experiential and the institutional,
and it must also include all that is religiously experiential and
1 
all that is religiously institutional." He continues:
On the one hand religion involves certain portions 
of human behaviour and on the other hand it in- 
cludes nil the institutional products of that 
behaviour. There remains only the determination 
of that feature which differentiates religious 
behaviour from other kinds of behaviour. This 
differentiating feature of religious behaviour 
is the fact that it centers about belief in some 
form of concept of God..... In its briefest form 
then the term religion may .be,, defined as, designating 
that behaviour and those behaviour products which 
are associated with a belief attitude toward some 
concept of a God or Gods.%
In the first place, it is necessary to understand what 
Professor Conklin means by the word behaviour. In a previous chapter 
he makes his meaning abundantly clear in the following wordst
Behaviour is a very convenient term and in its use 
here there is not the slightest intention of ex- 
cluding consciousness from its designation. The 
term religious behaviour well describes that in- 
clusive range of human experience in which are 
feelings and emotions aroused by worshipful situations, 
by habits of prayer, by ceremonies elaborate or 
simple; in which are thoughts of the deity and of 
properties of conduct motivated by religious feelings; 
in which are the lives of the saints and the martyrs 
and the missionary heroes; and in which are the 
activities resulting in religious architecture, 
statuary, painting, and music.*
1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 46.
2. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
3. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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While agreeing with all that Professor Conklin here intends to 
designate by the word behaviour, according to our usage we should 
have to substitute for behaviour the word activity, and our reasons 
have been fully stated in Chapter I. If psychology is the study of 
activity it seems clear that a psychological definition of religion 
must be stated in psychological terms and religion must be defined 
in terms of activity.
It seems that, psychologically defined, religion un- 
questionably consists of certain activities of individuals or 
communities. But of what sort of activities? Professor Conklin 
says of those activities which are associated with a belief atti- 
tude toward some concept of a God or Gods. It cannot be doubted 
that believing a concept is itself an activity (or, in Conklin 1 s 
usage, behaviour). But it is certainly questionable whether the 
mere activity of believing in a concept even of a god is necessarily 
religious activity. Conklin recognizes this and urges that the 
presence of a god concept in the mind does not mean that any of the 
behaviour of that individual is religious. "A person may know about 
the concept of God but there must be the belief attitude toward that 
concept to engender religious behaviour. Mere knowledge of god 
concepts does not make religious experience nor religious behaviour 
any more than a knowledge of ethical standards makes moral conduct."
1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), 
p. 48.
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When we understand all that Conklin intends to signify 
by the belief attitude the criticism which we are at first tempted 
to offer is disarmed to a certain extent. His whole point of view 
is built around the notion of adjustment. But one wonders why he 
did not use the word in his definition. Religion is man f s sensing 
of a relationship to the Determiner of Destiny and his attempt to 
achieve a satisfactory adjustment. In religion all of man's most 
precious values are at stake, and his religious activity is an 
activity of adjustment in the interest of those values. To say that 
religion is an activity associated with the belief in a concept of 
god seems inadequate to suggest the warmth and awful nearness which 
man feels in the religious experience and the crucial importance of 
his effort to achieve the right adjustment to the Religious Object.
Professor Conklin's insistence that the conserved products 
of religious experience and behaviour should receive some recog- 
nition in an adequate definition of religion seems justified in the 
light of almost innumerable attempts to define religion in terms of 
one or another of these products. But it is equally clear that the 
products of religious activity are not to be considered equally 
fundamental with the religious adjustment itself as activity. 
Religious experience and behaviour are fundamental and primary in the 
conception of religion; religious products are secondary. But if 
the view which we sketched, in Chapter I, of man and his relation to 
the world, is anything like a correct description of the facts, then 
the adjustment of any individual to any situation is significant as
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involving that individuals past and as partly conditioning his 
future. That is to say, no individual act of a person is to be 
correctly understood apart from that person f s total life. And the 
same principle seems to hold good of the behaviour of communities. 
The religious experience of any individual at a given moment has a 
social and individual background and inevitably leaves its traces 
in the fundamental character of the individual and to a less extent 
in the life of the community in which he lives. Religion at its 
best is therefore not to be understood as an act or an experience 
but as a continuous and progressively developing experience of and 
adjustment to the Power or Powers which individuals or communities 
conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies.
We therefore define religion as follows: Religion consists, 
primarily, of those activities of individuals or communities through 
which they seek satisfying adjustment to the Ppwer_pr_ Powers which 
they conceive to have ultimate^ control, over their, interests and 
destinies; and p secondarily, of the conserved products of those 
activities in the form of mental dispositions and social institutions.
According to this definition religion may be represented 
schematically as involving on the part of an individual or community:
1. A scheme of values.
2. Belief in a "Determiner of Destiny" conceived as having 
either a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the 
most precious values of the individual or community.
3. Baotional excitement commensurate with the devotion to 
the values involved and the state of their well-being 
and security.
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4. Plan of adjustment in order to conserve, augment,
discover, or create the values most strongly desired.
5. Attempted execution of the plan, resulting in
6. Learning with respect to, or new insight into 
a. Values, or
b. The attitude of the Determiner of Destiny, or 
c. The method of adjustment.
7. Conservation of the results
a. In the individual, in the form of attitudes,
sentiments, ideals, or habits, 
b. In society in the form of institutions.
8. New attempts at religious adjustment influenced by 
the conserved results of previous religious activity.
So conceived religion is a dynamic procedure directed 
towards a satisfying adjustment of the whole individual to the total 
environing situation, to that "something upon which human life is most 
dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance," to 
the Universe, to God; religion is man*s acute awareness of the realm 
of unattained possibility and his attempt to get into right adjust- 
ment with the most protecting and sustaining behaviour of the universe 
to the end of escaping the terrible possibilities of evil which have
entered his awareness, and to attain the glorious possibilities of
2 
good.
1. Wieman: Religious Experience and Scientific Method (1926), p. 9.
2. Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (1927), p. 155.
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If this be the right view of religion it is obvious that 
progress in the achievement of a satisfactory religious adjustment 
is exceedingly difficult. It is difficult in the first place be- 
cause there are so many chances of failure: one may have a very 
inadequate sense of value, or he may be the victim of habitually 
unwholesome desires; he may have an inadequate conception of the 
Religious Object, or an incorrect notion of the relation and atti- 
tude of the Religious Object to his values; he may form an inferior 
plan of adjustment, or an entirely wrong one; he may not be per- 
sistent enough in his attempted execution of the plan, or he may 
be too persistent; he may draw the wrong conclusions from the re- 
sults of his attempted adjustment and so fail in his next attempt. 
It is difficult in the second place because, due to the nature of 
religion, religious experimentation cannot be carried on in the 
same way as scientific experimentation, or if it can be done no 
satisfactory methods have yet been devised for the purpose. Professor 
D. C. Macintosh has written profoundly of theology as an empirical 
science, but the religious experiment involves the whole person and 
his whole life and is not open to the ordinary methods of empirical 
science. Definite and adequate religious techniques therefore have 
been difficult to establish. A third difficulty in the way of 
progress is that the essential mystery of the Religious Object, the 
crucial importance of religious values, and the obvious ease with 
which men make tragic mistakes, make men extremely anxious to con-
1. Macintosh: Theology as an Empirical Science (1914).
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serve any insight which has come down from the past, extremely- 
cautious in venturing after new conceptions of Deity or new pro- 
grams of adjustment, and extremely distrustful of their own in- 
sight into values. And finally the conserved products of previous 
religious activity serve as bulwarks against innovations.
These considerations need to be kept in mind as we 
proceed to the discussion of the origin of religion.
21. The Religious Sentiment
We have defined religion as primarily the activity of 
adjustment to the Religious Object and secondarily the conserved 
products of that activity. We now turn to the consideration of 
the secondary factors. The community products of religious activity 
are social institutions. As we have pointed out in Chapter I, 
psychology is interested in social institutions only as they are 
related to the activities of the individual. Psychology studies 
the activities of the individual while the study of institutions 
is the work of social science. We shall, therefore, not give de- 
tailed attention to the consideration of religious institutions 
but shall restrict our discussion to those acquired religious dis- 
positions of the individual which are at once the conserved product 
and the instigating source of his religious experience and behaviour. 
These are the religious sentiments. Like other sentiments, the 
religious sentiment grows out of activity and in turn influences 
future activity. As Professor Conklin says:
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Much experience with a believed-in concept of 
God and its attendant emotions will eventuate 
in the establishment of a religious sentiment. 
Any object or situation as thought which arouses 
the thought of God will thereafter arouse the 
associated pattern of emotional experience be- 
cause of this sentiment. At least, there will 
be a tendency toward such an arousal even though 
it be temporarily blocked by responses to other 
thoughts or situations.^
Like other sentiments, also, the religious sentiment 
may develop, or decline, both in complexity and in strength. In 
his'Outline of Psychology J! Professor McDougall gives an interesting 
imaginary sketch showing how a primitive man, whom he calls Mowgli, 
might develop a religious sentiment. First Mowgli experiences 
wonder and fear in connection with a certain cave; then subjection 
is added and these three are blended into a sentiment of awe which 
is organized about Mowgli»s idea of a mysterious power which dwells 
in the cave5 finally, circumstances occur which adds gratitude
(made up of subjection and tender emotion) to the sentiment of awe
2
and his sentiment becomes one of reverence. This is a very good
illustration of how a sentiment may develop in complexity on the 
emotional side. But it may also develop in strength of the emo- 
tional dispositions involved and likewise in the number of ideas 
included within the system of the sentiment. Just as the boy in 
love has his emotions stirred by the perception of a glove which 
he recognizes as having been in the possession of his beloved, or 
by her handkerchief, or by a rose which she has given him or by
1. Conklin: Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 59.
2. McDougall: Outline of Psychology (1929), pp. 209-210.
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any other thing which he perceives as having been associated with 
her, so the person who possesses a religious sentiment will have 
his emotions stirred by such things as Bibles, Churches, certain 
words and phrases, symbols and ceremonies which he perceives as 
being associated with the Religious Object or with his experience
of religious adjustment. It is in this way that things come to
2
have religious significance.
It is important that we should indicate clearly the dis- 
tinguishing characteristic of the religious sentiment. At present 
we shall do no more than state our point of view and for the time
being let it rest upon the authority of such writers on the sub-
64 5 678 Ject as Pratt, Conklin, Thouless, Waterhouse, Edward, Wright,
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Wieman, McDougall, and others. All of these writers hold that
some idea or rudimentary concept of God or Gods is essential to 
religion. We have accepted this point of view in our definition of 
religion but have not yet argued for its validity. It will be 
necessary to do so when we come to the discussion of the origin of 
religion. Therefore we have provisionally adopted the principle 
and propose to defend it later. Meantime we desire once more to
1. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), p. 94.
2. Cf. our discussion of Meaning, section 10.
3. Pratt: The Religious Consciousness (1920), pp. 3 ff.
4. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Adjustment (1929), 
pp. 47 ff.j 61 ff.
5. Thouless: An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion 
(1923), Ch. Ill, pp. 100 ff.
6. Waterhouser The Philosophy of Religious Experience (1923) 
Chs. II and III.
7. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), Chs. I and IX.
8. Wright: Journal of Religion. IV, (1924), pp. 449-463; esp. 
p. 453.
9. Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (1927), Part Two. 
10. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 134 ff.; pp. 317 ff.
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make it central in our conception of religion, lay stating that 
what makes the religious sentiment religious is that it is 
organized about the idea, however crude and fragmentary, of a god 
or gods. McDougall says that reverence is the religious emotion 
par excellence. But by this we do not understand him to mean 
that reverence as such is always religious, but that when exercised 
toward God it is a very high level of religious experience. He 
does not deny that reverence may be felt toward other persons but 
says that human beings who inspire reverence usually owe their
reverend character to their being regarded as ministers and dis-
2pensers of Divine power. Professor Gonklin quite clearly states
that under certain circumstances one person may feel reverence for 
another and the feeling of reverence in itself is not necessarily 
a religious experience. "The religious sentiment is one which is 
activated by consciousness of the presence of God, by thoughts
about God, by any symbol of God, or by anything which is perceived
3 
as related to God." It will be noted that Professor Conklin is
writing from the point of view of the Christian religion. From 
that point of view his definition covers the facts admirably. 
We seek, however, a somewhat broader concept which 
will be applicable to all religions. We find ourselves, there- 
fore, more favorably inclined toward the following definition 
by Professor W. K. Wright:
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 136.
2. Ibid.,p. 136.
5. Conklin: The Psychology of Religious Ad.fastment (1929), p. 62.
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The religious sentiment is an organization of 
man's deeper impulses about an object that he 
believes to be superhuman - an object external 
to Mm and to other men, not completely to be 
identified with physical nature in its purely 
mechanical aspects.
We are concerned in this definition only with Professor Wright f s 
description of the object of the religious sentiment. The 
Religious Object in Wright's definition is one which the possessor 
of the religious sentiment believes to be superhuman and in some 
sense spiritual.
We insist on one other characteristic; that the Religious 
Object must be, for the religious person, in some sense a Determiner 
of Destiny. That is to say, for the religious person the superhuman, 
spiritual object about which his religious sentiment is organized 
must be one on whom he believes that one, some or all of his most 
precious values depend. We have discussed this point fully in de- 
fining religion.
The religious sentiment may be defined provisionally as 
a disposition growing out of religious activity and tending to the 
arousal of a certain pattern or combination of emotions and im- 
pulses when activated by the consciousness of the presence of the 
Religious Ob,1ect f or by thoughts about, or by any symbol of. or by 
anything which is perceived aa related to^ the Religious Object. 
By the term Religious Object is meant an object which the religious 
person believes to be external to him and to other men, and not
1. Wright: Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment. 
Journal of Religion, IV, 1924, p. 453.
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completely to be identified with physical nature in its purely 
mechanical aspects, and upon which he believes some or all of 
his most precious values to depend. By the term religious activity 
is meant the behaviour and experience involved in seeking adjust- 
ment to the Religious Object. By religious person is meant one 
who possesses a disposition toward religious experience and be- 
haviour, i.e., toward religious activity.
The typical religious sentiment is the sentiment of 
reverence exemplified in the Christian subject toward the Christian
God. The emotions which enter into the pattern of the system which
1 





IAdmiration \ - , . , . ^ 1Subjection
Reverence is composed of the emotions of gratitude and awe, both 
of which are complex. Gratitude is a binary compound of negative 
self-feeling and tender emotion while awe is a binary compound of 
fear and admiration, the latter of which is compounded of wonder 
and negative self-feeling.
But while reverence is the typical religious sentiment 
it is not the only one, as Professor McDougall himself suggests:
The history of religion seems to show us the 
gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. 
Primitive religion seems to have kept separate 
the superhuman objects of its component emotions, 
the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on the one
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), pp. 132-159.
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hand, and kindly beneficent powers that in- 
spired gratitude on the other. It was not 
until religious doctrine had undergone a 
long evolution that, by a process of syn- 
cretism or fusion, it achieved the conception 
of a Deity whose attributes were capable of 
evoking all the elements of the complex 
emotion of reverence.
When we look for religious origins therefore we shall be pre- 
pared to find them in much simpler experiences and much less 
complex sentiments than reverence. We shall not be surprised 
to find very curious systems of emotions centered about the idea 
of religious objects. And, remembering that religious sentiments 
will vary according to the emotions and impulses that compose them 
and according to the relative strength of their various components, 
we shall be greatly surprised to find anything like a standard 
quality among them. We shall therefore as consistently refuse 
to judge the more advanced types of religion by primitive stan- 
dards as we shall refuse to judge primitive religion by Christian 
standards.
We recognize that our study involves the observation of 
religious advancement. What we have is a developing subject, ad- 
justing himself as best he can to the total environment as best 
he can conceive it, learning from this activity, and on the basis 
of this improvement beginning a new adjustment. Growing insight 
may be looked for in the appreciation of values, in the under- 
standing of the nature of those powers upon which man is dependent
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 139.
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and of their attitude toward man and his values, and in the formu- 
lation of programs of adjustment which he undertakes as the result 
of these. This will involve also a gradual development in emo- 
tional response and the growth into religious maturity.
22. Religious Ideals
Sentiment is characteristic of the ideational level of 
mind. At the conceptual level the sentiment may and normally 
should develop into the ideal. It is not to be imagined that at 
some given time in the history of the race or in the history of 
the individual mind suddenly blossoms forth on the conceptual level 
and sentiments are all done away. It is rather the fact that very 
gradually both in the individual and in the race does conscious 
intelligence begin to criticize the concepts which had hitherto been 
accepted without conscious consideration and to formulate intelli- 
gent plans to take the place of the old instinctive ones. To the 
extent to which conscious intelligence and choice enters into our 
adjustments, to that extent we live on the conceptual level. In 
the lives of many, perhaps of most, of us the ratio is not high. 
It is not so high in the life of the race as a whole as in the life 
of the most gifted individuals.
But there is a conceptual level and there are ideals 
which grow up out of and have their roots firmly planted in the 
soil of sentiment. It is a mistake to suppose that primitive man 
thought over the mystery of the world about him and decided that 
the most logical conclusion was that supernatural beings were
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responsible for it and since this was so he ought to try to understand 
them as best he could. The fact probably is that he found himself be- 
having as if there were supernatural beings about him and so far as he 
ever thought at all, he wondered why he should behave in this way. We 
still wonder why. And when we try to think it out we find ourselves 
tempted at every point by delightful myths of the imagination which 
would protect what we like to believe.
He who succeeds in examining the concepts about which his 
sentiments center is making the first step in the direction of ideals. 
But it is not easy to examine the ideas which form the center of a 
strong sentiment. The effort to do so results often in the finding of 
many illogical reasons for what we already believe. Or again, it may 
turn our love into hate, and result in much unreasoning abuse of our 
former views. With these results every student of pathological 
psychology is familiar.
Professor Henry Nelson Wieman says:
With respect to religion there are three classes 
of people: the religious rationalizers, the 
irreligious rationalizers, and the religiously 
inquisitive. The first class may think about 
religion from the outside to defend it; the second 
class may think about religion from the outside 
to destroy it. But only the third class thinks 
about it from the inside with a view to discovering 
precisely what may be the good of it. It alone 
inquires into its validity, its conditions and 
consequences. Only this third class makes of 
religion a problem. The other two merely accept it 
or reject it without examining into it.
It would be difficult to find a clearer contrast between religion on 
the ideational level and religion on the conceptual level than is
Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (1927), p. 35.
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indicated in these words. Wieman does not mention different levels of 
mind or any contrast between sentiment and ideal. But the facts are 
looked at in a very enlightening manner.
For example, he describes the first class as follows:
Their religion is for them a very precious and 
holy thing. They acquired it in childhood or 
youth or in some profound experience of later 
years. It is quite complete and finished and 
they have nothing more to learn about it. They 
have only to enjoy and use it..... All their 
religious discussions and exercises are not forms 
of inquiry but devices for stimulating further 
religious experience and moral endeavour..... 
Whatever serves to stimulate the emotional glow 
and corresponding practical effort they gladly 
welcome; but anything that turns the light of 
intellectual investigation upon their religion 
they bitterly resent, etc.
Of the second class he says that they also refuse to 
examine the merits of religion but for an opposite reason. They have 
an antipathy for it.
As the first class was blinded by prejudice for, 
this is blinded "by prejudice against. Some of them 
have studied all about it in Sunday School, but 
it was presented to them in such a way that they 
have become sick and weary of it. It is for them 
a frightful bore, a foolish superstition, an evil 
influence or a haunting specter, or in some other 
way distasteful..... They resent intellectual 
inquiry into religion as much as the religious 
, devotees we described in the first group.
Everyone will recognize how true are the descriptions of 
these two classes. Wieman makes no attempt to explain them psychologi- 
cally. But it will be seen at once, we believe, that the activity of 
these two classes with respect to religion is carried on almost entirely, 
°r at least predominantly, on the ideational level. With respect to
!  Op. dit., p. 36.
2 « Op. dit., pp. 36-37,
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religion individuals of the first class possess a strong sentiment 
of the favorable type, while individuals of the second class possess 
a strong sentiment of the unfavorable type.
As over against these Wieman describes the third class as 
intellectually alive in the direction of religion.
Religion is for them a problem - for some of them 
the greatest problem of all human living. They do 
not think merely to defend their religion against 
attack. They think in order to understand. They 
turn the full light of intellectual inquiry upon 
the holy of holies. Religion may be no less precious 
to them than to the first group, but for them the ^ 
most precious things are subjects for investigation.
Here we have a description of religion on the conceptual level, where 
conscious intelligence becomes a factor in the direction of religious 
activity. On the conceptual level man consciously examines the con- 
cepts of his religion, of which he has hitherto been almost unconscious, 
to discover their conditions and consequences. He examines his 
values, his concepts, his methods; he reconstructs his concepts; dis- 
covers new values; adopts new methods; forms new purposes. Religion at 
the conceptual level uses the best results of all the sciences, of 
philosophy and of its own clear insight. It is very disturbing because 
it is so challenging. It demands the reconstruction of habits of 
thinking, feeling, desiring, willing, and acting. It is difficult 
because it requires vigorous self-discipline and a spirit of high 
adventure to live up to its new discoveries.
Op. cit., p. 37.
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It is interesting to find Wieman practically excluding 
the first two classes from religion. He says they think about 
religion from the outside. It is only those who are intellectually 
alive to religion who look at it from the inside. Certainly we must 
agree that the highest type of religion is that of the highest mental 
level, but we cannot afford to define religion in such terms as will 
exclude the religious sentiment. let many if not most philosophers 
restrict religion to the conceptual level.
Religion at the conceptual level, which we may refer to 
as Ideal religion, may be defined as devotion to an ideal regarded 
as worthy of man 1 s absolute devotion and dependence upon a being 
regarded as worthy of man's absolute dependence. The highest unity 
of these two notions would be where the divine ideal is found in 
the divine being as the divine will, the content of which is the 
highest good, but whose purposes have not yet been fully realized.










The views of McDougall as the leading exponent of instinct- 
psychology are expounded as a basis for the chapter. His 
analysis of the emotion of reverence and his exposition of 
its gradual development in the life history of the individual 
and of the race are accepted. Objections are raised against 
his derivation of the gods from the social nature of sub- 
mission. It is shown that objects and forces may arouse 
submission without being personalized and that they may be 
personalized without arousing submission. Some of the short- 
comings of rationalistic and subjective theories of religious 
origins are pointed out and it is held that the idea of the 
religious object has a valid objective reference and that 
although it is cognitive in character it is unmediated by 
rational inference.
Among the recent writers on psychological subjects none 
has been more widely followed in the analysis and classification of 
the emotions than Professor William McDougall. In his "Social 
Psychology" and other works McDougall takes the position that 
reverence is the religious emotion par excellence. He develops the 
theory that the origin and development of the religious emotion of 
reverence came about through the synthesizing and blending of cer- 
tain native tendencies and their natural emotions, and that it may 
vary in quality according to the number, kind, and relative strength 
of its various components. McDougall has thus given the clearest 
exposition of religious origins from the point of view of instinct-
no.
psychology. And since he is also the most distinguished champion 
of the instincts and their part in individual and social psychology, 
nothing could be more appropriate than to present his views as the 
basis of the present chapter.
25. The Development of Reverence in the Individual and in the Race
McDougall analyzes one type of reverence as being a binary 
compound of awe and gratitude, both of which are complex. Gratitude 
is composed of two primary emotions, subjection and tender emotion, 
while awe is made up of the primary emotion of fear and the complex 
emotion of admiration which is itself a blend of wonder and subjection.
Another analysis of this emotion which McDougall calls a
2
"different kind of reverence" presents it as a compound of the pri- 
mary emotion of fear and the complex emotion of tender admiration. 
Tender admiration is made up of tender emotion and admiration, the 
latter of which is a blend of wonder and subjection.
In his discussion our author does not actually begin with 
reverence and proceed to analyze it but he begins with one of the 
primary emotions or a combination of them and shows how the emotion 
of reverence may be built up. The following diagrams represent the 
composition of the two kinds of reverence referred to above.
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It will be noted that in the first type subjection enters from two 
sources, as an element of both admiration and gratitude, while in 
the second type it enters only through admiration. Thus it is seen 
to vary in degree and so to make enough difference in the total 
pattern of the emotion for the author to refer to them as different 
kinds of reverence.
While these diagrams are valuable as showing at a glance 
the emotions which are blended in the complex experience of reverence 
it is not meant to suggest by them that this exceedingly complex 
emotion is often, or ever, evoked by a situation or object on its first 
presentation to an individual. On the contrary, reverence is likely to 
be a development, extending over a considerable period of time and 
involving the synthesis of simpler constituents, in the form of senti- 
ments, into the experience and finally into the sentiment of reverence.
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Such a development of the sentiment of reverence in the 
"natural" man, McDougall has brilliantly sketched in his "Outline 
of Psychology* 11 He imagines a small community of men grown up to- 
gether in detachment from all tradition. One of these men, whom he 
calls "Mowgli" after the hero of Kipling's "Jungle Tales," he 
describes as follows:
Mowgli would enjoy all the sensory capacities that 
we enjoy and, in respect of the natural objects 
with which he was led by his instincts to concern 
himself, his powers of perceptual discrimination 
would probably be very highly developed, as we find 
among many savages. He would be endowed with the 
instincts which we have seen reason to suppose are 
common to the higher gregarious mammals. He would 
be moved, on the perception of various objects and 
situations, to strive impulsively toward the natural 
goals of his instincts. He would experience the 
appetites or cravings of his several instincts and 
the emotional excitements proper to them. He would 
feel pleasure or satisfaction on success, pain or 
displeasure on failure or thwarting of his im- 
pulsive efforts. He would have no command of 
language, beyond a few emotional cries and inter- 
jections, aided by expressive gestures.^
Let us imagine Mowgli discovering the entrance to a deep
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cave. Impelled by curiosity, he enters and penetrates cautiously
until the light grows dim. Suddenly a very loud rumbling resounds 
through the cave. Mowgli flees in terror but when he reaches his 
own abode and many times thereafter he lives again through the ex- 
perience in imagination. In imagination he depicts the source of 
the noise as some great agency capable of seizing and devouring him. 
The thought of this vague agency fills him with fear but at the same
1. p. 209 ff.
2. Ibid, p. 205.
3. Ibid^ pp. 209 ff.
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time arouses his curiosity. One day finding himself near the cave, 
he approaches nearer still, and, finally, impelled by curiosity and 
restrained by fear he ventures in, with extreme caution, ready to 
flee at the least sound. Nothing happens, and he (perhaps with com- 
panions) ventures farther than before and finds a spring of cool, 
clear water, at which he slakes his thirst. After this discovery, 
when Mowgli dwells in imagination on this place he not only feels fear 
and curiosity (or wonder) but he feels humble before the power which 
has given what he needs and values. Mowgli and his companions now 
frequent this spot and make their home near it. In time of drought 
the spring does not fail them and they feel gratitude as when a 
fellow-hunter shares his game with them and place within the cave 
small objects of value such as they would give to one another in ex- 
change for some gift. Mowgli, the "natural11 man, has now developed 
a rudimentary religious sentiment, a sentiment of awe, developing by 
the addition of gratitude, into one of reverence. "His imagination 
would have provided him with an object on which the various impulses 
of this sentiment are centered; and, whenever he may approach this 
spot or think of it in any way, these various impulses will be stirred 
within him, one or another more strongly than the rest, according to 
the circumstances of the moment. 11
Even in the religious development of the individual of the 
present day it is hardly possible that any situation would evoke the 
complex experience of reverence on its first presentation without some
1 » Outline of Psychology (1918), p. 210.
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basis in sentiment already formed. It takes time to develop the 
emotion of reverence. In the case of primitive man this is adequately 
suggested in McDougall's description of Mowgli's experiences.
According to McDougall, the genesis of the religious senti- 
ment of reverence involved a long and gradual development in racial 
history. As a result of a long period of evolution awe was achieved 
toward the terrible forces of nature. Gratitude toward the beneficent 
powers arose later, and much later still these were united in reverence 
for powers conceived of in such a way as to evoke this complex emotion.
The history of religion seems to show us the 
gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. 
Primitive religion seems to have kept separate 
the superhuman objects of its component emo- 
tions, the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on 
the one hand, the kindly beneficent powers that 
inspired gratitude on the other. And it was not 
until religious doctrine had undergone a long 
evolution that, by a process of syncretism or 
fusion, it achieved the conception of a Deity 
whose attributes were capable of evoking all   
the elements of the complex emotion of reverence.
McDougall's exposition, thus far and subject to our previous 
criticism of his view of the instincts and emotions, we accept. We 
do not regard sentiment as the highest form of religion, however, and 
reverence would have to be connected with a religious disposition on 
the conceptual level before we could call it the religious emotion 
Bar excellence.
!  Social Psychology (1918), Ch. XIII, 
2. Ibid^ p. 139.
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24. Origin of Man's Belief in the Gods
Professor McDougall says that the awe-inspiring powers 
were the first gods to be recognized by man. Fear of the unusual, 
the mysterious, the threatening, came first. But with the develop- 
ment of language and the capacity for a fuller life of ideas, the 
instinct of curiosity must have been more and more frequently excited 
lay what had previously been only terrifying. This instinct must have 
kept man's thoughts on these experiences in awful contemplation of 
the objects of his wonder and fear, and he began to evolve theories 
to account for his terrible and mysterious experiences. We must 
assume that man knew nothing of mechanical causation.
The fall of bodies to the ground, the flowing of 
water, the blowing of the wind, the motions of 
the heavenly bodies, the growth and movements of 
animals and plants, thunder, lightning, rain, 
fire, and the emission and reflection of light 
and heat - these are prominent among the things 
that interest him, and in none of them is there 
any obvious indication of mechanical operation. 
The one kind of causation with which the un- 
cultured man is thoroughly familiar is his own 
volitional action, issuing from feeling, emo- 
tion, and desire5 and this naturally and in- 
evitably becomes for him the type on which he 
models his theories of the causation of terrible 
events. ̂
Let us note carefully that man's wonder would not likely be 
aroused by the gentle and beneficent events of nature. He was en- 
thralled only by the terrible things which thoroughly upset his 
equilibrium: disease and death, pestilence and famine, storm and
1 « Social Psychology (1918), pp. 310 ff. 
2. Ibid., p. 311.
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flood, lightning and thunder, and the powerful beasts of prey. These 
are apt to come suddenly, irregularly, apparently capriciously. About 
these man f s imagination chiefly played. "Hence it followed that the 
powers which his imagination created for the explanation of these events 
were conceived by him more or less vaguely as terrible powers ready at 
every moment to bring disaster upon him and his community." There- 
fore he walked in fear and trembling lest he should give offence to 
them. As soon as he began to regard them as personal he humbled him- 
self in submission.
Or, perhaps, it would be truer to say that as man 
began to form conceptions of these forces of nature, 
they evoked in him the impulse and emotion of this 
instinct, threw him into the submission attitude, 
characteristic of this instinct, which is essentially 
a personal attitude, one implying a personal re- 
lation; and primitive man, finding himself in this 
attitude before these powers was thus led to per- 
sonify them, to attribute to them the personal 
attributes of strength and anger, which are the ,> 
normal and primitive excitants of this instinct.
Thus his emotion took the complex form of awe; he not only wondered 
at and feared but humbled himself before these powers and sought to 
gain and to obey the slightest indication of their wills.
McDougall's theory, so far as it deals with the primacy of 
awe in the developing of reverence, seems incontrovertible. It seems 
beyond doubt that the terrible events would force themselves on the 
attention of man and require an adjustment to themselves before the 
milder powers.
1 » Social Psychology (1918), p. 512.
2. TMrlIbid.
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The notion that the idea of personal supernatural powers 
arises out of the social nature of submission and admiration which 
demands a personal reference for these emotions is not so convincing. 
Dr. Kenneth Edward questions this point and quite correctly concludes, 
we think, that the invariably social character of submission (or 
admiration of which it is a part) requires to be scrutinized and much 
more firmly established before such a far-reaching conclusion is 
founded upon it.
We do not wish to deny that the feeling of submission often, 
even generally, has a personal reference. But we feel that submission 
may be evoked by certain stimuli to which personality would not 
necessarily be attributed. Things which surpass a man in some quality 
such as strength or size may evoke the attitude of wonder and sub- 
mission, we believe, without the feeling of personality. Such objects 
would probably need to be familiar and friendly or comparatively un- 
related to or indifferent to man f s values. From his earliest years 
the writer has admired large sturdy trees. They seemed so strong and 
so calm in a world which so continuously upset the growing boy's 
equilibrium that he often gazed at them in admiration, even to the 
strengthening of his own character, yet never attributed to them per- 
sonality. Yet he freely attributed personality to those objects and 
events which bore directly on his values: the crashing thunderstorm 
that bore down upon his lake, blackening the waters beneath him and 
tossing his little boat mercilessly as he struggled in vain against
Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 64,
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the mighty windj the seared, grizzled, old mountain-peaks of the 
Southern Rockies, vaulted against the sky, their gleaming eyes 
searching far and near the burning desert sands - these came to the 
boy with animus and intent, as William James said the earthquake 
came to him; they menaced his values. It certainly cannot be doubted 
that submission is often evoked "by circumstances which appear as if 
they possessed intelligence and intention toward the subject. But it 
would seem that the attribution of personality to these circumstances 
is the exciting cause of the feeling of submission rather than the 
result of it. In our view, the original fear experience of Mowgli 
upon hearing the rumbling in the cave contained the datum out of which 
an image of its source might easily develop. McDougall himself says, 
as we have shown above, that in imagination he depicts the source of 
the noise as some great agency capable of seizing and devouring him. 
There certainly is no guarantee that that agency will not be depicted 
as personal, especially since, as we have seen also, primitive man 
knows nothing of mechanical causation.
In the experience of the boy on the lake battling to make 
the shore, against the resistance of wind and wave, against the threat 
of swirling black water and roaring, crashing thunder, there is an 
almost irresistible tendency to personify the threatening and opposing 
elements. But the tendency does not arise from an experience of sub- 
mission. All those fearful aspects of the situation that imply 
intention, purpose, attitude - these, also, are aspects of the datum 
which when elaborated by the imagination becomes the terrible ob.lect
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of the experience. As Professor Koehler says: "All physical events 
or states which send similar constellations of stimuli to our eyes 
and ears, as issue from the physical body of another person, will 
look or sound 'emotional, 1 'restless, 1 'directed toward something, 1 
'determined,' and so forth just as a living person does." Now such 
qualities as "angry," "restless," "opposing me," "powerful," "determined," 
and so forth even singly are often sufficient to suggest the configura- 
tion of "personality." Where several of them are combined it would 
seem difficult for the primitive man to avoid sensing among the 
phenomena which possess these characteristics a being similar to him- 
self. When looked at in this way the facts do not seem to warrant the 
view that such attribution is limited to the results ensuing from 
the arousal of the emotion of submission.
Our second objection to McDougall's view is that it seems 
to imply that personality and certain personality traits were 
attributed by primitive man to the objects of his submission as a 
result of inference. If this is the right interpretation of McDougall's 
meaning then he is open to the charge of rationalism and religious sub- 
jectivism. Since these problems will be confronted again and again in 
the discussions which are to follow, we shall give them an extended 
treatment here and thus early place before the reader our views on 
these important matters.
1. Koehler: Gestalt Psychology (1929), p. 264.
120,
25. The Objectivity of the Gods
1 
Doctor Kenneth Edward in his Kerr Lectures takes the
g 
criticism which Dr. Rudolph Otto directs against Schleiermacher 1 s
rationalism and develops it as a "challenge alike to the conclusions 
of the whole American school of religious psychology from Hall and 
James to Leuba and Pratt, and to those of the current general and 
social psychology in its dealing with religion, as exemplified in 
McDougall."5
Edward says of McDougall's view, which we have presented 
above, that although it is a process of association rather than one 
of complete and formal inference, the principle is the same, "If 
the human mind does not infer the divine, in this case, it at least 
jumps f to the conclusion* of divine beings or a divine being, God
is reached, it may be, by a leap of the imagination. But the point
4 
is that the idea is subjectively produced from the emotional state."
Very similar to this view is the theory arising from both psychological 
and historical investigation, that religion is the resultant of fear, 
wonder, and awe awakened in primitive man by the fearsome and in- 
explicable in nature. Powers are invoked to account for the latter, 
and the idea of gods finds birth. Here, again, the idea of the divine 
is a conclusion, and the origin a subjective process.
Edward maintains that these explanations overlook an im- 
portant objective factor which he believes that Otto has apprehended,
1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), Lecture III.
2. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923).
3. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), pp. 65-66.
4. Ibid, p. 64.
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and he points out this factor in Otto f s own words as follows: 
"Rather, the 'creature-feeling 1 is itself a first subjective con- 
comitant and effect of another feeling-element, which casts it like 
a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary 
reference to an object outside the self." This object is the 
"numinous" and Edward says that "while the numinous experience is 
of a highly emotional character it contains a definitely cognitive
element. It contains an objective datum* It is, therefore, a form
o 
of perception. The numen is felt as objective and outside the self."
Now if Edward ! s interpretation of McDougall's meaning is 
correct we feel that his criticism is justified. And there are some 
sentences in McDougall's discussion which seem to indicate that 
Edward's interpretation is correct. For example, consider the 
following passage: In considering the fact that we admire natural 
objects, flowers, shells, landscapes, etc., where no known person is 
called to mind as the object of our admiration, he says,
Just because admiration implies and refers to 
another person, is essentially, in so far as it 
involves negative self-feeling (submission), an 
attitude towards a person, it leads us to postulate 
a person or personal power as the creator of the 
object that calls it forth. Hence in all ages 
the admiration of men for natural objects has led 
them to personify the power, or powers, that have 
brought those objects into being, either as super- 
human beings who have created, and who preside over, 
particular classes of objects, or as a Supreme 
Creator of all things; and, if the intellect re- 
jects all such conceptions as anthropomorphic 
survivals from a ruder age, the admiration of 
natural objects still leads men to personify, under ^ 
the name of Nature, the power that has produced them.
1. Ditto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 10; Quoted by Edward: 
Religious Experience (1926), p. 65.
2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 65.
3. Social Psychology (1918), pp. 134-135.
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To say that the experience of submission leads us to 
postulate a personal power, seems like describing a rational process, 
involving inference. If McDougall means that the idea of gods 
originated by inference from the emotional experience of submission, 
then we must disagree with him. It is as though we became frightened 
in the woods, and came home, thought the matter over and concluded 
that the particular quality of the fear which we felt indicated that 
we had met a bear. The fact is that men do not postulate causes for 
their fear, anger, submission, or any other emotion. They see them. 
Some configuration in the environment gives rise to the emotional 
response and normal men usually know what it is that gives rise to 
their feelings. Mowgli knows very well that it was the "big noise" 
which frightened him. The boy does not have to go home and wonder 
about his experience on the lake to account for his fear. He cannot 
think of the swirling black water without feeling the fear. It 
looked angry; it seemed powerful; it resisted his efforts to escape. 
The whole storm situation was after him. If Mowgli could talk we 
might ask Mm what sort of noise he heard. He probably would answer 
that it was a loud, angry voice. The boy would be certain to say 
that it tried to blow hfcn away from shore and sink him.
Now if any inferences, resulting in the attribution of 
personality to natural events or to account for natural events, are 
drawn by primitive man, are we not bound to say that they begin with 
these perceived qualities - such as "angry," "powerful," "opposing 
- in the environment, rather than with his own feelings which
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result from the perception of these qualities? That these qualities 
are directly perceived in the environment Koehler has conclusively 
shown. Therefore, in so far as McDougall derives personification 
from the feelings of the individual which really result from his 
perception of qualities or attitudes in the environment, his theory 
does not fit the facts, and we cannot follow him.
But when we read McDougall sympathetically we find many 
suggestions of the view we have just presented, and we are somewhat 
uncertain regarding the adequacy of Edward f s interpretation. For 
example take the passage (p. 312) which we have already quoted. He 
says that as soon as man began to regard the powers as personal he 
humbled himself before them. Then he changes and says perhaps it 
would be truer to say that as man began to form conceptions of 
these forces of nature, they threw him into the submissive attitude 
and finding himself in this attitude he was led to personify them. 
Here is a very plain admission of some cognitive element preceding 
submission - even a statement that the attribution of personality 
preceded the feeling of submission. The latter is changed imme- 
diately and one feels that the author is satisfied with neither of 
his formulations. Perhaps if he had not already been committed to 
the social nature of submission he might have arrived at a more
satisfactory conclusion.
2 
Again, in another passage which we have also quoted,
McDougall says that admiration has led men in every age to postulate
1. Op. cit., Ch.
2. Social Psychology (1918), pp. 134-135.
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a personal power as the creator of the object that calls it forth. 
The word postulate is unfortunate but when one examines the state- 
ment it turns out again that McDougall has not accounted for the 
gods as inferences from an emotion but he regards them as imagined 
beings such as might account for the perceived objects which give 
rise to the emotion.
It must be admitted that McDougall ! s formulations are 
ambiguous, and his words can be interpreted in a way which justifies 
the criticism of his explanation of the origin of religion as a leap 
from the subjective feeling of submission to the objective idea of 
a god to account for it. Thus he is to some extent open to the 
charges of subjectivism and rationalism. But, on the other hand, 
we feel that the charge of subjectivism is considerably mitigated 
by the considerations we have suggested above and that the charge 
of rationalism may not be as serious as Edward makes it.
1 
Edward says that there is an objective datum, a cognitive
element, a form of perception in the numinous experience. Let us 
inquire into the meaning of this statement and try to understand, 
if we can, what this cognitive element is. We say, "if we can,"
because there are those who believe that we cannot. Otto is one of
2 
these. He says that the creature-feeling is a subjective effect of
another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in
1. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 65.
2. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), Ch. III.
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itself has Immediate and primary reference to an object outside the 
self. By creature-feeling is meant "the emotion of a creature, 
abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that 
which is supreme above all creatures." It is analogous to but is 
not the same as a feeling of absolute dependence in a natural sense. 
It differs from such feeling in its intrinsic character and not 
merely in degree. As to the feeling-element which gives rise to the 
creature-feeling, casting it like a shadow, its character can only 
be suggested. Reference is made to a statement of James regarding 
the origin of the Greek gods in which he says: "It is as if there 
were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of 
objective presence, a perception of what we call Something there, 1 
more deep and more general than any of the special and particular
'senses 1 by which the current psychology supposes existent realities
2 
to be originally revealed." Now, says Otto, "This f feeling of
reality,* the feeling of a 'numinous 1 object objectively given, must 
be posited as a primary immediate datum of consciousness, and the
'feeling of dependence 1 is then a consequence, following very closely
3 
upon it, viz. a depreciation of the subject in his own eyes."
"Feeling of dependence" in this sentence is the same as "creature- 
feeling" and we can now see what it is that makes it "something more
4 than and other than a mere feeling of dependence," in a natural
sense. It is that it is evoked "toy the "feeling of a 'numinous 1
1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 10.
2. James: Varieties of Religious Experience (1922), p. 58.
3. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 11, footnote.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
126,
object objectively given," and so in some sense partakes of the 
numinous character*
Here then is our objective datum, so far as Otto is con- 
cerned. It is a "feeling of a numinous object objectively given," 
Thus expressed it is impossible for psychology to deal with it as 
with other feelings, because the feelings with which psychology deals 
are qualities of the individuals activity in response to per- 
ceptions or thoughts. It is not their function to apprehend that 
which is objective, but to qualify that which is subjective. Of 
course it is possible to speak of numinous feeling, meaning the 
quality of our feelings as we respond to numinous objects. But 
that is exactly what Otto calls creature-feeling, and helps us 
none at all in answering the question, How is the numinous appre- 
hended?
It is evidently this question which Otto desires to give 
help in answering. We may inquire then whether the "feeling of a 
numinous object objectively given" is a phrase intended to describe 
a cognitive state. Edward thinks it is. He says, "It is claimed 
to be a state of immediate apprehension. Its content is entirely 
distinctive and is, therefore, apprehended in a distinctive way, 
with a feeling which characterizes it alone and which is recognizable
though naturally not describable in terms of any other content of
gconsciousness. 11 Then he goes on to point out that this is why
Otto insists on the "unspeakable" nature of the numinous experience.
1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 11.
2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 68.
127.
Otto frankly takes the view that it is not the sort of thing that 
can be dealt with by "natural" psychology. Edward thinks it can
be dealt with lay psychology in terms of the elements of conscious- 
ly 
ness known to it. But the only help he gives us on the question
of how the numinous is apprehended is to inform us that it is im- 
mediately apprehended and that it can be communicated not in words
5 
but by direct induction. If we understand Edward ! s view correctly
he supposes that numinous objects are apprehended in some way in- 
dependent of any known sensory mechanism.
Now if immediate apprehension (i.e., not mediated by any 
known afferent mechanism) of any object whatsoever can be estab- 
lished it is the business of the psychologist to recognize it and 
to relate it to the other facts of psychology. And if the psycholo- 
gist refuses to accept the principle of immediate apprehension in a 
given case he is obligated at least to recognize whatever facts 
there are in the case and, having recognized them, either to explain 
them or to confess his inability to do so. We do not wish to take 
upon ourselves the burden of proving that there is no such thing as 
the immediate apprehension of numinous objects. But we believe that 
the relevant facts regarding the "numinous" feeling and the appre- 
hension of "numinous" objects can be adequately explained without 
assuming that our apprehension of them is not mediated by any known 
afferent mechanism, such as the visual and auditory sensory mechanisms.
!  Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 8.
2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), p. 67.
3. Ibid., p. 182.
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We believe that Koehler has adequately demonstrated 
that our apprehension of certain subjective experiences of other 
people, such as emotions of fear, anger, etc., attitudes of 
interest,aversion, etc., and purposes, at the beginning of their 
execution, of approach, attack, avoidance, etc., is of a direct 
character in the sense that it is involved in the perceptual process 
of the organization of the sensory field and that secondary processes 
such as memory and reflective thought are not involved. That is to 
say that we perceive other people as "angry," "calm," "excited," 
"reaching for," "opposing me," etc. We do not perceive certain con- 
stellations of stimuli, reflect upon them, and draw conclusions 
regarding the probable subjective experiences of those whom we are 
observing. Of course we may learn to do so and we may learn also 
to hide our emotions by giving expression to them in "unnatural" 
ways. But animals, very small children, and primitive man would not 
be expected to do either. Furthermore our own reactions (i.e. the 
reactions of "natural" man unaffected by the artificial products 
of culture) are based upon these direct perceptions of the atti- 
tudes of others rather than upon inferences.
Let us apply this principle to the problem in hand - let 
us say, to the problem of the origin of the feeling of submission. 
McDougall says that the primary excitant of this feeling is the 
presence of a person bigger and more powerful than oneself. Now 
let us imagine that we are standing on the brink of the Grand Canyon
1. McDougall: Social Psychology (1918), p. 134.
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of the Colorado at the point where it is eleven miles wide, and 
more than a mile deep. It stretches away to the right and to the 
left some forty miles each way. Beneath us are whole ranges of 
what would be mountains if they were above the line of our regard. 
There are chasms of awful depth, black and mysterious. The colors 
are indescribably brilliant in the sun, mysterious, tantalizing in 
the shadows - altogether beautiful, and terrible. Here, if any- 
where, one feels submissive. Standing here one is completely un- 
done, entirely surpassed. It yawns, not in drowsiness but in 
terrible menace. One draws back, yet one is fascinated, and must 
approach it again. One speaks in a low voice, for a mighty silence 
broods over the canyon - a silence borne upon the deep, whispering 
roar of the rushing torrent far down in its deeps. It is not a 
silence of the dead - the canyon is decidedly alive, vibrant, with 
restless energyI Busy with its own affairs, it is magnificently 
indifferent to man, so long as he stays away from it, yet any man 
who fails to adjust himself to its dominion and power when he 
approaches it, it threatens with instant death.
Let us now ask whether we can say what it is in this 
situation that gives rise to our feeling of submission. We believe 
that we can. Of course our feeling is not simply submission, but 
awe which is composed of other emotions blended with submission. 
This makes our task difficult. And our difficulties are increased 
by the fact that one emotion and impulse may be stimulated by one 
aspect of the situation and as our reaction develops, the aspect
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of the situation changes and a new emotion and impulse are called 
into activity either as the sole constituent of consciousness or 
blended with those already in process. For example, one who, 
without knowing what to expect, walks rapidly up to the canyon, 
finds himself having come suddenly upon the very brink of a chasm 
of such monstrous proportions that he draws back in surprise and 
fear. From a safer position he begins curiously to observe this 
extraordinary phenomenon. But it does not easily fit into his 
scheme of knowledge. He looks across, down, to the right, to the 
left; he explores the deep chasms, the great boulders, the young 
mountains beneath him; he observes the colors; he tries to trace 
the course of the river - heroically he attempts to recognize, to 
classify, to organize this thing with his other experience. But 
it is the new wine which bursts the old bottles; it will submit 
to no category in terms of which he is accustomed to think. Very 
likely he will say, "It is like nothing else on earth." His attempt 
to measure it with his mind is baffled. He begins again, drawing 
nearer, growing more serious. His eyes pass from a great boulder 
to a dark and deep chasm which he had not noticed before, and he 
draws back with a start and a slight shudder; in imagination he 
walks beside the rushing river on those slippery dark ledges of rock 
but the place is too unfriendly, too treacherous, too terrible; now 
he lifts his eyes to gaze in rapture at the colors, but soon they 
begin to take on strange, haunting, fearful, fascinating con- 
figurations in his mind. And so on. No matter in what way he may 
try to master this thing, he is baffled, completely undone,
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thoroughly mastered. Even if he goes down into the thing he comes 
back knowing as little about it as ever. There it is, mysterious, 
haunting, alive, menacing, baffling, indifferent to those who 
keep their distance, impelling all to draw near.
Our feeling of submission is bound up with this whole ex- 
perience and it takes time for the experience to develop. The 
experience of one who runs jauntily up to the canyon, takes one 
glance, and comes away is very different from that of one who ob- 
serves it for some hours and tries to understand it. Perhaps no 
one really understands it, but the person who observes it for some 
time knows that he does not, whereas one who merely glances at it 
may think that he does. To the person who observes it for a long 
time it becomes a unique moment of experience. Models and pictures 
of the canyon which enable us to grasp it in one perceptual image 
do not satisfy those who have seen the original. They do not 
satisfy precisely because that which makes the canyon unique in 
experience is not to be found in models and pictures. All those 
configurations of sound and light and shade and color and movement 
which in experience are perceived as vastness, mystery, power, 
restlessness, illusiveness, dazzling brilliance, super-human subtlety, 
the appearance of being alive, the appearance of awesome gravity, the 
appearance of having a mouth so deep and a voice so "big" that if 
it ever spoke it would rend the earth asunder, the appearance of con- 
cern with its own affairs, the appearance of infinite power and 
urgency in the protection of itself from molestation by man - these
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and others do not appear in models and pictures. They do not appear 
because there is not time to develop them in the effort to organize 
our perception of the whole; because the model is not built on a 
sufficiently grand scale to baffle our efforts at organizing our 
perception of it; because it is not vague enough to defeat our efforts 
to comprehend it and at the same time to be capable of having its 
various elements organized as constituents of more than one con- 
figuration, form, or appearance; because we are not in looking at 
or reacting to the model compelled to adjust ourselves to it but 
may adjust it to ourselves; and because there is in the model or 
picture no possible menace to our values.
We may organize our perception of the model and the 
picture immediately and to that extent "understand" them without 
effort. We master them without in the least jeopardizing our values. 
We never master the original, but we are again and again completely 
baffled, utterly surpassed, altogether undone in the attempt; and 
with all our values threatened, at that. The impenetrable mystery 
of the thing, its apparently omnipotent power of baffling us, its 
incomprehensible vastness, its awesome gravity, its ponderous silence, 
its weird hypnotic attraction, its yawning mouth - these are some 
of the qualities which evoke the attitude of submission. And these 
are qualities that are directly perceived. And when we come away 
they are conserved in our memories as integral parts of the total 
mental system which we symbolize by the phrase "Grand Canyon." 
When they are experienced as present in perception or in imaginative
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recall they give rise to the emotion which we symbolize by the 
word "submission."
Here, then, is the genesis of the emotion of submission; 
here the objective datum. It is a constellation of stimuli per- 
ceived as a quality of the sort which naturally evokes the emotion. 
This does not make the quality subjective any more than the tree 
outside my window which I perceive is subjective. And it is not 
arrived at by inference from an emotional experience.
As to the other emotions their genesis is the same. They 
are evoked by a perceived quality in or of the situation. For 
example, unless we have a fear sentiment with the idea of a bear as 
the central core, the mere sight of a bear in a cage does not evoke 
in us the emotion of fear. It is only when he is perceived as 
"attacking me" or "liable to attack me" that the situation is a 
fearful one. And so we might go over the whole list of the emotions 
involved in reverence and show that it is the perception of a quality 
in the situation or the reproduction of such perception in memory 
that evokes them.
Now let us press the question, How is it that "natural" 
man comes to attribute personality to natural objects and events? 
From the foregoing discussion it may appear to the reader that it 
would be easy for the writer to attribute personality to the Grand 
Canyon. Barring the effects of civilization it would likely be 
difficult not to do so. Why? Because so many personal qualities 
are organized as integral parts of the total mental configuration
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that results from our perceptual efforts. Koehler has shown 
that, in the perceptual process of organizing the sensory field, 
certain details not in the objective constellation of stimuli tend 
to be supplied in the process of organization. Now such qualities 
as "alive," "occupied with its own affairs," "not to be inter- 
fered with," "gravity," "silence," "subtlety," etc., would certainly 
be capable of furnishing the basis for a sense of personality asso- 
ciated with the total configuration of this extremely complex ob- 
ject. Or if we reject Koehler 1 s conclusions the theory of meaning
2 
would give us the same results. In the experience of primitive
man we should no doubt find, if we could examine it, not only a 
perception of what we may call "something there" but often a per- 
ception of what we might call somebody there. The perception of 
somebody there would necessarily be vague. It would not often be 
an image, though that would be possible as we well know, in the 
case of those who see ghosts, etc., and even if an image, not a 
clear one with distinct features. Normally the somebody would be 
hidden. The situation would possess personal characteristics. 
There would be a feeling as if there were a presence. It would be 
"spooky," eerie, weird, unearthly, mysterious. Such perceptual 
data would undergo elaboration both on the ideational or imaginative 
level and to some extent on the conceptual level. On the ideational 
level it might result in the development of an image of a being 
whose features would embody and explain the perceived qualities,
1. Koehler: Gestalt Psychology (1929), Ch. VI.
2. Cf. supra, section 10.
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and on the conceptual level it might result in quite clear state- 
ments as to the character of the invisible objects of man's fear 
and devotion. As the quality of man 1 s thinking advances the con- 
cepts become more advanced, more subtle, more universal, in 
character, while the images gradually diminish in importance until 
they are given up altogether.
We believe that the experience of the observer at the 
Grand Canyon is of the sort that Otto and Edward would describe as 
numinous, and that the feeling which we have called submission, 
using McDougall's terminology, might equally well be called 
"creature-feeling" in the sense in which Otto uses the word. We 
conclude, therefore, that Otto and Edward - and James - are right 
in insisting on the objectivity of the datum which gives rise to 
the creature-feeling, but we insist as against the contentions of 
Otto that the apprehension of this datum is not a feeling-element 
but a cognitive element of perceptual character, subject like other 
perceptions to imaginative and rational elaboration and criticism. 
We feel that the category of the numinous might be valuable in 
psychology but only if it can be related to the other facts of 
psychology in some such way as we have suggested. We cannot assume 
any "numinous consciousness" which is different from ordinary con- 
sciousness except in the quality of its contents. In the next 
chapter we shall compare Otto's analysis of the numinous experience 
with McDougall f s analysis of reverence.
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Chapter V 
MYSTICISM - THE NUMINOUS
Dr. Rudolph Otto is taken as the spokesman for mysticism 
on the subject of the origin of religion. The objective 
character of the numinous and its direct apprehension by 
man are accepted but it is questioned whether such direct 
apprehension can properly be called a feeling-element. 
Exception is taken to the theory that there exists 
numinous emotions similar to but entirely distinct in kind 
(though they are recognized as different in quality) from 
their corresponding natural emotions and with which they 
are associated in such a way that they can arouse and be 
aroused tjy the natural emotions. The superiority of the 
sentiment over a law of association of the feelings as an 
explanatory principle is urged and demonstrated. Although 
the numinous cannot be perceived in its essential nature 
it can be perceived as something which is mysterious, or 
awe-ful, etc., or a combination of the numinous elements, 
and such a perception, contrary to Otto f s view, is cognitive 
in character (though it is not the result of inference) and 
not emotional. The view of Otto that religion is the off- 
spring of history only in so far as history on the one hand 
develops our predisposition (not instinct but capacity) for 
knowing the holy, and on the other is repeatedly a mani- 
festation of the holy is accepted with such substitutions 
as are necessary for one who accepts emergent theory of 
development and regards capacity to rest in the total en- 
vironing situation, including the individual, rather than 
merely in the individual alone.
Dr. Rudolph Otto has taken the position in a significant 
psychological study of religion that the essential element of 
religion is a non-rational (i.e. non-conceptual) or feeling element 
and he has attempted to isolate and bring into the light this
1. Das Heilege f Breslau, 1917, Translated by John W. Harvey, 
The Idea of the Holy. Oxford University Press (1923).
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essential element which he calls the numinous. and to demonstrate 
its relation to the development of religion in the individual and in 
racial history. Dr. Otto is not only a mystic himself but a renowned 
scholar in the field of the mystical literature of both the East and 
the West, and in Das Heilege he has given a representative and authori- 
tative exposition, from the point of view of mysticism, of the origin 
of religion. To the presentation of his view and its criticism we 
shall now address ourselves.
26. The Numinous
Otto says that we must be on our guard against an error that 
would lead to a wrong and one-sided interpretation of religion, viz., 
that the essence of deity can be given completely and exhaustively in 
rational attributions. Indeed even such rational attributes as Spirit, 
Reason, Purpose, Good Will, etc., themselves imply a super-rational 
Subject of which they are predicates. The difference between rationalism 
and profounder religion lies in a difference of quality in the mental 
attitude and emotional content of the religious life. "All depends 
upon this: in our idea of God is the non-rational over-borne, even 
perhaps wholly excluded, by the rational?"
Looking at the matter thus, Orthodoxy has been the mother of 
Rationalism and this rationalistic bias still prevails not only in 
theology but in comparative religion in general, and from top to 
bottom of it. Students in these fields, and especially those who try
1. Op. cit., p. 3.
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to reconstruct the  bases' or 'sources' of religion set as their 
main problem the f evolution 1 of religious concepts and fashion 
ideas and notions of lower value which they regard as paving the 
way for them.
It is always in terms of concepts and ideas that the 
subject is pursued, 'natural 1 ones, moreover, such 
as have a place in the general sphere of man's 
ideational life, and are not specifically religious. 
And then with a resolution and cunning which one 
can hardly help admiring, men shut their eyes to 
that which Is quite unique in the religious ex- -  
perience, even in its most primitive manifestations.
This unique element Otto says, is suggested in the holy. 
Holiness - the holy - is a category of interpretation and valuation 
peculiar to the sphere of religion. It is complex but contains a 
non-rational element or moment which remains inexpressible. The 
word holy comes to us freighted with moral significance but in it 
there is a clear overplus of meaning. Nor is this merely a later 
and acquired meaning. The original words in the Latin, Greek, 
Semitic and other ancient languages denoted first and foremost only 
this overplus. The ethical was not original and never was the whole 
meaning. As a word to stand for this element in isolation, this 
extra in the meaning of 'holy' above and beyond the meaning of good- 
ness he coins from the Latin the word numen from which the adjective 
numinous is derived.
Of the numinous state of mind the author writes: "This 
mental state is perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other;
1. Op. cdt., p. 4-
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and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, 
while it admits of being discussed it cannot be strictly defined." 
If we desire another to understand, the only way we can help is to 
try to awaken the experience in him. It cannot be taught; it can 
only be evoked.
Schleiermacher reaches out toward the numinous in isolating 
the feeling of dependence. But his formulation is unsatisfactory to 
the author in two respects. In the first place, while Schleiermacher 
makes a distinction between the ordinary feeling of dependence and the 
feeling of absolute dependence which is religion, his distinction is 
really based on a difference in degree. But Otto holds that the re- 
ligious feeling is qualitatively different from analogous states of 
mind.
When Abraham ventures to plead with God for the men 
of Sodom, he says (Genesis XVIII:27): 'Behold now, I 
have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am 
but dust and ashes. 1 There you have a self-confessed 
1 feeling of dependence,' which is yet at the same 
time far more than, and something other than, merely 
a feeling of dependence. Desiring to give it a name 
of its own I propose to call it 'creature-consciousness 1 
or creature-feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, 
abashed and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in g 
contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.
This phrase is not a conceptual explanation. It suggests 
the self-abasement into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute 
might of some kind and has to be experienced to be understood.
Our author's second objection to Schleiermacher's formu- 
lation is that his religious category is merely a category of self- 
valuation in the sense of self-depreciation - a feeling concerning
Op. cit., p. 7 
Op. cit., p. 9
140.
one ! s self in a special determined relation, viz., one's dependence. 
Thus we come upon the fact of God only by inference, by reasoning to 
a cause beyond ourselves to account for our feeling of dependence. 
This is opposed to the psychological facts. "Rather the 'creature- 
feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another 
feeling-element which casts it like a shadow but which in itself in- 
dubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside 
the self." This object is the numinous and the feeling of a numinous
object objectively given is the primary immediate datum of conscious-
2 ness which gives rise to the creature-feeling as suggested above.
For the creature-feeling and the sense of dependence to arise in the 
mind the 'numen' must be experienced as present.
In the previous chapter we have argued for the direct per- 
ception of certain characteristics of the environment which gives 
rise to what may be called numinous experience and which has reference 
to what may be called numinous objects or situations. We concluded 
that Otto is right in his insistence on the direct apprehension of 
the numinous, in the sense that it is not mediated by reflective 
thought, and on the objective character of such apprehension. But we 
seriously questioned the appropriateness of characterizing the appre- 
hension of the numinous, which gives rise to numinous emotional 
experience such as "creature-feeling," as a "feeling-element," and 
presented as alternative to this view the view that the apprehension
1. Op. cit., p. 10.
2. Op. cit., Footnote, p. 11.
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of numinous characteristics in an object or situation is a cognitive 
experience of the perceptual variety. It seems to us that Edward is 
correct in maintaining that the primary character of the numinous 
perception itself is all that is necessary to Otto's theory.
27. Numinous Emotions
But Otto insists that the religious feelings are a dis- 
tinctly unique class of emotions and that they are primary in charac- 
ter. They cannot be the same as "natural" emotions; neither can they
be compounds of the "natural" emotions. They are entirely unique,
g
sui generis, definable through themselves alone.
However, Otto recognizes that certain of the "natural" 
emotions are closely analogous to religious emotions. For example, 
he compares the numinous and the sublime and concludes that "the 
idea of the sublime is closely similar to that of the numinous, and
is well adapted to excite it and to be excited by it, while each tends
3 
to pass over into the other." He is at great pains to explain the
phrases "excite" and "pass over into." It is the self that passes
from one feeling to another and not the feeling that makes a transition
4 
into another. The latter would be a transmutation, but he is to be
understood as referring to the replacement of one feeling by another. 
Certain feelings may arouse the numinous because the latter is poten- 
tially already there in the mind, but the numinous is not to be derived
1. Edwards Religious Experience (1926), p. 67.
2. Ottor The Idea of the Holy (1923), p. 9, Ch. VII.
3. Op. cit., p. 43.
4. Op. cit., p. 44.
142.
from any other feeling and is in this sense "unevolvable."
Now let us ask how it is that one emotion arouses, or ex- 
cites, another. Otto supposes it to be due to a law which he calls
2the "Law of the Association of Feelings." He says:
It is a well-known and fundamental psychological law 
that ideas 'attract 1 one another and that one will 
excite another and call it into consciousness, if 
it resembles it. An entirely similar law holds 
good with regard to feelings. A feeling, no less 
than an idea, can arouse its like in the mind; and 
the presence of the one in my consciousness may be 
the occasion for my entertaining the other at the 
same time. 5
It will be instructive to study an example of how Otto 
applies this law. In discussing how the notions of "clean" and 
"unclean" come to have a religious application he shows how the 
unclean gives rise to the natural and protective feeling of disgust. 
Then he continues:
Between this and the feeling of the 'horrible 1 there 
is a very close analogy5 and from this it becomes 
apparent, in accordance with the law of the reciprocal 
attraction of analogous feelings and emotions, how 
the 'natural 1 unclean or impure is bound to pass 
over into, and develop in, the sphere of the numinous. 
Once, in fact, we have in our hand the key of the 
problem - the analogy and the law just mentioned - 
we can reconstruct a priori the actual genetic process 
involved, by which the one emotion prompts the other. 
We indeed have ourselves a direct experience of the 
same thing today in our emotional reaction to the 
sight of flowing blood, in which it would be hard 
to say whether the element of 'disgust' or 'horror' 
is the stronger.^
Later when numinous horror comes on the scene numinous objects 
could become unclean without any substratum of natural impurity
1. Op. cit., p. 45.
2. Op. cit., p. 43.
3. Op. cit., p. 43.
4. Op. cit., p. 127.
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to serve as point of departure.
And we can learn something of the relation in- 
volved from the fact.that in the reverse direction 
the feeling of the numinously impure calls up 
easily by association the 'natural' emotion of 
disgust.....so that things become disgustful or 
loathsome which intrinsically were not objects 
of disgust at all, but of numinous horror. In 
fact such secondary and derived feelings of 
disgust can maintain themselves independently 
long after the original numinous awe which they 
once evoked has died away.^
Let us note from the foregoing the following essential 
points in Otto 1 s theory? (l) the religious or numinous emotions 
such as awe, horror, etc., are entirely unique in quality, and 
irreducible to, though they are analogous to, the 'natural 1 
emotions to which we give the same names; (2) these analogous 
emotions are subject to association because of their similarity 
so that when one is aroused in the mind it tends to awaken the other 
also; (3) an emotion often aroused through association by an analogous 
emotion in connection with some object may be permanently associated 
with the object so that it may be aroused by the object directly 
even after the object has ceased to arouse the original emotion to 
which the derived emotion was due in the first place.
We are inclined to question the first two points and to 
offer substitute explanations for the facts referred to in all three. 
First of all, then, are there primary religious emotions which are 
different from the natural emotions which go by the same names? In
Op. cit., p. 128.
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one sense, of course, there are. There is every reason to believe 
that no two experiences of the "natural" emotion of fear, or of 
wonder, or of disgust, or of any emotion whatsoever, are ever 
exactly the same. Let us take the emotion of fear. The quality of 
any experience of this emotion will be influenced by the type of 
object or situation which stimulates it; the values involved; the 
degree and kind of hazard perceived; the mental state of the subject; 
the type and strength of conative tendency aroused; and the whole 
context of subject-related-to-situation. These elements certainly 
influence the experience of any emotion. There is an extremely wide 
variation in the quality of fear experiences. In a sense they are 
all perfectly unique, individual, sui generis, incommunicable. In 
this sense the "numinous" experience of fear is different from 
"natural" fear, because it is different in quality.
Otto is right in maintaining that the difference between 
the ordinary feeling of dependence and the feeling of absolute de- 
pendence is not one merely of degree, as Schleiermacher says, but 
that there is a real difference in quality. It is very doubtful 
indeed whether any two emotional experiences can differ from each 
other merely in degree. The total configuration of the elements - 
such as perception, impulse, felt bodily changes, direct excite- 
ment within the central nervous system, etc., - which contribute to 
the quality of emotional experience inevitably changes with every 
change in degree of excitement. Therefore a change in degree of 
emotional excitement involves a change in the quality of emotional
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experience. It is only in abstraction that we can say that one 
emotional experience is different from another in degree alone.
We are involved here in the extremely difficult question 
of what constitutes the differentia of an emotion. Does every 
difference in quality mean a difference in kind or may there be 
variations in quality within the limits of the various types or kinds 
of emotional experience? And if the latter be accepted how are we 
then to differentiate between these various types? It seems clear 
from our discussion above that if every difference in quality means 
a difference in kind of emotional experience we shall be hard put 
to it for names to symbolize them all and, furthermore, the same name 
would never fit twice. So if we are to have any intelligible dis- 
cussion whatever of emotional experience it must be on the assumption 
that such experience is capable of being classified according to 
types and that within the types the different constituents will be 
found to vary in degree and quality. Fear and anger are primary types 
of emotional experience which are distinguished even among the most 
primitive peoples and yet there are very many varieties of both fear 
and anger.
How are we able to distinguish between fear and anger? 
Not by the bodily changes involved, as Cannon has shown, and con- 
sequently not by any form of sensation. Not by the nature of the 
stimulus, for what gives rise to fear in one person may arouse anger 
or mirth in another. The distinguishing mark of an emotion Woodworth
n
has shown to be the conative impulse with which it is associated. "
1. Cannon: Bodily Changes in Pain. Hunger. Fear and Rage (1929).
2. Woodworthr How Emotions are Identified and Classified, in 
Wittenberg Symposium (1928).
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It is possible to have the impulse without the emotion, as we have 
shown, but it is probably not possible to have emotion without an 
impulse. We have already seen the reason for this in the fact that 
emotion develops in situations where for any reason an impulse or 
impulses fail to find prompt and adequate satisfaction.
Now if it could be shown that in the presence of "numinous" 
objects man experiences or has a tendency to experience emotional 
excitement with which entirely unique conative impulses are associated 
we should be entitled to regard these emotions as unique and irre- 
ducible to other emotions* But we believe that Otto has not shown 
this. He has evidently sought to locate the differentiating element 
of religious emotions in the object which excites them rather than 
in the conative impulses which are associated with them. If we grant 
this fundamental presupposition then Otto f s distinction between 
"numinous11 and "natural" emotions is perfectly sound. But the 
psychologist cannot grant it simply because it does not explain 
psychological facts. We conclude, therefore, with Edward, though our 
argument is entirely different from his, that "the factor which makes 
the difference in feeling between natural fear, awe, wonder, for 
instance and the religious counterparts of these natural emotions is
simply the tone which they receive from the distinctive quality of
P 
the numinous element itself."
1. Vide supra, section 12.
2. Edward: Religious Experience (1926), pp. 68-69.
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Let us now examine Otto ! s law of the association of the 
feelings. In the first place, it is evident from the way in which 
Otto applies the law that he has not sufficiently distinguished 
between primary emotions and their compounds. For example, in the 
story of his own reaction to the sight of blood he says that his 
feelings of horror and disgust give rise to one another. If 
McDougall's analysis of the emotion of horror is correct it is a 
blend of fear and disgust. In any excitement of the emotion of 
horror disgust would be an element and evidently in Otto 1 s feeling 
at the sight of flowing blood it is a prominent element. But this 
does not mean that the two emotions are associated in such a way 
that they evoke each other. It simply means that he has a complex 
emotional experience of horror which is analyzable into other 
primary experiences. And in this case one of the primary emotional 
constituents is prominent enough to be easily recognizable while 
the other is much weaker and consequently vague and not easily dis- 
tinguished from the complex whole. Consequently disgust and horror 
alternately become prominent in consciousness and seem to evoke one 
another. This is suggested as a possible explanation. Of course it 
is not for us to dogmatize about another's introspections. But one 
has the feeling that once this distinction is clearly made between 
primary and complex emotions, Otto's contentions regarding the close 
similarity between certain emotions and their tendency to arouse one 
another in the mind because of that similarity lose much of their 
force.
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This is not to deny the reality of complex emotions. When 
we analyze horror into fear and disgust it is no longer horror. 
Horror supervenes, emerges, comes into being, as the total emotional 
configuration of which fear and disgust are elements. But even so, 
disgust does not necessarily resemble horror unless in a given ex- 
perience it happens to be a very prominent element in this complex 
emotion. One might properly speak of disgustful horror or fearful 
horror according to whether the one or the other element is more 
prominent. In either case the complex emotion would resemble, or 
be "analogous" to the more prominent primary constituent. But even 
so neither one would give rise to the other in consciousness by 
virtue of any law of association of feeling. Affective experiences 
are excited not by other affective but by cognitive experiences.
The other objection which we wish to raise against Otto f s 
law of the association of feelings is that the facts which he seeks 
to explain by this law are more satisfactorily explained by the 
concept of the sentiment. We have already argued that the appre- 
hension of the "numinous" is cognitive and not affective in character, 
We have just shown that one emotion does not excite another emotion,
but that emotion is aroused by cognition. We have shown in our dis-
g 3 
cussions of sentiment and the religious sentiment that emotional
dispositions may be permanently associated with ideas in such a way 
that when the ideas with which they are associated are present in
1» Vide supra, section 24.
2. Vide supra, section 13.
3. Vide supra, section 21.
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consciousness the emotions also appear. It is now our contention 
that, instead of looking for permanent associations between "numinous" 
emotions and their "natural" counterparts whereby the "numinous" 
feelings are "schematized" in experience by the "natural," we shall 
be more successful in our search if we look for relatively permanent 
associations of emotions with ideas in the form of sentiments.
It is quite evident from what Otto says of his feeling of 
horror at the sight of flowing blood that the emotions of fear and 
disgust have in his own experience become associated with this idea 
to form a sentiment of horror. The emotions are not associated with 
each other because of some similarity, because fear and disgust really 
are not very much alike. They are associated with the idea. And even 
if Otto really means fear where he says horror the concept of senti- 
ment would still give a better explanation of the facts than the idea 
of feelings associated with one another. It is a fact that they are 
associated in a complex but the central core of the complex is idea 
not emotion.
Indeed Otto comes very near admitting this himself. In try-
2
ing to show that numinous horror can by association cause the emotion
of disgust to become attached to some object which may call out this 
emotion even after the numinous awe which the object once evoked has 
died away, he hurls a boomerang. For if there were an association be- 
tween the emotions of disgust and numinous awe in the first place then 
when the emotion of disgust is evoked it ought to arouse numinous awe.
1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), pp. 46-51, 
2» Op. cit., p. 128. Quoted above.
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But he not only says that it does not do so but he speaks of the 
object as evoking both disgust and numinous awe. So far as his 
contention that disgust was associated with the object through its 
likeness to numinous horror is concerned it is entirely unconvincing, 
The emotion might have become associated with the object entirely 
independently. The concept of sentiment not only explains the 
original connection of disgust with the object more satisfactorily 
than Otto's formulation but it enables us to explain completely the 
continuance of this connection after the object no longer evokes 
numinous awe, whereas the law of the association of feelings does
*
not in the least help us to explain this fact.
Many other examples might be cited of Otto's application 
of the "principle of association" where the concept of the religious 
sentiment would be far more adequate. We shall content ourselves, 
however, with only one more example. He says:
The mere word, even when it comes as a living voice, 
is powerless without the "Spirit in the heart" of 
the hearer to move him to apprehension. And this 
Spirit, this inborn capacity to receive and under- 
stand, is the essential thing. If that is there, 
very often only a small incitement, a very remote 
stimulus, is needed to arouse the numinous conscious- 
ness. .... .But where the wind of the Spirit blows,
there the mere "rational" terms themselves are 
endued with power to arouse the feeling of the 
"non-rational," and become adequate to tune the 
mood at once to the right tone. Here "schemati- 
zation" starts at once and needs no prompting.
From our point of view something more is needed than an "inborn 
capacity to receive and understand." The religious sentiment is
1. Op. cit., p. 63.
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necessary in order that words may be religiously evocative. And when 
the sentiment is present in one's mental integration those words 
which symbolize the ideas that form the central part of that senti- 
ment are endued with power to arouse the religious emotions.
Our conclusion, therefore, is: (l) that psychology cannot 
recognize "numinous" fear, wonder, awe, love, etc., as separate pri- 
mary emotions along with the "natural" emotions which go by the same 
names, but the emotion of fear, for example, and other emotions like- 
wise, may vary in quality according to the total pattern of the 
experienced relation of subject to situation. If the experience is 
of such a character that the subject seeks adjustment to a superhuman 
power or superhuman powers which he conceives to have ultimate con- 
trol over that which he greatly values, then the emotions which he 
may experience in the procedure of adjustment may properly be said to 
have a religious quality. (2) Emotions are not associated with one 
another in such a way that when one is activated it arouses similar 
emotions. Affective experience is awakened not by other affective 
experience but by cognitive experience. (3) Two or more emotions 
may be blended into an emergent complex emotion different from any 
of its components, but in such a blending some one constituent is 
usually more prominent than the rest. (4) Emotional dispositions 
may be associated in systems in such a way that when one is awakened 
all the members of the system will be to some extent activated, 
usually one more strongly than the rest. But in such systems the 
emotions are not associated with one another but each one is inde-
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pendently associated with an idea or system of ideas which serve
as the center and organizing principle of the system. Such a system
is properly called a sentiment*
28  Elements of the Numinous
Unlike McDougall, whose analysis of reverence is con- 
cerned with the subjective aspect of religious experience, Otto, 
in his analysis of the "numinous," quite evidently seeks to keep 
his discussion directed toward the objective side of religion. We 
have already examined and supported his argument that the numinous 
is an objective datum of experience. We have now to inquire whether 
as an objective datum the numinous admits of any description and 
if so what are its characteristics.
Otto says that the nature of the numinous is such that 
it cannot be directly described in rational terms; it can only be
suggested by means of the special way in which it is reflected in
2
the mind in terms of feeling. By adducing feelings akin to these
numinous affective states and lay the use of metaphor and symbolic 
expression he endeavours to make these states "ring out, as it were,
of themselves." If the numinous is to be characterized conceptually
3 
at all only one expression is appropriate to it, mvsterium tremendum.
4 
which may be translated, somewhat inadequately, as awe-ful mystery.
It is a mystery inexpressible and above all creatures.
1. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923), Chs. III-VI.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 25.
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Conceptually "mysterium" denotes merely that 
before which the eyes are held closed, that 
which is hidden and esoteric, that which is 
beyond conception or understanding, extra- 
ordinary and unfamiliar. The terra does not 
define the object more positively in its 
qualitative character. But though what is 
enunciated in the word is negative, what is 
meant is something absolutely and intensely 
positive. This pure positive we can ex- 
perience in feelings, feelings which our dis- 
cussion can help to make clear to us, in so 
far as it arouses them actually in our hearts.
Otto quite consistently maintains that the numinous cannot 
be rationally known but that it can only be felt; that our experience 
of the numinous as objectively present is essentially affective in 
character rather than cognitive. We have argued that our direct
apprehension of the numinous as an objective datum in consciousness
2
is not affective but cognitive in character. We must admit, how- 
ever, that Otto's contention has some justification. Some situations 
thoroughly defy our most persistent attempts to understand them, to 
Drganize them into one perceptual whole. Such a situation we have
tried to depict in our description of a young man' s experience of
3 
the Grand Canyon. Such cosmic disturbances as earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, hurricanes, eclipses, the appearance of a comet in the sky 
md such mysterious phenomena as death, birth, deadly epidemics of 
iisease, etc., furnish other illustrations of what for primitive man 
s not only unspeakable mystery, but mystery that vitally affects his 
alues. He knows nothing of their conditions; only enough of their 
ature to fill him with awe. They cannot be related to the rest of
Op. cit., p. 13.
Vide supra, section 24.
Vide supra, section 24.
154.
his knowledge. They transcend his powers of perception and con- 
ception. They break down all his normal and habitual reaction sys- 
tems. That an earthquake or a hurricane is vibrant with raging, 
cataclysmic power, tense and trembling with fury, and bent upon our 
destruction is not mere imagination. These characteristics can be 
perceived. Yet the whole, of which these characteristics are mere 
aspects, cannot be perceived; it is essentially a mystery.
Let us suppose that an individual, or community, is 
threatened by a mysterious something which he cannot perceive or com- 
prehend as a whole, but which clearly displays transcendent power, 
angry attitude, and destructive intent. These aspects of the situation 
are certainly such as we should expect to inspire the impulse to 
escape. But how shall one flee or hide from a hurricane or an earth- 
quake? Or from death? If one cannot oppose, nor yet flee nor hide 
from such a power, what can one do? Perhaps propitiate.
If we refer to our discussion of the types of situations 
which are likely to produce emotion (section 14) we shall see that 
the situation sketched above has several characteristics, any one of 
which would serve to characterize it as an emotional situation: (l) it 
is unclear, so that observation gets no facts to guide action; (2) the 
situation cannot be handled successfully because of lack of under- 
standing and skill; (3) extreme resistance is encountered; (4) the 
situation is often the object of a complex or sentiment developed in 
past experience. As a consequence of the above facts it is possible 
that the emotion may be so violent as to cause partial, or even total, 
dissociation of cortical processes and consequently of the more
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complicated cognitive aspects of experience. At any rate, since the 
situation as a whole is incomprehensible and essentially mysterious, 
and since the emotion is violent, it would be easy in introspection 
to overlook any cognitive content of consciousness altogether. We 
do not wish to deny the essential mystery of the "numinous." In- 
deed it is mysterium tremendum. But we wish again to emphasize the 
fact that the perceptual elements are there as the sine qua npn of 
the emotional elements. We see attitude and intent and magnitude 
and power, rather than form; we perceive, as it were, the invisible, 
in terms of the transient and fleeting, rather than in terms of 
stable and enduring configurations. That which is entirely and 
wholly beyond us could not attract us. We must be able to perceive 
something of its nature else we could neither fear nor love the 
mysterium tremendum. It is those perceived qualities of its nature 
that condition our interest in and form the raw material of our ad- 
justment to the mysterium tremendum; and these must also form the 
basis of any description which we can give of the numinous. As a 
whole it is a great mystery; but certain aspects of its character 
can be perceived and to some extent understood and dealt with. It 
seems to us that it is only on this understanding that we may logi- 
cally proceed with any discussion of the "elements of the numinous." 
According to Otto the numinous has a dual character; it
is "at once an object of boundless awe and boundless wonder, quelling
1 
and yet entrancing the soul." These daunting and fascinating
elements make up the qualitative content of the numinous experience,
g to which "the mysterious" stands as form.
!  Op. cit., p. 42. 
2. Op. cit., p. 31.
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The daunting qualities of the numinous are identified as
(l) absolute unapproachability or awefulness, (2) absolute over-
2 3
poweringness, (3) energy, urgency, vitality, (4) absolute mys-
4teriousness. The quality of absolute unapproachability or aweful- 
ness is reflected in primitive man's experience of daemonic dread 
which is "a quite specific kind of emotional response wholly distinct 
from that of being afraid, though it so far resembles it that the 
analogy of fear may be used to throw light upon its nature." No 
natural fear passes over into it, and the difference between natural 
fear and daemonic dread is not merely one of degree. "The awe or 
dread may be so great that it seems to penetrate to the very marrow, 
making the man's hair bristle and his limbs quake. But it may also
steal upon him almost unobserved as the gentlest of agitations, a
g 
mere fleeting shadow passing across his mood." The peculiar
property of the numen which awakens this numinous dread or terror is
7 
illustrated in the Old Testament concept of the wrath of God. This
wrath is of a non-or super-rational, i.e., numinous, quality. "Some- 
thing super-rational throbs and gleams, palpable and visible, in the 
 Wrath of God,' prompting to a sense of 'terror' which no 'natural 1
Q
anger can arouse."
1. Op. cit., pp. 13-19.
2. Op. cit., pp. 20-23.
3. Op. cit., pp. 23-24.
4. Op. cit., pp. 25-30.
5. Op. clt., p. 13.
6. Op. cit., p. 16.
7. Op. cit., p. 18.
8. Op. cit., p. 19.
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The absolute overpoweringness of the numen awakens creature- 
consciousness in man and this is the raw material of religious
1
humility. The element of overpoweringness may be interpreted pri- 
marily as "plentitude of power" and secondarily as "plentitude of 
being." But man ! s experience of self-depreciation in the presence 
of the transcendent object is not a rational apprehension of a causal 
relation, as Schleiermacher and the rationalists would have it, but 
the direct result of the felt contrast between the supremacy and ab- 




The element of energy or urgency is apprehended in both 
the awefulness and overpoweringness of the nuraen. The philosophic
God of rational speculation can be put into a definition but in the
5 
numinous experience God is the living God. This element of urgency
is recognizable in Schopenhauer's daemonic Will; in Fichte's gigantic,
4 
never-resting, active world stress. These and other "ideograms"
such as vitality, passion, emotional temper, movement, activity, 
violence, etc., form symbolic expressions through which this quality 
of the numinous is signified.
Even the form of the numinous as mysterium is of a daunting 
nature. The mental reaction peculiar to it is called stupor, signi- 
fying blank, staring wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, 
amazement absolute. Mysterium is an ideogram signifying that which
1. Op. dit., p. 20.
2. Op. cit., pp. 21
3. Op. bit., p. 23.
4. Op. dit., p. 24.
5. Op. dit., p. 26.
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is wholly other, outside the canny. It is beyond comprehension not 
merely because our knowledge is limited but because in it we come
upon the "wholly other" whose kind and character is incommensurate
1 
with our own.
But the numinous consciousness has its fascinating character 
as well as its daunting qualities. The concepts related to this ex- 
perience on the rational side are love, mercy, pity, comfort. But 
there are non-rational elements in religious felicity as well as 
religious infelicity. And we have no concepts which exhaust the pro- 
found element of wonderfulness and rapture which lies in the mys-
g
terious, beatific experience of deity. This mystic beatitude man
can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought but can only
3 
know in experience. At its'highest point of stress the fascinating
becomes the "overabounding," specially characteristic of mysticism 
but surviving in all truly felt states of religious beatitude such 
as grace, conversion, the second birth, etc. Such an experience may
pass into blissful excitement, rapture, and exaltation verging often
4 
on the bizarre and the abnormal.
If we keep in mind the dangers of summaries and schematic 
representations and guard ourselves against the falsifications which 
often accompany the use of symbols, we may make profitable use of 
a summary diagram of Otto's analysis of the numinous -
1. Op. cit., p. £8.
2. Op. cit., p. 32.
3. Op. cit., p. 34.
4. Op. cit., p. 37.
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Numinous Numinous Experience Analogous
to which it Natural
Property gives rise Emotion
1. Awefulness Daemonic Dread Fear 
(Tremendum)
2. Overpoweringness Creature Feeling Subjection 
(Majestas)
3. Urgency ——————————— ———————— 
(Vitality)
4. Mysteriousness Stupor Wonder
(Mysterium) (Amazement)
5. Fascination Rapture Love
(Fascinans) (Wonder)
It will be seen at once that the first four represent the daunting 
qualities of the transcendent object and that the analogous "natural" 
emotions are practically the same as those which compose the complex 
emotion of awe, according to McDougall f s analysis. One feels that 
these qualities have received at the hands of Otto more thorough 
treatment than the fascinating qualities of the numinous. For these 
still seem to be complex. But even so, it cannot be doubted that 
tender emotion is at least a component element of the "natural" 
emotion which is analogous to numinous exaltation or rapture. So 
that although Otto approaches the analysis of religious experience 
from the objective side and McDougall from the subjective, their re­ 
sults point in the same direction. They both make a distinction be­ 
tween the awe-inspiring and kindly-disposed characteristics of the 
religious object; they both hold that in the development of religion 
the apprehension of the awe-inspiring powers comes first in point of 
time; they both maintain that the religious emotion is a unique
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complex of which, on its natural side, fear, subjection, wonder, 
and tender emotion are components.
If the point of view which we have supported in this and 
the previous chapters is well-founded we are ready to draw certain 
conclusions with respect to Otto f s analysis. In the first place 
the properties which he attributes to the numinous object are such 
as a person may perceive. It may be objected that what is essen­ 
tially and absolutely mysterious cannot be perceived. It is true 
that the numinous cannot be perceived in its essential nature as 
numinous. But it can be perceived as mysterious. We may not be able 
to understand or to comprehend a given situation or object. But we 
can see that there is something there which is beyond us. And while 
the situation or object may entirely baffle our cognitive powers 
certain aspects of the presentation must be intelligible to us else 
we could neither know it as "something there" nor be in the slightest 
degree interested in it. Such aspects of the "something there" as 
its being alive or active, possessing power, and exhibiting a favor­ 
able or unfavorable disposition toward us and our values are cer­ 
tainly intelligible and they are certainly capable of being perceived 
and referred to that which we do not understand and know that we 
cannot understand. Otto's analysis then seems to come to this: that 
in the numinous experience we directly apprehend the presence of a 
mysterious object so different from the ordinary objects of everyday 
experience that it seems to belong to an entirely different order;
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that this object appears so mighty in power or vast in being (or 
both) that compared to it we are as nothing; that it seems alive 
and active in a manner and to a degree that is beyond the ordinary 
objects of our experience; and that it exhibits a disposition, 
favorable or unfavorable, toward us of such a character that its 
displeasure toward us inspires a terror beyond the imagination of 
anyone who has not felt it and its favor ravishes the soul with 
such raptures as no symbol can signify to the uninitiated.
As to the distinction between numinous and "natural" 
emotions we have already argued that the distinction between one 
emotion and another lies not in the object which awakens it but in 
the impulse which accompanies it; that no real distinction is 
possible between numinous and natural emotions on this basis; and, 
therefore, that the classification of the numinous emotions and their 
natural counterparts as two different sets of primary emotions is in­ 
valid. According to our view, for example, daemonic dread and natural 
fear are not two primary emotions, but daemonic dread is a particular 
kind of fear which differs from, let us say, the fear of another per­ 
son. And one difference between the two is due to the difference in 
the total configuration of the two perceived situations in which they 
are evoked. There is a difference in quality but not in kind. All 
emotions are natural emotions but many of the emotions may possess a 
quality that can properly be signified by the word "numinous."
As to the adequacy of Otto's analysis it appears that the 
author in his desire to present the mysterium as entirely non- or 
super-rational in character has not done justice to the element of
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curiosity or wonder. It cannot be doubted that the mysteries of 
religion have given rise to a very large part of mankind ! s reflective 
thought. It is too much to say that the mysterious entirely stupefies 
the mind. It often stimulates it. There is a haunting and irre­ 
sistible desire to explain the mysterious by relating it to the rest 
of our knowledge - to know even as we are known. Indeed worshipful 
contemplation is by no means the least of religious attitudes, as 
Otto himself seems to suggest when he says that the numinous is at 
once the object of "boundless awe and boundless wonder." But from 
his previous discussion of the fascinating qualities of the numinous 
it appears that what he means by wonder is not an emotion which re­ 
inforces the impulse of observation, or curiosity, but an emotional 
response to the numinous apprehended as favorably disposed toward 
the subject. His only real treatment of the impulse of curiosity and
the emotion of wonder in the sense in which we use these terms is in
2 connection with his discussion of the "mysterium," and there he
presents them as completely baffled and outdone by a transcendent ob-
5 
ject in the understanding of which they are of no avail whatsoever.
They are merely stupefied and deadened by the presence of the numinous. 
We have been at some pains to show that in the numinous experience man 
apprehends that which is essentially mysterious but not altogether 
mysterious, else it could not possibly hold his interest. We conclude, 
therefore, that wonder, supporting the impulse of curiosity, is a 
genuine element in the numinous experience.
!• Op. cit., p. 42.
2. Op. cit., Ch. V.
5. Op. cit., pp. 26 ff,
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29. Religious History and the. Numinous
According to Otto, religious evolution begins, histori­ 
cally, with the appearance of sundry curious phenomena which are 
preliminary to religion proper but which deeply affect its subsequent 
course. "Such are the notions of 'clean 1 and ! unclean,' belief in 
and worship of the dead, belief in and worship of 'souls' or 'spirits,' 
magic, fairy tale, and myth, homage to natural objects, whether 
frightful or extraordinary, noxious or advantageous, the strange idea 
of power (Orenda or Mana), fetishism and totemism, worship of animal 
and plant, daemonism and polydaemonism." These phenomena, standing 
as they do at the threshold of religion, may be termed as 'pre- 
religion' but not in the sense that religion and the possibility of 
religion are explicable by their means. Rather they are themselves
only made possible and can only be explained from a religious basic
g
element, viz., the feeling of the numinous, which in these primitive
7;
experiences takes the form of daemonic dread.*" The "daemonic dread" 
phase of numinous consciousness is in these experiences awakened not
by genuine appearances of "the holy" but by an element common to them
4 
all which is merely analogous to "the holy." Such false recognitions
of the holy are later rejected and wholly or partly extruded as in­ 
adequate or simply unworthy so soon as a higher level of development 
and a purer religious judgment have been reached. This religious 
development on its non-rational side takes place as follows:
1. Op. cit., p. 121.
2. Op* cit., p. 128.
3. Op. cit., pp. 16, 32, 121-135, 137,
4. Op. cit., pp. 137, 147-148.
5. Op. cit., p. 148.
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"daemonic dread," after itself passing through various gradations, 
rises to the level of the "fear of the gods," and thence to "fear 
of God;" daemonic power becomes divine power, dread becomes worship. 
Shudder becomes holy awe. The feelings of dependence upon and
beatitude in the numen, from being relative become absolute; the
1 
numen becomes God and Deity. The rational elements come together
in the historical evaluation of religions with the non-rational, 
and serve to "schematize" them. The daunting and repelling moment 
of the numinous, the tremendum, is schematized by the rational ideas 
of justice, moral will, and the exclusion of what is opposed to 
morality, and becomes the "wrath of God;" the fascinans. the attracting 
and alluring moment of the numinous, is schematized by means of the 
ideas of goodness, mercy, love, and becomes all that we mean by
Grace; and the moment mysteriosum is schematized by the absoluteness
2 
of all rational attributes applied to the Deity.
The whole process may be summarized in the following words 
of the author:
There are, then, three factors in the process by 
which religion comes into being in history. First, 
the interplay of predisposition and stimulus, which 
in the historical development of man f s mind actual­ 
izes the potentiality in the former, and at the 
same time helps to determine its form. Second, the 
recognition, by virtue of this very disposition, of 
specific portions of history as manifestations of 
"the holy" with consequent modification of the re­ 
ligious experience already attained both in its 
quality and degree. And third, on the basis of the 
other two, the achievement of fellowship with "the 
holy" in knowing, feeling, and willing. Plainly, 
then, Religion is only the offspring of history in so 
far as history on the one hand develops our dis­ 
position for knowing the holy, and on the other is 
itself repeatedly the manifestation of the holy.
!• Op. cit., pp. 113-114.
2. Op. cit., pp. 144-145.
3. Op. cit., pp. 180-181.
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By way of comment we observe, in the first place, that
what Otto means by the word predisposition is not instinct, though
1 
his usage often suggests this interpretation, but potentiality,
faculty, or capacity. As to its origin this religious predisposition, 
the feeling of the numinous, is a primal element of our psychical 
nature, which like all other primal psychical elements, emerges in due
course in the developing life of human mind and spirit and is thence-
2
forward simply present. We are not to be led astray by the use of
the word emerge. His is not a view of emergent evolution. He recog­ 
nizes no novelties in the evolutionary process. A thing must already 
be in order to become. "There is something presupposed by history 
as such.....which alone makes it history, and that is the existence 
of a quale, something with a potentiality of its own, capable of be­ 
coming, in the special sense of coming to be that to which it was
3
predisposed and predetermined." Evolution for Otto is merely po­ 
tentiality becoming actuality, that which is already there, but hidden, 
making its appearance. Even in sub-human psychical life there is a 
"predisposition to form the predispositions or faculties of the actual
developed mind, and standing in relation to this as embryo to the
4 
full-grown organism." This holds for the religious predisposition
also, for "the predi sposition which the human reason brought with it 
when the species Man entered history became long ago, not merely for 
individuals but for the species as a whole, a religious impulsion."
We have argued all along that awe is a complex emotion. 
If it is, and if it is rightly understood as a synthesis of fear,
1. Op. dit., pp. 119-120.
2. Op. cit., p. 129.
3. Op. (Sit., p. 180.
4. Op. dit., p. 119.
5. Op. dit., p. 120.
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wonder, and subjection, then when it first appears in the history 
of man's development it is a genuine novelty that is more than what 
we can rightly speak of as the actualizing of a potentiality. It 
is a true emergent. Furthermore, if religious evolution begins with 
the experience of "daemonic dread," as we believe Otto is right in 
maintaining, if "daemonic dread" accompanies the experience of a 
mysterious power which appears to have ultimate control over some or 
all our values, which is unfavorably disposed toward us, and to which 
it is necessary to make some adjustment, and if daemonic dread is 
the kind of awe inspired by this situation, as we have argued, then 
it follows that religious awe, "daemonic dread" and, consequently, 
religion itself are genuine emergent experiences, and not mere 
potentialities becoming actual. Religion therefore emerges with man's 
attempt to adjust himself to his total and ultimate environment. And 
its evolution is through insight, trial and success. This view saves 
us the necessity of maintaining an outworn view of evolution; of 
assuming a "bifurcated" universe and consequently of holding to the 
unscientific view of active intervention of "the holy" in the 
phenomenal world; and of imagining some law of association of the 
feelings wherety- that which is not really "the holy," but in some 
strange way like it, arouses certain natural emotions which by an 
analogy arouse genuine numinous emotions that get diverted in this 
way to natural objects and result in the judgment that certain 
phenomena or objects are manifestations of "the holy" when in reality 
they are not. 2
1. Cf. Otto, op. cit., p. 146.
2. Cf. Otto, op. cit., p. 148.
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The other observation which we wish to make regarding 
Otto's theory of origins is concerned with those phenomena which 
stand at the threshold of religion. The view which we have 
developed all along is that living organisms are self-directing 
centers of force that seek to maintain themselves in dynamic 
equilibrium with their effective environment. The history of 
evolution is essentially the history of developing organisms be­ 
coming sensitive to and making successful adjustment to ever wider 
reaches of environmental influence, in point of space and time, 
and ever higher values in the environment. Now when, in the 
developing life of man, he begins to feel after and find those 
ultimate forces which underlie and condition the ordinary phenomena 
of every-day life he has reached the threshold of both philosophy 
and religion, and the development of these two go hand in hand. 
Philosophy is criticism and interpretation of resultsj religion 
is discovery and active adjustment. On this view we should expect 
that the daunting and repelling aspects of the wider environment, 
the equilibrium-disturbing factors, would be the first to attract 
man's attention to themselves. And, historically, this is exactly 
what we find. At this point we are in agreement with McDougall, 




SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY - TABU-MANA
Because his views on the origin of religion are essentially 
psychological in character and because they are so widely 
accepted in the field of Social Anthropology, Dr. R. R. 
Marett is chosen as the representative from this field. 
Marett's view that a primitive supernatural!sm existed 
before animism was developed is supported and accepted. 
His analysis of the supernatural in its existential 
dimension into a positive element (mana) and a negative 
element (tabu) is likewise accepted; but in its moral 
dimension his analysis of the supernatural into a social 
element (religion) and an anti-social element (magic) 
is rejected in favor of Frazer ! s psychological distinction 
between religion, which is characterized by submission, 
and magic, which involves the attitude of self-assertion. 
Marett's exposition of the psycho-physical basis of 
humility as a disposition composed of three impulses 
(flight, cowering, and prostration) organized with one 
emotion (heart-sinking) is noted and McDougall's analysis 
of awe is preferred. The essential similarity of the 
views of McDougall, Otto, and Marett with respect to the 
character of the religious object and man's response to 
it are noted as being important.
British anthropologists generally have applied a
psychological method in the comparative study of religion, treating 
psychological elements as fundamental in religious history. Prior 
to the work of Marett they principally employed the method of 
individual psychology and so were led to an abstract treatment of 
religion in so far as religion is a social product. Realizing this 
shortcoming, Marett, while not abandoning the method of individual 
psychology, introduces the method of social psychology, and in the
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study of rudimentary religion makes social psychology paramount. 
Marett 1 s theory of the pre-animistic origin of religion is thus 
at once a psychological theory and perhaps the most notable contri­ 
bution to the solution of our problem that has been made by any 
contemporary anthropologist. Furthermore, its wide acceptance in 
the field of Social Anthropology justifies its presentation as the 
representative view from this field.
50. Pre-Animistic Religion
In order to understand Marett's theory of pre-animistic 
religion it is necessary first of all to know what is meant by 
animism. As a technical term applied to religion, animism is asso­ 
ciated with the great name of Dr. Edward B. Tylor, who uses the
word to signify "the belief in Spiritual Beings" which he holds to
g
be the minimum definition of religion. (For a more extended
exposition of the meaning of animism, see Appendix I at the end of 
the present work).
Marett assumes that "animism, the belief in the existence 
of visionary shapes, whether of the dead or sui juris, became with 
the savage, at a certain stage in his development, the typical, 
nay almost the universal, means of clothing the facts of his
religious experience in ideas and words, and the typical and all but
3 
universal theory on which he based his religious practice." But
1. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), Ch. V. Cf. also 
Karpf: American Social Psychology (1932), p. 172.
2. lyior: Primitive Culture (1871), Vol. I, p. 424.
3. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 8.
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this being assumed, he asks the question: "Before, or at any rate 
apart from, animism, was early man subject to any experience, whether 
in the form of feeling, or of thought, or of both combined, that 
might be termed specifically Religious 1 ?"
In answer to this question Marett argues that psychologically
g 
religion involves feeling and will as well as thought; that religion
may manifest itself on the emotional side even when thought is
3 
vague; that probably for most persons the emotional side of religion
4 
constitutes its more real, more characteristic feature; that in
response to or in connection with such emotions as awe and wonder, 
wherein emotion seems for the moment to have outstripped reason, 
"there arises in the region of human thought a powerful impulse to
objectify and even to personify the mysterious or Supernatural 1
5
something felt, and in the region of the will a corresponding im­ 
pulse to render it innocuous, or better still propitious, by force
6 
of constraint, communion, or conciliation." This complex mental
state of feeling, thought, and will dictated by awe of the mysterious 
is called supernatural!sm, and is regarded as the raw material of
religion capable of existing apart from animism and of becoming the
7 
basis on which an animistic doctrine is later constructed. The
supernatural or supernormal, ngai, wakan, mana, is the common element
1. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 8.
2. Of. supra, section 18.
3. Op. cit., pp. 1, 5.
4. Op. cit., p. 5.
5. Cf. supra, section 25.
6. Op. cit., pp. 10-11.
7. Op. cit., pp. 1, 11.
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in ghosts and gods, in the magical and the mystical, the supernal
1 
and the infernal, the unknown within and the unknown without.
Any supernatural object, i.e., an object toward which awe is felt,
is termed a power, and of such powers spirits constitute but a
? 3
single class among many. Startling manifestations of nature,
4 5 
awe-inspiring objects such as the bull-roarer, curious stones,
6 7 strange, powerful, or gruesome plants and animals, dead remains,
g blood, etc., all may be objects of awe and so be regarded as
possessing mana, belonging to the sacred or supernatural world, and 
may consequently rank as powers without the agency of spirits being 
necessarily assumed. Even when they are regarded as alive such 
"animatism" falls short of animism in Tylor's sense of distinction
between the spirit and its vehicle, with the animating principle
9
regarded as independent and separable.
As a minimum definition of religion, therefore, animism is 
seen to be too narrow because too intellectualistic and a wider con­ 
ception is needed. This wider conception Marett finds in pre- 
animistic supernaturalism, or tabu-mana.
This view is also in opposition to the views of another 
great British Anthropologist, Dr. J. G. Frazer. We have added an
!• Op. cit., p. 12.
2. Op. cit., p. 13.
3. Op. cit., p. 14.
4. Op. cit., p. 16.
5. Op. cit., p. 18.
6. Op. cit., p. 20.
7. Op. cit., p. 23.
8. Op. cit., p. 25.
9. Op. cit., p. 14.
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appendix giving more extended treatment of the differences between
the views of Marett and Frazer and it is necessary here only to
1 2
state them. First, Dr. Frazer holds that an age of magic every­ 
where antedated an age of religion and that the two are so absolutely 
different that, like oil and water, they will not mix, while Marett
thinks that magic and religion were both differentiated out of a
5common plasm, namely, supernatural!sm, and that under certain cir­ 
cumstances magic may develop into religion; and, second, Dr. Frazer
4 
regards tabu as negative magic, whereas Marett believes that tabu
5is correctly viewed as negative mana and that tabu and mana, re­ 
garded as negative and positive supernaturalism, respectively, com­ 
pose the common plasm of crude beliefs about the awful and occult 
out of which both magic and religion were differentiated.
In Marett 1 s conception of pre-animistic religion, we are 
to note, first of all, that in making the limits of primitive religion
c
coincide with the limits of primitive "supernaturalism," Marett is 
not unmindful of the fact that "supernatural" is our term and not the 
savage's. "The savage has no word for 'nature.' He does not ab­ 
stractly distinguish between an order of uniform happenings and a
higher order of miraculous happenings. He is merely concerned to
7 
mark and exploit the difference when presented in the concrete."
An interesting example of the savage's perception of this difference
1. See Appendix II.
2. Frazer: The Golden Bough (1911), Vol. I, p. 233.
3. Marett: 6p. cit., p. xi.
4. Frazer: op. cit., Vol. I, p. Ill ff.
5. Marett: dp. cit., Ch. III.
6. Op. c it., p. 58.
7. Op. oit., p. 109.
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in the concrete is revealed in Marett 1 s story of his interview with 
the Pygmy chief Bokane. He asked Bokane how his people told whether 
the sudden death of a Pygmy was due to oudah or not. "He replied 
that, if an arrowhead or a large thorn were found inside the body, 
it was an arrow or thorn that had killed the manj but if nothing 
could be found, then oudah must have done it. If a dangerous animal 
killed a man, I learnt on further inquiry, it was not oudah, but it 
was oudah if you cut your finger accidentally. When strange sounds 
were heard in the forest at night, that was oudah." And Marett 
concludes, we believe rightly, that "on some such lines as these, 
then, we may suppose other savages also to have succeeded in placing 
the strange and unaccountable under a category of its own. It is 
this category of the strange, the unaccountable, the extraordinary, 
the wonderful, the miraculous, which we understand Marett to signify 
by the term "supernatural."
Now given the supernatural in any form, there are always 
two things to note about it: firstly, that you are to be heedful 
in regard to it; secondly, that it has power. The first may be called 
its negative character and the second its positive. Tabu signifies 
the negative mode of the supernatural; mana the positive mode.
Tabu-manar then, is a formula the limits of which coincide with the
*>
limits, on its existential side, of the supernatural.~ Tabu means
that you must be heedful in regard to the supernatural, not that
you must be on your guard against it. "The prohibition to have deal-
1. Op. cit., p. 87.
2. Op. cit., pp. 104-111.
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ings with it is not absolute; otherwise practical religion would 
be impossible. The warning is against casual, incautious, profane
dealings.... Under certain conditions man may draw nigh but it is
1 
well for him to respect those conditions." Likewise we must shun
descriptions of mana that are too specific. "Mana is often operative 
and thaumaturgic, but not always. Like energy, aana may be dormant 
or potential. Mana. let us remember, is an adjective as well as a 
noun, expressing a possession which is a permanent quality.... Hence
it seems enough to say that mana exhibits the supernatural in its
2 
positive capacity - ready, but not necessarily in act - to strike."
Tabu and mana apply to the supernatural solely in its
existential dimension. With its moral dimension they have nothing to
3 
do whatever. They are neither moral nor immoral but simply unmoral
4 
because these terms of valuation have not yet been superinduced.
In its moral dimension Marett says that supernatural!sin has 
two component elements also, namely, magic and religion. Magic 
according to Marett is the bad or anti-social kind of supernatural!sm 
and religion the good or social kind.
For scientific purposes at any rate, an evaluatory 
use ought..,.to be assigned to this historic dis­ 
junction, not merely in view of the usage of civ­ 
ilized society, but as a consequence of that ten­ 
dency to mark off by discriminative epithets the 
good and the bad supernatural!sms, the kingdoms 
of God and of the Devil, which runs right through 
the hieralogical language of the world. 5
1. Op. cit., p. 111. Of. also Maretts Faith. Hope and Charity 
in Primitive Religion (1932), Ch. XIII.
2. Op. cit., pp. 111-112.
3. Op. cit., p. 112.
4. Op. cit., p. 114.
5. Op. cit., p. 114.
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But in other passages where Marett discusses the relation 
between magic and religion he does not distinguish between them on 
this moral basis. For example, in discussing Dr. Frazer's identi­ 
fication of humility as the distinguishing mark of religion, he says 
of a quoted passage from Frazer: "In seizing as it does upon humility 
as the distinguishing mark of the religious spirit, it probably touches
the heart of the truth." Again, he says that the spell evolves
g 
into prayer, and offers this fact in proof of his contention that
magic may pass into religion. Once more, of a certain incantation he 
says: "According to our previous conclusions, however, this is no 
prayer so long as the force which sets the spell in motion is felt by
the operator as an exertion of imperative will and an attempt to
3
establish control. Again and again in his chapter entitled, "From
4 
spell to prayer," Marett treats magic as an "affair between wills"
in which the operator 1 s will dominates the will of his victim. And 
throughout this chapter he identifies an act as magical or religious 
according to whether the person performing it acted with an attitude 
of masterfulness or submission. He is not at all concerned to show 
that antisocial or immoral, or bad supernaturalism passes into social, 
or moral, or good supernatural!smj but he does show that the attitude 
of domination may pass into that of propitiation and invocation.
At any rate, it is certain that from the point of view of 
psychology it is more satisfactory to draw the distinction between
1. Op. cit., p. 177.
2. Op. cit., p. 66.
5. Op. cit., p. 69.
4. Op. cit., p. 71.
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magic and religion on the basis of their psychological rather than 
their ethical components. We are prepared, therefore, on this 
point to follow Frazer in making humility the differentiating mark 
of religion as contrasted with the self-assertive character of 
magic. If fear, wonder, and subjection compose the religious
attitude of awe then the superstitious attitude of magic may be
2 
analyzed as a complex of fear, wonder, and self-assertion. This
seems in fact to be the view which Marett generally assumes, although 
one or two passages quite inconsistently show definite leanings toward 
the views of Durkheim and the French sociologists. With these we 
shall be concerned in a later chapter.
It remains in this section only to summarize the advan­ 
tages of the conception of Tabu-Mana over Animism as a minimum defini-
3 
tion of religion: (l) Mana is always mana; animism splits up into
other concepts, such as soul, ghost, and spirit. (2) Mana is co­ 
extensive with supernatural!smj animism is far too wide. (3) Mana 
is adapted to express the notion of immaterial, unseen force while 
leaving in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal; 
animism tends to lose touch with supernaturalism in its more im­ 
personal forms and is not well-suited to express immateriality and 
transmi s sabili ty.
1. See Appendix II.
2. Cf. McDougall: TTit-rodugt^on to Social Psychology (1918),
p. 313. Also, ^opr«, section 25. 
5. Marett: o^p. cit., p. 119.
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51. The Birth of Humility
Marett agrees with Dr. Frazer that humility is the dis­ 
tinguishing mark of religion, as contrasted with magic, but disagrees 
with him when he traces the birth of religion, and of humility, to 
a change of mind consequent upon the realization by the shrewder in­ 
telligences of the race that magic is a failure and that mankind is
2
dependent. Marett finds Frazer 1 s account of the origin of religion
too intellectualistic. And he advances the thesis that "humility 
and religion are neither the discovery, nor the private possession
of a few 'higher intelligences, 1 but are bound up with the native
3 
tendencies and with the social development of ordinary humanity."
He finds reflected in the religious experience of the savage, which is 
characteristically mobbish, a predominantly emotional and motor in­ 
terest which the savage assigns to the object of his religious 
regard, i.e., to the "sacred" or "supernatural."
Statically viewed, and in its negative aspect, the super­ 
natural is viewed by the savage as more or less uncanny, often more
4 
or less secret, and always more or less tabu. From these qualities
attributed to the religious object Marett deduces the subjective 
experiences of the savage and finds that three instincts and one 
emotion are involved: the instincts of flight, cowering, and pros­ 
tration; and the emotion of fear or asthenic emotion, heart-sinking,
feeling unstrung. He concludes that "this general type of innate
5 
disposition would seem to be the psycho-physical basis of humility."
1. Marett: dp. cit., p. 177.
2. Frazer: dp. cit., Vol. I, pp. 238 ff.
3. Marett: op. dit., p. 182.
4. :S*fcd. Op. Cit., pp. 184-186.
5. Op. cit., p. 186.
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In its positive aspect the savage always attributes to
the object of his religious regard mystic potency or mana, and
1 
usually views it as ancient, and often as personal. But even
when not viewed as personal the spirit of humility is evoked by 
contact with the supernatural as such and not simply as a con­ 
sequence of the attribution of personality. The mana attributed to 
the religious object is such that contact with it according to the
accepted forms makes the subject feel "strong," and "wise," and
2
"good," and "glad."
Now, viewed dynamically, the savage's relations with the 
supernatural involves just this progress from felt need to renewed 
strength. "The very expectancy of benefit, the felt need to be 
improved, carry with them a certain depression, a certain relaxed
tension, which is, however, but a prelude to restored innervation
3 and fresh adjustment." Humility is thus seen to be but one
moment or one step in a complex experience which involves the 
passage from humiliation to exaltation, from depression to vitality, 
from tabu to mana. Rites of passage such as those connected with
adolescence, matrimony, parenthood, etc., are society's arrangements
4 for socializing and spiritualizing these psycho-physical crises.
The heart-sinking, loss of tone, aloofness, inertia, and disorientation 
which are all symptoms of psycho-physical crises have been dis­ 
sociated from their physiological base by a system of religious ritual
1. Marett: op. cit., pp. 187 ff.
2. Op. cit., p. 190.
5. Op. cit., p. 191.
4. Op. cit., pp. 192 ff.
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covering the whole life of primitive man. "The physical means of 
ministering to crisis that consists in humoring prostration and 
passivity whilst the recreative processes are coming to a head has 
been, in the course of social evolution, transferred into the moral 
sphere, so that spiritual crisis comes to be furnished with an 
analogous remedy."
Marett concludes, therefore, that
it is chiefly the emotional and motor factors that 
provide the key to the psychological problem. To 
cease from active life, and consequently to mope, 
as it were, and be cast down - such during the 
early and unreflective stages of religion is no 
subtle device of the "higher intelligences," but 
the normal tribesman's normal way of reacting in 
a world that is ever making serious and fresh de­ 
mands upon his native powers. By sheer force of 
that vital experience which is always experiment, 
he has found out - or rather society has found 
out for him - that thus to be cast down for a 
season means that afterwards he will arise a 
stronger and better man. That this happens, or 
tends to happen he knows; how it happens he also 
knows, in the sense that the tribal machinery of 
ritual retreat can be unfailingly set in motion 
by the tribal experts. But why it happens, that 
is to say, what the ultimate meaning and purpose 
may be of this widespread human capacity to 
profit by the pauses in secular life which religion 
seems to have sanctioned and even enforced in all 
periods of its history - such a question lies 
utterly beyond the range of the Savage.^
With Marett's emphasis on the importance of the emo­ 
tional and motor factors in the genesis of religion most students 
of the psychology of religion would now agree. His analysis of
It Op. cit., p. 199.
2. Op. cit., pp. 199-200,
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the emotional and instinctive factors involved they would probably 
question.
For example, let us examine the following passage:
Three instincts of a highly negative type are 
observable in the frightened animal. It runs 
away, or cowers in its tracks, or it prostrates 
itself in abject self-surrender. Now, it would, 
perhaps, be fanciful to say that man tends to 
run away from the sacred as uncanny, to cower 
before it as secret, and to prostrate himself 
before it as tabu. On the other hand, it seems 
plain that to these three negative qualities of 
the sacred taken together there corresponds on 
the part of man a certain negative attitude of 
mind. Psychologists class the feelings bound 
up with flight, cowering, and prostration, under 
the common head of 'asthenic emotion.' In plain 
English they are all forms of heart-sinking, of 
feeling unstrung. This general type of innate 
disposition would seem to be the psycho-physical 
basis of humility.
In the first place, we find difficulties with Marett's 
treatment of the innate disposition to escape. He regards this 
disposition as a system comprising three instincts and one accom­ 
panying emotion. This means that Marett evidently accepts the view 
of instinct which defines it as an action pattern. We have ad­ 
vanced good reasons however for discarding this view in favor of 
the concept of an instinct as a drive toward some biological end. 
So conceived this innate drive to escape is the real instinct which, 
when frustrated, gives rise to the emotion of fear, which he calls 
"asthenic emotion." We should like to urge rather strongly that the 
tendencies "to run away," "to cower in its tracks," and "to pros­ 
trate itself in abject self-surrender," are not in fact observable 
in the frightened animal as it reacts to a given situation. When an
1. Op. cit., p. 186.
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animal is frightened it will run away, or hide itself, or follow 
some other device which subserves the end of escape. Many animals 
may cower, some may prostrate themselves, but not all animals or 
insects do either. But all animals when frightened do seek to 
escape. And, furthermore, they seek to escape by some definite 
means and when once in progress a particular activity is followed 
either until its success is achieved or until circumstance favors a 
different activity as more feasible, or until the cause of the 
activity is removed. The particular kind of activity in which the 
instinctive impulse to escape will find expression depends to a 
very great extent upon the situation in which it becomes, or con­ 
tinues to be, operative. And the activity will change according to 
the manner in which the situation develops with attempted adjustment. 
The writer recalls an example of this principle which he recently 
witnessed on the shores of a mountain lake. Two people had just 
landed from a canoe when along the shore toward them came a rabbit 
running at top speed and hotly pursued by a puppy. Suddenly discover­ 
ing the party, the rabbit sought to change his course but found him­ 
self unable to negotiate a high embankment that flanked the shore of 
the lake. Being hard pressed and not quite daring to approach closer 
to the people in front of him, he stopped, hesitated, jumped about 
aimlessly for a second, then leaped into the water. The dog 
approached the water, hesitated, and plunged in also. But the rabbit 
now changed his course and seeing nearby a rude pier built very close 
to the surface of the water, swam underneath it, gained the shore and
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hid himself in a pile of logs and rubbish safe from molestation by 
his enemy. When the animal that is running away finds his course 
blocked he may turn to swimming or hiding if opportunity presents 
itself; if every avenue of escape is blocked he may cower or even 
prostrate himself before his enemy, he may feign death as the 
opossum does, or he may turn to attack his enemy with extraordinary 
ferocity. But these activities are all subservient to the one end 
of escape. And we may lay it down as a certainty that in the 
frightened animal every reaction pattern of his that subserves the 
end of escape may be successively called into action if the situation 
develops in the right way.
Furthermore, the emotional side of the frightened animal's 
activity is not merely heart—sinking, or "asthenic emotion." Fear 
is the reinforcement of an impulse, the impulse to escape or to 
avoid. It is only when the situation seems hopeless, when no plan 
of escape takes form, or when every plan that is formed is imme­ 
diately frustrated that the feeling of heart-sinking becomes prominent, 
Properly speaking, neither the instinct to escape nor the emotion of 
fear which reinforces it is negative in character. The impulse to 
escape or to avoid, from the point of view of an observer and with 
reference to the object escaped from or avoided, is negative. But 
from the point of view of the individual in whom the impulse is 
operative - and that is the psychological point of view - the impulse 
is intensely positive; and its success issues in pleasure, its 
failure in unpleasure.
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It appears therefore that humility cannot be derived from 
the instinct of escape and the emotion of fear alone. An animal 
or a person, finding every avenue of escape barred and hopeless, 
may resign himself, quaking with fear and without a struggle, to 
destruction by his enemy. But that alone is not humility nor can 
humility be derived from it. It is well-knovm that animals must 
be trained through kindness and not through cruelty. The cowering 
or prostration of a dog at the sound of his cruel master's voice 
is not the expression of pure fear, but of fear and affection, 
the result of cruelty and of kindness. Humility involves the 
instinct of self-subjection. But subjection is an instinct in its 
own right and is not dependent upon fear.
We feel that it would be truer to identify Marett's 
"asthenic emotion" with awe rather than with fear as he does in 
the passage quoted above. That he would not object to such inter­ 
pretation, his discussion of pre-animistic religion seems to 
show. For he there upholds the conception of a "certain religious 
sense.....whereof the component 'moments' are fear, admiration, 
wonder, and the like, whilst its object is, broadly speaking, the 
supernatural."
Thus we see that McDougall, Otto, and Marett, approach­ 
ing the study of religious beginnings from very widely different
1. Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 10,
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positions, arrive at conclusions that bear a very close resem­ 
blance. If we ask them to tell us what it is that man responds 
to in primitive religion and how we are to characterize the 
response, they make answer as follows:
1. McDougall: Man responds to the terrible powers with awe.
2. Otto: Man responds to the numinous with creature-feeling.
3. Marett: Man responds to the supernatural with humility.
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Chapter VII 
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS - THE FAMILY COMPLEX
Basing their interpretations on widely divergent theories, two 
leaders of the psychoanalytic school, Freud and Jung, have written 
extensively on religious origins. The views of both are pre­ 
sented and criticized. Freud conjectures that religion must 
have arisen in racial history from the sense of guilt felt by 
a band of brothers in the primal horde of mankind whose incest 
wishes impelled them to murder the primal father and eat his 
flesh. At many crucial points Freud's logic is found to be 
fallacious, many of his basic facts are shown to be at variance 
with the observations and researches of competent anthropologists, 
and some of his fundamental psychological principles are shown 
to be highly questionable; his formulation is, therefore, re­ 
jected even as a possible hypothesis. His emphasis on the in­ 
fluence of the family in the development of religion is regarded 
as an important contribution. For Jung the libido or life- 
impulse is the final source of religion. Three phylogenetic 
types of libido manifestation are represented in phantasies which 
have become the primordial prototypes of important religious 
conceptions and myths of the past and present: (l) the life- 
giving power of libido, (2) the longing for immortality, and 
(5) the desire for independent individuality. Objections are 
raised against: (l) Jung's disregard of history, (2) his too 
extensive use of analogy in logic, (3) his inadequate treatment 
of aesthetic imagination, (4) his unsatisfactory conception of 
the unconscious. Jung's theory is regarded as being important 
in: (l) its emphasis on eudo-psychic process, (2) its develop­ 
ment of the notion of the family complex, (3) its emphasis on 
the importance of the instincts and phantasy.
Strictly speaking, psychoanalysis is the name given to a 
special psychological method. It aims to bring to light the under­ 
lying motives and determinants of the symptoms and attitudes of the 
individual human being, and to reveal the unconscious tendencies 
which lie behind actions and reactions and which influence development
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1 
and determine the relations of life itself. But while psychoanalysis
is properly a method, no more evidence than this brief statement of 
aim need be presented to show that it involves a considerable amount 
of theory.
The protagonists of psychoanalysis have not been slow to 
expound and elaborate psychoanalytic theory so that today it is regarded 
as one of the most important of the modern "schools" of psychology.
Two leaders of the psychoanalytic school, Professor Sigraund 
Freud of Vienna and Professor C. G. Jung of Zurich, have dealt in their 
writings with the origin of religion, each explaining it according to 
his own psychoanalytic theory. Since there is no unity in the school 
of psychoanalysis it is impossible to choose either of these leaders 
as the representative of the school as a whole, and so we shall have 
to consider the theories of both.
Although their views of religious origins are entirely de­ 
pendent upon their psychological theories, to include an exposition of 
psychoanalytic theory here would draw out the present chapter to an 
undesirable length. We have, however, included at the end of. the 
present work expositions of the psychoanalytic theories of Freud 
(Appendix III) and of Jung (Appendix IV). No claim is made for their 
comprehensiveness. Only such matters are there dealt with as are im­ 
portant for the understanding of their theories of religious origins.
1. Of. Hinkle: Introduction to English translation of Dr. C. G. 
Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious (1916), p. ix.
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32. The Oedipus Complex and Religious Origins
From taboo Freud derives morality; from totemism, religion. 
Observing that savage and semi-savage races show in their psychic 
life stages which are comparable to early stages in the development 
of the individual personality of the present, Freud searches the re­ 
sults of the psychoanalytic study of neurotics and children for 
possible explanatory principles which may shed light upon some of the 
puzzling problems of the psychology of primitive races. His method 
is therefore comparable to that of Wundt, who applies the principles 
of non-analytic individual psychology to the study of racial psychology; 
and is exactly the opposite of Jung,who examines racial psychology for 
possible explanatory principles in individual psychology.
Following this method of procedure in the study of racial 
psychology, Freud attacks the problem of religious origins by attempting 
to solve the riddle of totemism, and reports his findings in a work 
entitled, Totem and Taboo; resemblances between the psychic lives 
of savages and neurotics. It turns out that from this study Freud 
is able to explain the origin and development of morality and of 
societal forms as well as the genesis of religion, but we shall restrict 
ourselves as far as possible to his treatment of the latter.
First of all, what is totemism? Seeking to arrive at the 
characteristics of original totemism by sifting through everything that 
may correspond to later development or decline, Freud finds the 
following essential facts:
1. Translation by A. A. Brill.
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The totems were originally only animals and were 
considered the ancestors of single tribes. The 
totem was hereditary only through the female line; 
it was forbidden to kill the totem (or to eat it, 
which under primitive conditions amount to the 
same thing) 5 members of a totem were forbidden to 
have sexual intercourse with each
Assuming, now, that the principle, basic to psychoanalytic 
theory, that all activity is unconsciously motivated, is as important 
in racial psychology as it is in individual psychology, and assuming 
that among primitive peoples the same sort of unconscious motivation 
underlies their myths and social practices as gives rise to phantasies 
and compulsion neuroses in children and neurotic patients, it is easy
to conjecture that something corresponding to the Oedipus complex is
2 at the bottom of the four essential characteristics of totemism.
z
Totem exogamy would prevent group incest and totem inheritance through
the female line would prohibit the male from having sexual relations
4 
with his mother and sisters. The prohibition against killing the
father is very clearly expressed in the taboo against killing or eating
5 the flesh of the totem, if we are willing to believe that the totem
actually stands for the father through the mechanism of displacement
g or transference. This in briefest outline is the theory which Freud
discloses as his conviction.
We may now reconstruct those events in the life of primitive 
man that led to the choice of a totem as a substitute for the father 
and the institution of exogamy and the prohibition against killing and
1. Freud: Totem and Taboo, pp. 177-178.
2. Ibid., pp. 234 ff.
3. Ibid., pp. 3-16.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Ibid., p. 234.
6. Ibid., pp. 210 ff., esp. p. 218.
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eating the totem animal. If we are willing to accept the Darwinian
1 
conception of the primal horde as a true description of the early
life of man we have the stage set for the development of a most
2 
astounding theory. We state it in the words of our author:
There is only a violent, jealous father who keeps 
all the females for himself and drives away the 
growing sons..... One day the expelled brothers
joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus 
put an end to the father horde..... Now they accom­ 
plished their identification with him by devouring 
him and each acquired a part of his strength. The 
totem feast which is perhaps mankind's first cele­ 
bration, would be the repetition and commemoration 
of this memorable, criminal act with which so many 
things began, social organization, moral restrictions 
and religion..... The group of brothers banded to­ 
gether were dominated by contradictory feelings 
towards the father..... They hated the father who
stood so powerfully in the way of their sexual de­ 
mands and their desire for power, but they also 
loved and admired him. After they had satisfied 
their hate by his removal and had carried out their 
wish for identification with him, the suppressed 
tender impulses had to assert themselves. This 
took place in the form of remorse....... What the
father's presence had formerly prevented they them­ 
selves now prohibited in the psychic situation of 
'subsequent obedience' which we know so well from 
psychoanalysis. They undid their deed by declaring 
that the killing of the father substitute, the totem, 
was not allowed, and renounced the fruits of their 
deed, by denying themselves the liberated women. 
Thus they created the two fundamental taboos of 
totemism out of the sense of guilt of the son, and 
for this very reason these had to correspond with 
the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. 
Whoever disobeyed became guilty of the only two 
crimes which troubled primitive society.
1. Darwin: Descent of Man. Ch. XX. The conception is founded on 
a description by Dr. Savage of the habits of the gorilla in 
which he says that only one adult male is seen in a band. 
When the young males grow up a contest takes place for supremacy. 
The strongest kills the others off and establishes himself as 
head of the community. Cf. Boston Jnl. Nat. Hist.. Vol. V, 
1845-47, p. 423.
2» Freud: Totem and Taboo, pp. 234-238.
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It is with the taboo which protects the life of the totem 
animal that we are particularly concerned in studying the genesis of 
religion. The kindly treatment of the surrogate for the father was 
an attempt to assuage the burning sense of guilt of the sons and to 
conciliate the father who in return for their subsequent obedience 
would give his children protection and care. Totemism was not, 
however, exclusively a manifestation of remorse. The totem feast pro­ 
vided an occasion where "subsequent obedience" was suspended and the
crime of parricide was re-enacted thus giving expression to the re-
2 
pressed feelings of defiance and triumph over the father. The brother
clan then took the place of the father horde. Society was based on 
complicity in the common crime j religion on the sense of guilt and the
consequent remorse; morality partly on the necessities of society and
5
partly on the expiation which the sense of guilt demanded.
In the course of time, under the operation of the new form 
of society, the brother-clan, men gradually forgot their bitterness 
toward the father and began to long for him more and more. There was a
tendency, therefore, to revive the old father ideal in the creation of
4 
gods through veneration of distinguished men. Thus paternal deities
were instituted and the fatherless society then changed to a patriarchal 
one. The god therefore became a new and more exalted surrogate for the 
father. The totem meal became a totem-animal sacrifice to the god
and the father appeared twice in the sacrifice, once as god and once as
g 
totem-sacrificial animal. Here we find a perfect representation of
!• Op. cit., p. 240.
2. Op. cit., p. 241.
3. Op. cit., p. 242.
4. Op. cit., pp. 243 ff.
5. Op. cit., p. 244.
6. Op. fcit., p. 248.
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the ambivalent attitude of the son towards the father as well as the 
triumph of the tender emotional feelings over the hostile ones. The
very commemoration of the great misdeed offered satisfaction to the
1 
father.
In the further development the animal lost its sacredness 
and the sacrifice its relation to the totem. Sacrifice no longer 
commemorated the great misdeed. The rite became a self-deprivation 
in favor of the deity who was so highly exalted that he could only be 
approached through a priestly intermediary. Sacrifice was beyond 
their responsibility. The god demanded it and even slayed the animal 
which he himself was. This was the greatest possible denial of the 
great misdeed.
At first it looks as though the hostile impulses which be­ 
long to the father complex had entirely subsided but Freud cautions 
us that those ambivalent emotions which gave rise to the great mis­ 
deed were not and to this day have not been extinguished. On the
contrary the effort to express these opposing psychic forces in an
g 
acceptable manner is the heart of all subsequent forms of religion.
So with the increased exaltation of God, the father, came 
a change in the choice of a sacrificial subject. In the social order 
kings had been substituted for patriarchs in satisfaction of the 
sons 1 father-longing. What more appropriate now than that these 
exalted beings against whom the sons manifested the greatest ambivalence 
should be sacrificed to God, thereby satisfying both the hostile and
1. Op. cit., p. 249.
2. Op. cit., p. 250j also pp. 252-253.
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tender feelings of the father complex? If we are to believe Freud 
this is exactly what happened among some primitive peoples. Thus 
human sacrifice was instituted. Later an inanimate imitation (a doll) 
was substituted for the living person. In the light of these facts 
the relation of animal to human sacrifice is solved in the following 
manner:
The original animal sacrifice was already a sub­ 
stitute for a human sacrifice, for the solemn 
killing of the father, and when the father sub­ 
stitute regained its human form, the animal 
substitute could also be retransformed into a 
human sacrifice.^
With the introduction of agriculture the incestuous libido 
of the son found a symbolic satisfaction in labouring over mother 
earth. But the endeavour of the son to put himself in place of the 
father god was not entirely satisfied in this manner for it gave rise 
also to phantasies regarding youthful divinities, like Attis, Adonis, 
Tammuz, etc., who were spirits of vegetation and committed incest 
with the mother in defiance of the father. The son f s sense of guilt, 
however, found expression in these stories. The hero-gods were
killed or suffered castration and punishment by the father god
5 
appearing in animal form.
Freud thinks that the sufferings of Christ, however, are of
a different order. "He sacrificed his own life and thereby redeemed
4 the brothers from primal sin. M He nevertheless regards the story
of Christ as a mythical formulation arising out of the sense of guilt 
of the Son. The very fact that Christ by sacrificing his own life
1. Op. cit., pp. 250 ff.
2. Op. cit., p. 251.
5. Op. cit., p. 255.
4. Op. cit., p. 254.
193,
redeems mankind from the weight of original sin against God the 
Father forces us to the conclusion that this sin was murder, thinks 
Freud, because, according to the law of retaliation, a murder can 
be atoned only l>y the sacrifice of another life. And if the sacrifice
of one ! s own life brings reconciliation with God, the Father, then
1 
the crime so expiated can only have been the murder of the father.
Freud 1 s further elucidation of Christian mysteries we
2
present in his own words:
Thus in the Christian doctrine mankind unreservedly 
acknowledges the guilty deed of primordial times 
because it now has found the most complete expiation 
for this deed in the sacrificial death of the son. 
The reconciliation with the father is the more 
thorough because simultaneously with this sacrifice 
there follows the complete renunciation of woman for 
whose sake mankind rebelled against the father. But 
.now also the psychological fatality of ambivalence 
demands its rights. In the same deed which offers 
the greatest possible expiation to the father, the 
son also attains the goal of his wishes against the 
father. He becomes a god himself beside or rather 
in place of his father. The religion of the son 
succeeds the religion of the father. As a sign of 
this substitution the old totem feast is revived again 
in the form of communion in which the band of brothers 
now eats the flesh and blood of the son and no longer 
that of the father, the sons thereby identifying 
themselves with him and becoming holy themselves. 
Thus through the ages we see the identity of the 
totem feast with the animal sacrifice, the theanthropic 
human sacrifice, and the Christian eucharist and in 
all these solemn occasions we recognize the after­ 
effects of that crime which so oppressed men but of 
which they must have been so proud. At bottom, how­ 
ever, the Christian communion is a new setting aside 
of the father, a repetition of the crime that must be 
expiated. We see how well justified is Frazer's dictum 
that "the Christian communion has absorbed within itpelf 
a sacrament which is doubtless far older than 
Christianity." (Cf. Eating the God, p. 51).
1. Op. cit., p. 255.
2. Op. cit., pp. 256-257.
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1 
In "The Future of an Illusion" Freud somewhat expands his
idea that the belief in God arose out of the father-longing of man­ 
kind. The latter he there explains as due to raan f s helplessness in 
defending himself against the crushing supremacy of nature. And he
claims that this is in entire accord with his findings in "Totem and
2
Taboo," while at the same time he denies that it was his purpose to
3explain in that volume the origin of religions.
55. Criticism of Freud^s Theory
If Freud's conclusions regarding the origin of religion
seem fantastic we should in justice to him recall his modest claims
4 
in the preface of "Totem and Taboo." He says:
The problem of taboo is presented more exhaustively, 
and the effort to solve it is approached with per­ 
fect confidence. The investigation of totemism 
may be modestly expressed as: "This is all that 
psychoanalytic study can contribute at present 
to the elucidation of the problem of totemism."
Again, in "The Future of an Illusion," he reminds us of the restricted
5 problem which was his in "Totem and Taboor"
In Totem und Tabu it was not my purpose to explain 
the origin of religions, but only of toteraism.
We think it pertinent to observe, however, that the reader 
of "Totem and Taboo" will regretfully find this expression of modesty 
too largely confined to the preface. Elsewhere, throughout the book, 
the author's words reveal less uncertainty and the fact that men do
1. Translation by W. D. Robson-Scott (1928).
2. Freud: The Future of an Illusion, p. 42.
3. Ibid.,p. 42.
4. p. vi.
5. The Future of an Illusion, p. 39.
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find his views fantastic is regarded as a strong supporting argument 
because it reveals the presence in men of the very ambivalent con­ 
flicts which gave rise to totemism in the first place.
If Freud's purpose in "Totem and Taboo" was to explain the 
origin only of totemism and not of religion then all that one can say
is that his ardour took him beyond his purpose. For he there clearly
1 states his conclusions as follows:
In closing this study, which has been carried out 
in extremely condensed form, I want to state 
the conclusion that the beginnings of religion, 
ethics, society, and art meet in the Oedipus com­ 
plex. This is in entire accord with the findings 
of psychoanalysis, namely, that the nucleus of 
all neuroses as far as our present knowledge of 
them goes is the Oedipus complex.
Freud not only devoted a large section of "Totem and Taboo" 
to the origin of religion, but he states his conclusions in unquali­ 
fied language and he assumes the correctness of those conclusions in
2 later writings. It is not possible, therefore, for us to admit his
plea that in "Totem and Taboo" he does not discuss the origin of 
religion as he conceives it. He does. And we have stated his argu­ 
ments and his conclusions.
In making an appraisal of Freud's hypothesis we shall first 
examine his logic and method; next we shall inquire rather closely 
into some of the data upon which his hypothesis is constructed; and 
then we shall investigate some of the fundamental psychological 
principles which guide him to his conclusions.
1. Totem and Taboo, p. 260.
2. The Future of an Illusion. Ch. IV.
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a. Freud's Logic and Method
Freud's method is to work out separately with extreme care 
the nature, attitude and costume of each character that plays a 
part in his drama of religious development; then he sets the stage; 
and finally he turns the light of psychoanalysis on the whole, even 
as it has guided him in the determination of each part, and the play 
goes on. We have seen the play. Let us now go behind the scenes.
In the following account we shall state, in barest outline 
and as though he himself were writing it, Freud's preparatory argu­ 
ment leading up to his exposition of religious origins, and we shall 
make criticisms and comments on his logic and method in the footnotes.
We can know the mind of primitive man through the remnants
1 of his thinking that survive in our own manners and customs. If this
assumption is correct we may use the psychology of the neurotic as re­ 
vealed through psychoanalysis to explain some of the difficult problems
2of the psychology of primitive races. " One such problem is that of
totemism and we shall proceed by this method to explain its origin and 
meaning.
"Almost everywhere the totem prevails there also exists 
the law that the members of the same, totem _are not allowed to enter
into sexual -relations with each other; that is, they cannot marry each
2 other." This taboo which is associated with totemism is called exogamy.
It Totem and Taboo, p. 1. Freud means that with the help of 
psychoanalysis we can know it.
2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 6. Freud says here that almost everywhere that totemism 
prevails it is associated with exogamy. When, without further 
discussion of this point, he mentions exogamy in the next chap­ 
ter (pp. 53-54) he calls it one of the basic laws of totemism, 
and he so regards it throughout the rest of the book.
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Totemisra is hereditary and is not changed by marriage. 
Where it is hereditary through the maternal line exogamy avails to 
prevent incest between mother and son and between brother and sister 
but, of course, does not forbid incest between father and daughter. 
Exactly the opposite condition would prevail in case of paternal 
inheritance of totem and incest between mother and son could be en­ 
joyed with impunity. "These consequences of the totem prohibition 
seem to indicate that the maternal inheritance is older than the 
paternal one, for there are grounds for assuming that the totem pro­ 
hibitions are directed first of all against the incestuous desires
2
of the son."
These same incestuous desires form the primary trait of
3 infantile sex life and the core of every neurosis. If this fact
seems incredible to the reader the very rejection of it proves man's
deep aversion to his former incest wishes which he has finally re-
4 pressed. Incestuous impulses are still sufficiently conscious in
1. Totem and Taboo, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 8, footnote. What these grounds are we are not told. 
One suspects that the Oedipus complex will shortly occupy them, 
When next maternal inheritance is mentioned it has become one 
of the four essential characteristics of totemism (p. 178).
3» This is an assumption based upon psychoanalytic theory and, 
of course, quite justified from the point of view of method 
but questionable, we believe, as theory.
4. Ibid., p. 29. It is nothing short of genius to construct a 
theory which when accepted by others is corroborated and when 
rejected by others is strengthened because the very rejection 
is proof of its validityl
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the mind of savage men to be considered worthy of the most severe
1 
defensive measures.
Exogamy is an example of taboo and since it is not the only 
prohibition connected with totemism it is now desirable for us to 
study taboo in a more general way.
Taboo in folk psychology corresponds to the prohibition
which is characteristic of a compulsion neurosis in individual
2 
psychology. Of course the similarity may be superficial and may
lead to confusion. "We shall bear this warning in mind without, how­ 
ever, giving up our intended comparison on account of the possibility
3 
of such confusions."
And so we shall study taboo as if it were of the same nature
4 
as the compulsive prohibitions of our patients. Studying taboo
1. Totem and Taboo, p. 29. Freud seems here to indicate that
primitive man knows the reason for his incest taboo (exogamy). 
In the next chapter, however, he plainly says that the savage 
knows nothing as to the real motivation of their prohibitions, 
(p. 52).
2. Ibid., p. 43.
3. Ibid., p. 45. This quotation speaks for itself. One has the 
feeling that Freud knows what he is looking for and he is 
determined to find it.
4. Ibid., p. 52. This is not a distortion of Freud's views. Be­ 
tween the statement taken from p. 43 and this one four similari­ 
ties are noted and some illustrations are given. The reasoning 
is as follows: Taboo has characteristics A, B, C, D. Compulsion 
neurosis has characteristics A, B, C, D. Therefore Taboo is the 
same as compulsion neurosis. Again and again we find our author 1 s 
logic to be faulty. Even the four similarities mentioned (that 
their origin is unmotivated and enigmatic, that they are main­ 
tained on account of an unconquerable anxiety, that they 
possess an extraordinary capacity for displacement or trans- 
ferrence, and that they result in ceremonial actions and command­ 
ments, having the nature of permanence, which emanate from the 
forbidden) are already deeply tinged with psychoanalytic theory.
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thus we come to the following conclusions: (l) Savages know nothing 
of the real motivation of their prohibitions or the genesis of taboo; 
(2) Taboos are very ancient prohibitions of strongly desired actions 
forced upon a generation of primitive people from without, probably 
by an earlier generation; (5) The prohibitions maintained themselves 
from generation to generation, at first as a result of tradition, 
but later, perhaps, through heredity; (4) The persistence of taboo
shows that the original pleasure to do the forbidden still continues
they 
among taboo races, and therefore/assume an ambivalent attitude toward
their taboo prohibitions - they would like nothing better but fear to
3. 
do it and fear because they would like to transgress.
Now "the oldest and most important taboo prohibitions are 
the two basic laws of totemism; namely, not to kill the totem animal, 
and to avoid sexual intercourse with totem companions of the other sex.
It would therefore seem that these must have been the oldest and
2
strongest desires of mankind."
Of course the assertion that taboo is derived from an 
original prohibition imposed from without cannot be proven. But we 
know that neurotic symptoms are derived from ambivalent impulses which 
result from enforced prohibitions of desired actions imposed from 
without. And if we could show that ambivalent impulses were charac­ 
teristic of taboo then our original assumption would be immensely
5strengthened. Here again we cannot demonstrate ambivalent impulses
1. Totem and Taboo f pp. 52-53.
2. Ibid.,pp. 53-54.
3. Ibid.,p. 60. But it would amount to nothing like scientific 
proof unless it were also shown that ambivalent impulses could 
result only from enforced prohibition of desired action imposed 
from without and that they were imposed by some person or by 
persons. Ambivalent impulses and feelings may result from 
difficult natural circumstances that thwart our desires.
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in the case of the two fundamental prohibitions of totemism but we 
can with the help of psychoanalytic interpretation give conclusive
proof of ambivalence in the execution of taboos connected with the
1 2 3 savage's treatment of his enemies, of his rulers, and of the dead.
Hence we conclude that ambivalence is characteristic of all taboos,
that it was very strong among primitive men, and that when it de-
4 clined taboo declined•*
We are now ready to proceed with our more direct analysis 
and explanation of totemism itself.
First of all we wish to make it clear that a totemic culture 
was at one time the preliminary stage of every later evolution as well
1. Totem and Taboo, pp. 62 ff.
2. Ibid., pp. 70 ff.
5. Ibid., pp. 88 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 112. This generalization is more comprehensive than 
the facts warrant. The logic is as follows: All taboos have 
characteristics A, B, C, D. All compulsion neuroses have 
characteristics A, B, C, D. Therefore all taboos have all the 
characteristics of compulsion neuroses. Therefore all taboos 
have characteristics 1, 2, 5, 4, which are also characteristics 
of compulsion neuroses. And therefore the two taboos in 
question (namely, against killing the totem and against incestuous 
relations with totem companions) have characteristics 1, 2, 3, 4.
Now all ambivalent impulses that characterize neuroses 
are derived from enforced prohibitions of desired actions im­ 
posed from without. Therefore, by analogy, if ambivalent im­ 
pulses are found in taboo we should expect them to be due to 
the same cause. They are found in some taboos. Therefore 
they are characteristic of all taboos, and hence are character­ 
istic of the two taboos that especially concern us. And there­ 
fore the taboos against killing the totem animal and against 
incestuous relations with totem companions are enforced pro­ 
hibitions of strong desires, and prohibitions originally 
imposed by someone who was both feared and loved. Comments 
on the logic are unnecessary.
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as a transition stage between the state of primitive man and the
1 
age of gods and heroes.
And as to the nature of totemism, although reluctant to 
do so, we must depart in some respects from such authorities as
Reinach, Wundt and Frazer and state the essential characteristics of
2
totemism as follows: The totems were originally only animals and
were considered the ancestors of single tribes; totem membership was
5 hereditary only through the female line; it was forbidden to kill or
to eat the totem animal; members of a totemic clan were forbidden to
4 
have sexual intercourse with each other.
Regarding the origin of totemism, the origin of exogamy, 
and the relation of totemism and exogamy there is so much conflicting 
evidence and such wide diversity of opinion among authorities that
anthropological researches are not only inconclusive but give us prac-
5 tically no help at all. Into this darkness psychoanalytic experience
throws a single ray of light. The psychoanalyst is familiar with the 
recurrence in young children of totemism in the form of animal phobias. 
And he recognizes that in boys it is at bottom the fear of the father
1. Totem and Taboo r p. 167. This is based on a statement from 
Wundt which Freud quotes. Wundt's statement is qualified but 
we have represented Freud as making an unqualified statement 
because he does assume, in the argument that follows it, what 
we have set down.
2. Ibid., p. 177.
5. This is an unqualified categorical statement whereas previously
when Freud mentioned totem-inheritance through the female line
it was regarded as only probable, (p. 8.)
4. Exogamy here appears as an essential characteristic of totemism. 
Freud has only given psychoanalytic evidence of this. He proves 
his essential facts from his psychoanalytic theory and then 
uses these facts to justify his psychoanalytic interpretation. 
This is reasoning in a circle.
5. Ibid., pp. 181-210.
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displaced upon the animal. The phobia presents two important traits 
of totemismt the complete identification with the totem animal, and 
the ambivalent affective attitude towards it.
If now we apply this suggestion to the problem of totemism 
among primitive races we are able to take savages literally when 
they call their totem ancestor and primal father. Furthermore, "if 
the totem animal is the father, the two main commandments of totemism, 
the two taboo rules which constitute its nucleus, - not to kill the 
totem animal and not to use a woman belonging to the same totem for 
sexual purposes, - agree in content with the two crimes of Oedipus, 
who slew his father and took his mother to wife, and also with the
child's two primal wishes whose insufficient repression or whose re-
2 
awakening forms the nucleus of perhaps all neuroses."
1. Totem and Taboo, pp. 210-218. This conclusion is based entirely 
upon psychoanalytic interpretation. It completely ignores the 
possibility of conditioning.
2. Ibid.,p. 219. As a concluding statement in our discussion of 
Freud 1 s method and logic nothing seems more appropriate than a 
paraphrase of Professor Freud's own suggestion of what we might 
profitably say to ourselves as an antidote for the influence of 
wishful thinking in religion, (Future of an Illusion, p. 58): 
It would indeed be very nice if there were an Oedipus complex, 
and taboo could be explained as a compulsion neurosis, and 
exogamy were an essential characteristic of totemism, and the 
original state of human society were correctly described by 
the Darwinian notion of a primal horde, and a totemic culture 
were the preliminary stage in the development of human civili­ 
zation, but at the same time it is very odd that this is all 
just as Professor Freud would wish it. And it would be odder 
still if Professor Freud could with one psychological formula 
(the Oedipus complex) solve all the difficult riddles of 
the origin of human culture.
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b. Freud's Facts
We shall now make inquiry regarding some of the data upon 
which Freud bases his hypothesis of religious origins.
It is absolutely necessary to Freud's hypothesis to main­ 
tain that there was an original and necessary connection between 
totemism and exogamy and that toteraism was a preliminary stage of 
cultural evolution. No matter what excellencies it may have, his 
formulation can be no stronger than his contention on these points, 
for without them the Oedipus complex would not serve as an explana­ 
tory principle.
According to the opinion of competent authorities neither
T^
is true. Frazer notes that some totemic clans are not exogamous.
He says, likewise, that totemism has not been proved to have existed
2
among the Aryan, the Semitic, and the Turanian families of mankind.
He states, furthermore, that totemism seems to have originated indepen-
3 
dently in several parts of the world, and that there is no reason to
4 
believe that it is a product of absolutely primitive man. Dr. Robert
H. Lowie reports that there is no escape from the conclusion that the
totemic clan evolved at least four times in North America and accordingly
5
has had a multiple origin in the world. He likewise expresses the
view supported by the researches and opinion of Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser 
that every one of the alleged criteria of totemism, including exogamy,




5 * Primitive Society (1920), p. 129.
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the association of totemic taboos with a totemic name for the group 
practicing them, and descent from the totem, is wanting in even approxi­ 
mate universality. Carveth Read also points out that no one has yet 
shown any sort of necessity why in certain cases clans should have 
borne the names of certain animals. Since the practice is not universal
he adds that it cannot be necessary and that it may have had several
2 
origins. And Professor Clark Wissler of the Institute of Human
Relations in lale University and Curator of Anthropology in the American 
Museum of Natural History, in summarizing his discussion of totemism, 
says: "Because of its limited distribution and because there is no 
good evidence that it once prevailed among the ancestors of European 
peoples, and for other reasons, it is generally admitted that totemism
is not universal and so need not have arisen as a direct natural response
g to situations of a single type." In view of these facts we cannot
escape the conclusion that Freud f s definition of totemism, and con­ 
sequently his conclusions with respect to its origin, is unjustified.
Another fact of importance to Professor Freud's view is the
4 5totem feast. Of this Dr. Goldenweiser gives the following appraisal:
Totemic sacrifice is a phenomenon practically un­ 
known to ethnologists. Robertson Smith's 
"instances" were all based on reconstructed 
material. It is thus a highly arbitrary pro­ 
cedure on the part of Freud to accept speculative 
evidence merely because it meets the needs of his 
theoretical structure and in the face of the re­ 
jection of such evidence by those familiar with 
early institutions.
1. Primitive Society (1920), p. 140.
2. Man and his Superstititions (1925), pp. 227-228.
5. An Introduction to Social Anthropology (1929), p. 209,
4. Totem and Taboo• pp. 220 ff.
5. Goldenweiser: Early Civilization (1922), pp. 595-596,
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In denouncing the notion of a "primal horde" as the original 
state of human society, Dr. Goldenweiser says: "The idea of a primitive 
Cyclopean family is itself a figment." It seems to us that Dr. 
Wohlgemuth's criticism of Freud on this question misses the point. He 
understands Freud to cite Dr. Savage's description of the gorilla band
9
as an explanation of the Oedipus complex.'" He does not so use it in
3
"Totem and Taboo" and we have not found it so used in other psycho­ 
analytic literature. In "Totem and Taboo" we understand Freud to use 
this reported observation solely to strengthen the possibility of the 
notion of a primal horde of humanity such as he hypothecates. And such 
use we hold to be justifiable ; but we do not regard it as convincing.
Of course Freud realizes that the anthropologists will not accept his
4 "primal horde" because it has nowhere been observed but, as usual, he
applies the magic of psychoanalytic interpretation to the observations 
which he does consider, regards the needed facts as having been 
sufficiently established, and goes blithesomely on his way.
Having killed the father Freud says that of course these 
cannibalistic savages ate their victim and so established the totemic 
feast which explains so many practices in more advanced religions and 
even avails to unmask the Christian eucharist. On this point we also 
quote Dr. Goldenweiser's remarks as the judgment of a competent 
anthropologist:
!• Op. cit., p. 396.
2 « A Critical Examination of Psycho-analysis (1923), pp. 152-153,
3. Op. cit., 208-209, 234-235.
4 » Totem and Taboo, p. 235.
5. Ibid., p. 236.
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....the eating of the father by the patricidal 
brothers is a notion which doubtless would have 
met with derision in the aboriginal fraternity 
itself; therefore it does not please the 
ethnologist. The probable extent of early 
cannibalism has often been grossly exaggerated. 
Man has never used man as a regular article of 
diet. There has been some ceremonial eating of 
man, victims of a war raid were occasionally 
consumed (as in Polynesia), here and there human 
flesh was used in cases of severe famines. But 
we do not hear of the eating of relatives. To 
assume a condition which is psychologically im­ 
probable and remains unsupported by ethnographic 
data, is to transgress the bounds of permissable 
speculation.
To this Freud would probably reply gratefully that this proves 
his point because the sense of guilt was so strong in the brothers who 
did the deed that the taboo was extended not only to the flesh of the 
father-surrogate but in less degree to all of kin.
o. Freud f s Psychology
We turn now to the examination of certain psychoanalytic 
principles which guide our author in the formulation of his hypothesis 
about the origin of religion. Of course it cannot be expected that we 
should make a critical examination of the whole of Freudian theory. 
That were a subject for a whole book in itself. We can only consider 
certain selected general principles that bear directly on our subject 
of religious origins.
First of all we should like to mention three guiding principles 
that Freud uses in the interpretation of observed phenomena. One is that 
what is prohibited or abhorrent is desired, and the stronger the pro­ 
hibition or the feeling of horror the stronger the desire. This is a
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very important principle in "Totem and Taboo." An example of its use
1 
is as follows:
What nobody desires to do does not have to be for­ 
bidden and certainly whatever is expressly forbidden 
must be an object of desire. If we applied this 
plausible theory to primitive races we would have 
to conclude that among their strongest temptations 
were desires to kill their kings and priests, to 
commit incest, to abuse their dead and the like.
Of course, in the next sentence Freud says that this is not 
very probable but he is there expressing the reader's abhorrence of 
the idea, as the discussion that follows plainly shows. The quotation 
above represents Freud's point of view on such matters throughout his 
writings.
What shall we think of it? If we take this statement to 
mean that whatever is expressly forbidden in a group must be an object 
of desire for every member of that group, and this is Freud's usage, 
then, logically, it seems unjustified, for presumably a prohibition 
might be established to curb the abnormal impulses of only a few members 
of the group. Indeed if a thing is universally desired why should it be 
prohibited at all? It may be replied that not everything that is de­ 
sired is desirable. True. But may it not be true that what is desirable 
may also be desired by many people? And furthermore, is it likely that, 
in a society where nobody desired the desirable, prohibitions would be 
raised against the undesirable which was universally desired?
Two observations are needed here. One is that there is a 
difference between the hypothesis that every prohibition of the
Totem and Taboo, p. 117
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neurotic patient conceals a desire and the hypothesis that every pro­ 
hibition recognized by a social group conceals a desire on the part of 
every member of that group to do the thing prohibited. In the former 
case the neurotic individual imposes the prohibition on himself because 
he (consciously or unconsciously) recognizes in himself the desire. But 
in the latter case the leader, or the elders, or a majority, of the 
group may impose a prohibition because they recognize in one or more mem­ 
bers of the group a tendency (from whatever cause) to perform the for­ 
bidden act. This is essentially an argument against the application of 
the formulas of individual psychology to the problems of group psychology,
Another observation that seems pertinent here is that in 
either case the strength of the prohibition as indicated by the severity 
of the punishment does not vary in proportion to the strength of the 
desire to perform the forbidden act, as Freud says it does, but in pro­ 
portion to the appreciation of the value which is menaced by the action. 
It does not matter in the least whether one knows why he loves his flag 
or his totem. If a strong sentiment of attachment has been developed 
through experience for his national flag on the part of a civilized 
modern man, or for his totem animal on the part of a savage, then we may 
expect that insult to the flag or harm to the totem will arouse resent­ 
ment, abhorrence, and activity in proportion to the strength of the 
sentiment and according to the respective customs involved.
Let us call to mind the universal feeling of abhorrence in the 
civilized world and the widespread strengthening of the laws in America 
against kidnapping as a result in 1932 of the kidnapping and murder of 
the infant son of Colonel and Mrs. Charles A. Lindbergh. Will anyone
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dare to say that the feeling of abhorrence so universally evident was 
due to an equally strong and universal desire on the part of people 
throughout the whole world to kidnap and murder the son of this rich 
and famous man? Or is such a notion utterly absurd?
Closely related to Freud's principle that what is prohibited 
is desired is a similar principle that whatever is feared is desired, 
the fear being a mask for the desire. A typical instance of Freud's 
use of this principle is as follows:
The persistence of taboo teaches.... that the original 
pleasure to do the forbidden still continues among taboo 
races.... In their unconscious they would like nothing 
better than to transgress them but they are also afraid 
to do it; they are afraid just because they would like to 
transgress, and the fear is stronger than the pleasure. 
But in every individual of the race the desire for it is 
unconscious, just as in the neurotic...
If Freud were content to maintain that in neurotic people over- 
anxiety for the safety of other persons generally masks a desire to do 
them harm then we should be inclined to agree. But to say that in the
psychology of groups, hospitality to strangers, guarding the life of
2 
rulers, and mourning for deceased loved ones reveal such a desire seems
unwarranted. There is no good reason to suppose that one might not 
develop a sentiment for another person, for example the father, with a 
strong element of fear in it as a result of conditioning or through the 
normal process of experience.
Our appraisal of this principle is that, judiciously applied, 
and particularly in dealing with abnormal people, it may reveal important 
facts but taken as a universal principle it leads one into many pitfalls.
Totem and Taboo, p. 52 
Ibid,,pp. 61 seq.
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A third guiding principle used by Freud in the interpretation 
of observed phenomena involves more intimately his theory of motivation 
and his theory of the unconscious. It may be stated as follows: Every 
wish should be interpreted in terms of the most extreme form in which 
it might find satisfaction and should be designated by the term 
signifying such extreme form of expression. The application of this 
principle is probably most clearly illustrated in Freud's numerous dis­ 
cussions of the formation of the Oedipus complex. First of all the 
infant son is attracted to his mother as a source of food, tenderness, 
warmth, etc. Now being in love with a person is an extreme form of the 
favourable attitude toward that person. Further, sexual union is the 
most extreme expression of being in love. Hence it is not only 
justifiable to speak of the infant son as being in love with the mother 
but in so far as he desires her or is favourably disposed toward her in 
any sense or degree whatsoever we are justified (according to this 
principle of Freud's) in saying that she is coveted by the son as a 
sexual object, that is, that she is the object of the son's incestuous 
impulses.
Now when the son grows a little older the father becomes the 
admired ideal. So Freud is able to say (according to the principle 
noted above) that the infant son's libido (i.e., the psychical energy 
associated with the sexual impulse) is now transferred to the father. 
(But this is homosexual!tyl) As a result the boy identifies himself 
with his father and seeks in all things to imitate him. Soon, however, 
he finds that in just one thing he never can take the father's place, 
namely, he cannot be his mother's husband, because the jealous father
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will not permit it. So the boy now develops an ambivalent (favourable 
and unfavourable) attitude towards his father. Now an unfavourable 
attitude can find expression either in avoidance or destruction of its 
object. The father cannot be avoided so the only possibility left is, 
even while loving him, to desire also his destruction. Freud puts it 
bluntly ty saying that the boy wishes to kill the father and take the 
mother to wife - murder and incest are the strong words he uses.
And so, following this principle, Freud speaks of death 
wishes, homosexual impulses, incestuous desires, etc., where the lay­ 
man, using milder language, might speak of dislike for or being 
annoyed by another person, of admiration for a member of one f s own 
sex, or of a son's fondness for his mother and sisters, etc. We speak 
of favourable and unfavourable attitudes or sentiments; the Behaviourist 
speaks of reactions of approach and avoidance; Freud speaks of 
sexuality (libidinous impulses) and death wishes.
Freud's defense of what he calls his "nomenclature" is 
instructive:
The majority of "educated" people have regarded this 
nomenclature as an insult, and have taken their re­ 
venge by retorting upon psychoanalysis with the 
reproach of "pan-sexualism." Anyone who considers 
sex as something mortifying and humiliating to human 
nature is at liberty to make use of the more genteel 
expressions "Eros" and "erotic." I might have done 
so myself from the first and thus have spared myself 
much opposition. But I did not want to, for I like 
to avoid concessions to faint-heartedness.
The writer has no interest whatever in regarding Freud's 
"nomenclature" as an insult. Neither has he any great concern to appear
• Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1922), p. 59,
to others either faint-hearted or heroic. Biit he has considerable 
interest in scientific formulations concerning these matters which 
correctly and adequately represent the psychological facts and in a 
terminology which is serviceable in the communication and valuable in 
the discovery of knowledge.
Without going into the analysis and criticism of Freudian 
theory in toto, which would take us too far afield, we wish to make two 
observations with respect to this third guiding principle which he 
employs. In the first place, we judge it to be a very inferior tool 
of communication. This ought to be sufficiently demonstrated by the 
well-nigh universal misunderstanding of Freud, against which we find in 
his writings so many expressions of bitterness. But it goes much 
further than a mere misunderstanding by people who are educated to 
prejudice. It seems to us that the serious and unprejudiced reader will 
not only be often mystified himself, but not seldom will he feel that 
even Freud is baffled in trying to understand his own views after they 
have been formulated in the terms which this principle dictates. An 
example of this is Freud's insistence that by the sexual he does not 
mean the copulative act of adult human beings, when almost all the while 
he writes as though that is exactly what he means. Our criticism is not 
here directed against Freud's emphasis on sexuality but on his practice 
of designating undifferentiated psychological processes having extensive 
denotation and slight connotation by names of exactly the opposite 
character having specific denotation and very extensive connotation, and 
then of reasoning as though the designation were appropriate. This is 
not just a matter of "nomenclature;" it is a matter of science and logic,
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And he who follows a principle that violates the fundamentals of logic 
must hope neither to be understood by others nor to arrive at dependable 
conclusions for himself.
Our second observation is that as a tool of discovery this 
principle is almost entirely unfruitful. Psychoanalytic theory began 
with the effort to explain transference and resistance. Fundamental in 
Freud's development of psychoanalysis was this third guiding principle.
It led to the formulation of a theory which may be expressed in three
1 
words, repressed infantile sexuality, and the essence of which may be
expressed in two words, Oedipus complex. There the trail ended. And 
for Freud the problem of psychology, both individual and social, was
reduced to the task of explaining all observed psychical phenomena in
2
terms of this theory. Consider the works of Freud and see if this is
not so. We hasten to add that certain of Freud's ideas, particularly 
his emphasis on the dynamical character of mental process and his 
theories of repression and the unconscious, are among the most important 
contributions made by any one to modern psychology. And we wish to add 
an expression of our appreciation of his genius. But not one of these 
contributions is the necessary result of the guiding principle that we 
have been discussing while those theories that are a necessary result of 
it are the ones that receive the severest criticism from competent 
psychologists of today both in and out of the psychoanalytic school.
1. Freud: History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, p. 9. Cf. also 
Woodworths Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931), pp. 139-143,
2. Cf. Totem and Taboo, p. 261. In a footnote he speaks of the
contributions of psychoanalysis and then addst "The synthesis of 
the whole explanation must be left to another. But it is in the 
nature of this new contribution that it could play none other 
than the central role in such a synthesis, although it will be 
necessary to overcome great affective resistances before such 
importance will be conceded to it."
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Having discussed three guiding principles employed by 
Freud in the interpretation of psychical phenomena upon which his 
theory of religious origins is based we pass now to the discussion of 
the Oedipus complex which epitomizes the basic content of Freud's 
psychoanalytic theory. From the preceding discussion it will be 
apparent that while we accept repression as a psychological phenomenon 
we are compelled to reject the theory of infantile sexuality as Freud 
expounds it. And unless we accept his exposition of infantile sexuality 
we cannot accept his exposition of the Oedipus complex upon which it is 
based. We insert here only one or two brief observations to make clear 
our reasons for the rejection of infantile sexuality. It is our view 
that the instincts arose out of the process of evolutionary develop­ 
ment. Organisms developed in complexity of physical and psychical 
structure and in responsiveness to the more complex and remote factors 
in the environment. Concomitantly their organic and psychical needs 
became increasingly differentiated and complexly organized as innate 
drives which are now objectively observable in the typical activities 
that satisfy these drives. One of these organic needs or instincts is 
sexual union. The sexual function was not the primordial drive in 
evolutionary development but what Bostock has called the "urge to ad-
4 * a1just." If this is true then neither can the instincts of the higher 
animals and man be all regarded as sexual in character (for they are 
highly specialized urges to adjustment such as satisfy fairly definite
1. Bostock: The Neural Energy Constant (1931), pp. 34, 46. 
Cf. also our discussion above, Ch. I, especially section 9,
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organic and psychical needs, and they include the urge to sexual union 
as one among their number of specialized tendencies) nor can the un- 
differentiated primordial "urge to adjust" be characterized as sexual
because the function of sex arose relatively late in the evolutionary
1 
process.
Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski has made an anthropological study of
2 
the family in which he compares the European upper-class family life,
the European peasant family life and the Melanesian matrilineal family 
life with a view to testing out Freud's hypothesis regarding cultural 
origins. In Part I of this study Malinowski presents very convincing 
evidence in support of his conclusion that the situation in European 
family life in general was very much as Freudian theory has made it out, 
including a repressed affection on the part of sons for the mother and 
an ambivalent attitude toward the father. Equally telling evidence was 
to the effect that among the Melanesians, where society is ordered on 
the basis of matrilineal inheritance of membership in exogamous clans, 
there existed neither a repressed sentiment of affection for the mother 
nor an ambivalent attitude towards the father.
This evidence further weakens Freud's theory as it bears on 
primitive society and is all the more important because Malinowski was
1. Freud is not unaware of this difficulty and he has sought to 
show against the experiments of Woodruff and others that the 
immortality of unicellular animals is dependent upon sexual 
union. (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, section IV, pp. 54 seq.) 
Freud's contention that the need of these infusoria for fresh 
nutrient fluid, occasionally, proves their need for sexual 
union does not seem very convincing. The writer hopes that his 
inability to see how the need for food and the need for sex are 
identical does not result from prejudice or repressed complexes.
2. Malinowski: Sex and Repression in Savage Societz (1927).
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favorable to Freud's point of view. It tends to support the view 
that whatever sort of family complex may be established is the result 
of the social situation rather than the consequence of fixed native 
impulses of human nature.
Regarding the apparent support given the Freudian formulation 
by the evidence on the European family we have to report, in fairness
to all, that Malinowski, when he wrote these chapters, did not fully
1 
understand Freud's doctrine. This he readily admits himself and in
one footnote he writes:
Since this was first written in 1921, I have changed 
my views on this subject (infantile sexuality). The 
statement that "a young organism reacts sexually to 
close bodily contact with the mother" appears to me 
now absurd. I am glad I may use this strong word, 
having written the absurd statement myself."
Malinowski was, all the while he thought himself a Freudian,
talking in terms of sentiment, substantially in accordance with the
15 
views of Shand and of Morton Prince and not in accordance with Freud.
We find that Malinowski f s observations and conclusions are in harmony 
with the point of view which the present writer has been developing 
throughout this dissertation. He justly points out the importance of 
Freud's emphasis on the influence of the family situation in the develop­ 
ing life of the child. He also makes use of such concepts as repression, 
the unconscious, inhibition, etc., but these are all interpreted in a 
sense that are out of harmony with Freudian usage. It seems a pity 
that the most fruitful development of Freud's ideas has been made by 
non-Freudians.
1. Op. cit., pp. 36, 75; Part IV.
2 « Op. cit., pp. 36-37.
3. Cf. supra, section 15.
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We have been examining some of the pillars upon which rests 
the superstructure of Freud 1 s hypothesis of religious origins. Do 
these pillars rest upon a rock or upon the sand? Freud says:
...we base everything upon the assumption of a 
psyche of the mass in which psychic processes 
occur as in the psychic life of the individual.
By way of comment on this statement we quote from Freud
2
himself?
It is very interesting that among primitive men 
circumcision is combined with or replaced by the 
cutting off of the hair and the drawing of teeth, 
and that our children, who cannot know anything 
about this, really treat these two operations as 
equivalents to castration when they display their 
fear of them.
And upon this statement we forbear to make any comment I
d. Summary and Conclusion
We have shown that Freud claims to have solved the problem 
of religious origins in the origin of totemism and the incest taboo 
and that he holds these to be necessarily connected through primal 
parricide, displacement of the father image on to a revered animal, 
and the establishment of the father 1 s will as the basic law of the 
tribe in the form of prohibitions or taboos against incestuous relations 
vdth totem companions and against taking the life of the totem animal. 
We examined the logic by which these conclusions were developed and 
found it at many crucial points fallacious; we investigated some of
Totem and Taboo, p. 261, 
Ibid., p. ?54, footnote.
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the basic facts presented in support of Freud's theory and found them 
to be either unsupported by the observations and researches of com­ 
petent anthropologists or so highly tinged with psychoanalytic theory 
as materially to reduce their importance as objective observations; 
we found certain psychoanalytic principles which were used in the 
interpretation of data and the formation of hypotheses to be highly 
questionable; and we found that anthropological research by Malinowski 
did not sustain Freud's conjectures.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that Freud's formulation even 
by those who are favorably disposed towards psychoanalysis should not 
be regarded as anything more than a conjecture - a possible hypothesis, 
Since we have rejected what Freud calls one of the fundamental pillars 
of psychoanalysis (infantile sexuality), Freud's conjecture no longer 
remains for us as even a possible hypothesis.
Although we reject Freud's solution as a whole, it is not 
without its insights. Chief among these we consider to be the impor­ 
tance which it places upon the family situation as it influences the 
growing life of the child and of the race. This we accept and grate­ 
fully acknowledge.
Whether totemism has anywhere an essential connection or 
whether it has any sort of universal connection, essential or accidental, 
with religion are questions about which anthropological observations 
give us no basis for certainty. The evidence seems to support a negative 
answer to both. In sober honesty nobody knows what the origin of 
totemism was.
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There may be more evidence in support of some connection be 
tween the beginnings of incest-taboo and of religion. Marett points 
out quite convincingly that in primitive society woman was mysterious 
as a mistress but doubly so as a mother. In the days when mankind 
was yet unable to put two and two together about the relation of con­ 
jugation and parturition every birth was a mystery in which woman had 
all the responsibility and all the credit.
Thus not merely in a titular sense but literally, 
the mother stood for the fountain-head of the 
matrilineal group. The men in their superior way 
might elaborate a mythology concerning the esoteric 
reasons why babies are born; but she was bound to 
get all the benefit of it seeing that was all about 
her and about her only. Economically considered no 
doubt the male counted for a good deal; but viewed 
cosmically he was but as the rainbow in the water­ 
fall - an epiphenomenon in the absence of which 
the movement of life could proceed just as merrily 
as
Motherhood, then, was certainly a mystery in the days 
of old; even if it never can be certain that it first 
became so when, in place of the family, the unit of 
society was the kin, and the kin was in itself mother­ 
hood pure and simple, ̂
To go back, then, to the question of how exogamy, or 
rather the incest-taboo, arose, is it not possible that 
it was no Cyclopean sire of the type imagined by 
Athinson and Freud, but some even more revered kin- 
mother who is to be hailed as the first to bring primal 
lust under the reign of law? Cherchez la femme. . • • . 
As I conceive the Eldest of Mothers, she was something 
of a witch, and, however inarticulate, carried curses 
in her eye. While she had the girls under her hand, 
she had the boys under this eye of hers, so that they 
would be well advised to slink off to their amourettes 
beyond the range of her dire disapprobations. But, 
however it came about, somehow within that narrow circle
1. Marett: Faith. Hope x _and_Qharity in Primitive Religion (1932),
p. 83. 
-• -Ibid., p. 85.
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of intenser social life lust once for all was stayed. 
It had been transformed into incest, an accursed 
thing. Henceforth lust within the kin was as bad 
as murder or worse. Both were utterly abominable; 
for both were offences against the blood, the sacred 
blood, the blood of the mothers, the blood from 
which men are
In contrast to this view of one who knows something about 
primitive society, Freud's treatment of primitive woman as a mere sex- 
object of superior man is ridiculous. In view of the fact that he 
recognizes that his view does not explain the existence of the great
maternal deities which he admits must have everywhere preceded paternal
gdeities, we regard this discussion of Marett's as doubly important.
We present it as an acceptable substitute for Freud 1 s hypothesis in 
explanation of the origin of incest- taboo, and of its relation to 
religion.
54. Libido f The Collective Unconscious, and Religion
Another leader of the psychoanalytic movement, Dr. C. G. Jung 
of Zurich, has given a very different account of the origin of religion 
from that advocated by Freud. The differences between the views of 
these two men are rooted in fundamental differences in psychological 
theory. We have, therefore, included at the end of the present work 
an exposition of the psychological views of Dr. Jung that are important 
for the understanding of his theory of religious origins (Appendix IV).
1. Op. cit., pp. 85-86.
2. Totem and Taboo f p. 247.
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We may here present the broad outlines of Jung's theory of 
the origin of religion in his own words:
One might raise the objection that the mythological 
inclinations of children are implanted by education. 
The objection is futile. Has humanity at all ever 
broken loose from the myths? Every man has eyes and 
all his senses to perceive that the world is dead, 
cold and unending, and he has never yet seen a God, 
nor brought to light the existence of such from 
empirical necessity. On the contrary, there was 
need of a phantastic, indestructible optimism, and 
one far removed from all sense of reality, in order, 
for example, to discover in the shameful death of 
Christ really the highest salvation and the redemption 
of the world. Thus one can indeed withhold from a 
child the substance of earlier myths but not take from 
him the need of mythology. One can say, that should 
it happen that all traditions in the world were cut 
off with a single blow, then with the succeeding 
generation, the whole mythology and history of religion 
would start over again. Only a few individuals 
succeed in throwing off mythology in a time of a cer­ 
tain intellectual supremacy - the mass never frees 
itself. Explanations are of no avail; they merely 
destroy a transitory form of manifestation, but not 
the creating impulse.
This statement which appears near the beginning of "The 
Psychology of the Unconscious," in which he considers the question 
of religious origins, clearly reveals several fundamental assumptions 
in Jung's thinking on this problem: (l) Jung is concerned principally 
with the origin of religious conceptions and myths such as one might 
expect to arise out of primordial images and ways of thinking. 
(&) The origin and explanation of religion is to be sought in sub­ 
jective motives and their phantastic elaboration rather than in 
objective conditions and man's intelligent dealing with them. (3) The 
explanation of the religious phantasies of the individual is to be
!• Jung: Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 30.
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sought in the study of racial psychology and its application to these 
phenomena of individual psychology. (4) Religious ideas and myths 
have no objective validity and the mature individual will be interested 
in them only as it helps him to understand the neurotic and immature 
individual.
When one sifts through the immense amount of psychological, 
anthropological, and mythological material which Jung employs in the 
analysis and explanation of the Miller phantasies (Psychology of the 
Unconscious) one finds just one source of religion - the libido or 
life-impulse.
And one finds three phylogenetic types of libido manifestation 
the phantastical representations of which have become the primordial 
prototypes of important religious conceptions of the past and of today.
The first of these manifestations to be noted is the life- 
giving, fructifying power of libido. The primordial symbols of sun
and fire represent the fructifying strength and heat which are attri-
1 
butes of the libido.
The visible father of the world is, however, the sun, 
the heavenly fire; therefore, Father, God, Sun, Fire 
are mythologically synonomous. The well-known fact 
that in the sun's strength the great generative power 
of nature is honored shows plainly, very plainly, to 
any one to whom as yet it may not be clear that in 
the Deity man honors his own libido, and naturally 
in the form of the image or symbol of the present 
object of transference.^
God, the Father, thus represents the creative and powerful aspect of 
libido.
1. Jung: Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 100-101,
2. Ibid., p. 99.
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Another typical manifestation of libido is to be seen in the 
desire for rebirth and renewal, i.e., for immortality. The sun is 
the ever-youthful, vigorous, and powerful one who, in the mythology of 
all races, is reborn each morning from the life-giving waters (womb) 
of mother-earth and after his fiery journey across the heavens is again 
swallowed up by those same waters that gave him birth. In the night- 
time the sun is transported in the belly of a sea-monster (phallic 
symbol) to the place of his birth and rising. Jung tells us that 
the meaning of these sun-myths is
the longing to attain rebirth through the return to 
the mother's womb, that is to say to become as 
immortal as the sun.l
Jung calls this an incestuous desire but he states quite 
clearly that the fundamental basis of the incest wish does not aim 
at cohabitation but at the special thought of becoming a child again, 
of turning back to the parent's protection, of coming into the mother 
once more in order to be born again. Here we come upon the problem 
propounded to Christ by Nicodemus - how may one re-enter the mother's 
womb and be born again? Of course, says Jung, the most obvious way 
would be through cohabitation; but the incest-taboo prevents this, so
phantasy is resorted to, and libido becomes spiritualized and flows
p off in mythology.~
The religious thought is bound up with the compulsion 
to call the mother no longer mother but City, Source, 
Sea, etc. This compulsion can be derived from the 
need to manifest an amount of libido bound up with 
the mother, but in such a way that the mother is 
represented or concealed in a symbol.
!• Op. cit., p. 240. 
2. dp. clt., p. 251.
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Some of the mother symbols are city, source, sea, water, the earth, 
tree (Christ died on the tree of life - the mother - and so 
achieved immortality), etc. Even the underground caverns where the 
early church met (and hence the church today) are symbols of the 
mother's womb, etc.
Jesus' reply to Nicodemus was, in effect, according to Jung, 
"Think symbolically." He concludes that
Christianity with its repression of the manifest 
sexual, is the negative of the ancient sexual 
cult. 2
And the New Testament reveals a system of symbolical thinking on these
3
matters.
Libido manifesting itself as the desire for immortality gives 
rise to a widespread and elaborate mythology and symbolism of the 
Mother. Moreover, it results in the myth of the sun-god who periodically 
returns to the mother's womb and is born again. This myth occurs in 
many forms the two most important of which concern Christ and Mithra.
Christ as the "God becoming flesh" has generated 
himself through Maryj Mithra has done the same. 
These Gods are unmistakable Sun-gods, for the 
Sun also does this, in order to again renew 
himself. 4
In religion, therefore, says Jung, man has the realization 
of his incest desires. Heaven is the Father, Earth is the Mother and
all men and women are brothers and sisters. Thus man can remain a
5 
child for all time and satisfy his incest wish all unawares.
!• Op. cit., p. 253.
2. Op. cit., p. 257.
5. Op. cit., p. 252.
4. Op. cit., p. 217.
5« Op. cit., p. 261.
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According to our author this state would doubtless be ideal 
were it not for the unfortunate fact that it is infantile and, as such, 
in conflict with the tendency of libido to achieve independence. This 
desire for independence is the third type of libido manifestation 
which we shall mention as an important source of religious symbol and 
myth.
At the age of about four years the child begins to have a
1 «
mind of his own - i.e., the process of individuation begins. Then
he seeks to leave the mother and win the world. This is one aspect 
of the inner struggle of youth; the other is the incestuous longing 
to return to the parents. This retrogressive longing must be sacri­ 
ficed and the libido freed for works of service and self-fulfilment.
The object of psychoanalysis has frequently been 
wrongly understood to mean the renunciation or 
gratification of the ordinary sexual wish, while, 
in reality, the problem is the sublimation of the 
infantile personality, or, expressed mythologically, 
a sacrifice and rebirth of the infantile hero.^
Thus libido is to accomplish the rejuvenation (salvation) of the world 
and the conquest of death, and this manifestation is mythologically 
expressed in the various hero-niyths (of which the Christ-myth is only 
one among many) where these objects are accomplished by the self- 
sacrifice of the hero.
1. Op. cit., p. 461.
2. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 315. Also, 
Psychological Types, p. 561.
3. Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 479.
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According to Jung's interpretation the great world religions 
have no historical basis. Their source is the libido and its mani­ 
festations. But how did these mythical formulations arise in history 
and become so widely accepted among men? In this way: In times of 
weariness, or stress, or necessity when the conscious rational approach 
to the world fails, as it must fail in the face of great destroying 
forces of nature or in periods of social disintegration, these mytho­ 
logical structures take life. Men project their desires upon these 
creatures of phantasy and they are seen as realities. Thus the gods 
become real and personal and religious institutions, which are the 
means by which men deal with the gods, flourish and grow strong and 
vastly outlive the necessity which gave them birth. Thus Christianity 
and Mithraism with their splendid moral idealism arose because a 
sophisticated philosophy had destroyed belief in the old gods, had 
released the moral restraint of animal impulses, and had left the 
people vegetating in spiritual darkness. If these old truths seem 
empty to us it is because they have done their work so well that the 
necessities which brought them forth have actually been lost, and 
religiousness has now become a neurosis.
The dynamic appearance of both religions betrays 
something of that enormous feeling of redemption 
which animated the first disciples and which we 
today scarcely know how to appreciate.... Most 
certainly we should understand it, had our customs 
even a breath of ancient brutality, for we can 
hardly realize in this day the whirlwinds of the 
unchained libido which roared through the ancient 
Rome of the Caesars. The civilized man of the 
present day seems very far removed from that. He 
has become merely neutotic..... The elementary 
emotions of the libido have come to be unknown
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for us, for they are carried on in the unconscious; 
therefore, the belief which combats them has be­ 
come hollow and empty.
Since religion is the product of phantastic thinking which 
was very valuable in its day but the need of which men should long 
ago have outgrown, it should now be supplanted, says Jung, by science
9
which is.the product of directed thinking."
55. Criticism of Jungts Theory 
a. Relation to History
The most obvious objection to Jung f s theory of the origin 
of religion is that it ignores history. It is not necessary here to 
argue the question whether Jesus of Nazareth was an historical person. 
We can only regard it as an unfortunate circumstance for Dr. Jung 
that his psychological theories are at variance with the results of 
historical research.
We do not wish to deny that the phantastic elaboration of 
subjective motives (i.e., myths) tend to cluster about the great names 
of history. But that is no proof that the persons about whom mythical 
stories are told never existed. It merely provides the historian with 
the fascinating task of deciding what is truth and what is fiction. 
It is just as uncritical to assume without investigation that all the 
stories regarding a certain character are fictitious as to assume 
that they are all true.




We find two difficulties with Jung's logic. The first is 
that he reasons by analogy to an extent and in a manner that seems to 
us unjustifiable. As an example we may take Jung's analytical inter­ 
pretation of Miss Miller's dream-hero. In the vision he appears as 
an Aztec and his name is Chiwantopel. This name is associated with 
Popocatepetl which in turn is put through a series of associations 
connected with anal eroticism, is illuminated by a disgusting story of 
an insane woman 1 s idiotic behaviour, and is brought to light as the 
product of the infantile phantastic theory of creation by the anal 
route. Chiwantopel is now associated with and identified with Ahasver, 
Chidr, the Sun, Mithra, Christ, Elias (which means Helios, the Sun), 
Moses, Gilgamesh, and many another, and finally completely revealed 
as Miss Miller's own libido struggling for independence against the 
incestuous desire to return to the dependence of childhood. Who can 
tell whether this is the right interpretation? Jung himself says that
9
there are no established symbols for our guidance. If this is so, it 
seems probable that the interpretation would represent the wishes and 
the associations in the mind of the analyst rather than those in the 
mind of the patient.
As an example of the extremes to which this sort of reasoning 
can carry even so great a thinker as Dr. Jung we may cite his assertion
that the generation of fire originally occurred as a result of onanistic
3 
boring. To one who has had experience in producing fire by friction
!• Psychology of the Unconscious,, pp. °05 ff.
2. Ibid.,p. 249.
3. Ibid. ,?. 174.
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and knows how difficult and complex an art it is, such a statement 
seems worse than absurd; it is ridiculous.
Our second objection to the logic of Jung is that he ex­ 
plains the psychology of the race by the psychology of the neurotic 
and then explains the psychology of the individual by reference to the 
psychology of the race. This does not necessarily mean that he reasons 
in a circle but that such a procedure is open to the fallacies of 
composition and division.
c. . ^Psychological Theory
From the point of view of psychological theory Jung's ex­ 
planation of religious origins involves two dogmas which we .-mint now 
subject to somewhat more rigorous examination. They are concerned 
with his theories of phantasy and mythology, and of the collective 
unconscious.
There is unquestionably a valid distinction between phantasy 
and directed thinking. The importance of that distinction for 
psychological theory is indeed very great. And "orthodox" psychology 
owes psychoanalysis a debt of appreciation and gratitude for the 
emphasis which the latter has laid upon the significance of the 
phantastical elaboration of subjective motives.
Our objection to Jung's treatment of phantasy is that his 
contrast between phantasy and directed thinking does not io justice to 
some very important facts. We shall try to show that this is so. In 
brief, Jung says that phantastical thinking gives rise to dreams in
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the individual and in the race to myths, while directed thinking r-suits 
in science. We believe, however, that the situation is not quite so 
simple as that.
Our problem here, from the point of view of scientific 
psychology, is to get an adequate view of imagination and see just how 
mythology and science really fit into the total scheme.
Human beings are able to recall or re-present to consciousness 
impressions of objects, situations, events and relations which were once 
present in perception but which are no longer so. And they are able 
also to construct from elements of such re-presented impressions new 
impressions or images of possible objects, situations, events, or re­ 
lations. The sum of these activities we shall designate by the term
1
"ideal representation." We may now divide ideal representations
into two classes: (1) reproductive• in which the aim is to reinstate 
past experience, and (2) constructive y in which the aim is to build up, 
out of the elements of reinstated past experience, an experience that is, 
as an integrated whole, essentially new to the subject. We shall use 
the word "imagination" to designate the activity of forming constructive 
ideal representation.
We may also divide the second of the above classes, i.e., 
constructive ideal representations or imagination, into two classes: 
(1) imitative, in which the aim is, by following the cues given by 
another, to construct an experience that is representative of an object, 
a situation, an event, or a system of relations described or suggested 
by another person; and (2) creative, in which the aim is to construct
1. Our discussion follows the position taken by Drever: Psychology 
of Education (1925), Ch. X.
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an essentially new experience that is representative of a possible 
object, event, situation, character, or system of relations. An illus­ 
tration of a constructive ideal representation of the imitative sort 
would be the activities of a person reading a novel; of the creative 
sort, the activities of the person writing it.
Creative imagination may be subdivided likewise into two 
classes: (l) pragmatic. and (2) aesthetic. The pragmatic type of 
creative imagination has two distinguishing marks: (l) it involves 
objective control or the feeling of objective control, i.e., its 
direction is toward an end which is in congruity with objective con­ 
ditions in the real world, conditions in which or to which adjustment 
has to be made; and (?) as a result of its nature, the activity itself 
derives its chief value and significance from the results to be 
achieved. The distinguishing marks of the aesthetic type of creative 
imagination are almost the exact opposites of those of the pragmatic 
type: (l) it is free from the hampering restrictions of conditions in 
the real world. Whatever conditions may be imposed, consistency and 
congruity with which may be demanded, they are, in general, and are 
felt to be, self-imposed; and hence, (2) the value and significance of 
the activity is derived not from any system of objective values but 
from the emotional satisfaction which it yields.
Both pragmatic and aesthetic imagination may be further sub­ 
divided. Pragmatic imagination may be either: (l) practical, in 
which the immediate aim is action, and which finds its exemplification 
in the affairs of practical life and work; or (2) theoretical, in which 
the immediate aim is understanding, and which is exemplified in 
mathematics, science, and philosophy. Aesthetic imagination falls into
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two types also: (l) artistic, in which the aim is to create beautiful 
or satisfying forms consistent with self-imposed standards; and 
(2) phantastic, which is creative ideal representation unrestricted 
either by external conditions in the real world or by self-imposed 
standards.













Jung contrasts phantasy and directed thinking in such a way 
that either he leaves out of consideration the practical type of prag­ 
matic imagination and the artistic type of aesthetic imagination, or 
he fails to make a distinction between the theoretical and practical 
types of pragmatic imagination and between the artistic and phantastic 
types of aesthetic imagination. In his treatment of this subject in 
"The Psychology of the Unconscious" he seems to do the former; in his
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essay on "Poetic Art," the latter. In either case he identifies 
mythology with phantasy.
We wish to center our objection on Jung's inadequate treatment 
of the aesthetic imagination because this is what concerns us in our 
study of religious origins. Either to ignore artistic imaginative 
activity or to identify it with phantasy we regard as a serious psycho­ 
logical mistake. Mythology is not pure fancy. It has its roots in the 
real world and its creation partakes more of the nature of artistic 
imaginative activity which involves some degree of critical guidance 
than of the nature of pure fancy in which the critical powers are rela­ 
tively dormant. Thus our first objection to Jung's theory of aesthetic 
imagination as it bears on religious origins is that it cannot sufficient­ 
ly be interpreted in terms of phantasy, and that if this is so then 
neither can the origin of mythology nor of religion be adequately so 
interpreted.
Our second objection to Jung's treatment of the aesthetic 
imagination is that the distinction between the aesthetic and the prag­ 
matic types is not nearly so clean cut as he makes it out. Most complex 
activities involve the demand both for consistency with conditions in the 
objective world and for congruity with self-imposed standards; i.e., 
they involve both the pragmatic and the aesthetic types of imaginative 
activity. Even in planning a bridge or designing a motor-car both types 
are demanded. But in the formation and development of ideals, of 
religious conceptions and practices, of philosophical systems, etc., how
Contributions to Analytical Psychology, pp. 255 ff
234.
much more true it isl Religion demands adjustment to external conditions, 
but also it demands that such adjustment shall be made as far as possible 
in keeping with certain self-imposed standards. Our view is that 
religion is both pragmatic and aesthetic in its origin and in its 
present demands. It simply cannot be dug out of the racial unconscious 
in the form of phantastical imagery of typical libido manifestations, 
even if there were a collective unconscious of the kind for which Jung 
contends.
It is very difficult to estimate the value of Jung's doctrine 
of the collective unconscious for the theory of religious origins. Jung's 
own writings are not always clear, nor are they free from contradiction. 
His later works, however, are fairly clear on the following points: 
(l) the collective unconscious is nothing but a possibility, that is, it 
is the inherited possibility, in the form of inherited brain structure, 
of psychic functioning below the level of awareness; (2) this inherited 
possibility comes to light in motives and images which, without historical 
tradition or migration, spring anew in every age and clime; (3) the
unconscious contents are active; and (4) they issue in products which are
1 
exemplified in dreams and phantasies.
With Jung's identification of the unconscious with structure 
rather than with process we must agree. We are unwilling, however, to 
identify the unconscious with brain structure, because what the relation
between brain structure and mental process is has not yet been told by
g
anyone. But, as Professor Drever says:
1 » Psychological Types, pp. 613-618. Also, Contributlojisjbo
Analytical Psychology, p. 246. 
2. Drever: Psychology of Education (1925), pp. 22-23.
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If the terra "unconscious" is to be employed in 
a specific and technical sense in psychology, it 
ought to be employed to designate those psychical 
determinants of experience or conscious process, 
which from their nature never can become conscious. 
We should then recognize the two types of mental 
fact, conscious process, and unconscious determinants 
of conscious process, or the conscious and the un­ 
conscious.
From this point of view it is certainly possible and perhaps 
desirable to make a distinction between those determinants of experience 
(such, for example, as sentiments and ideals) which are products of the 
individual's responses, and those (such as the instincts) which are the 
inherited products of phylogenetic history. This, as we understand it, 
is what Jung essentially means to do in his distinction between the 
personal unconscious and the collective unconscious.
But our view of the nature of the unconscious is incom­ 
patible with Jung f s absolute cleavage between the personal and the 
collective unconscious. According to our view the collective unconscious 
would be equivalent to original nature, and the personal unconscious 
would consist of the modifications of original nature which result from 
the activities of the individual. Such modifications are exemplified in 
sentiments, ideals, habits, prejudices, etc. This means, however, that 
the personal unconscious mental structure is an extension or develop­ 
ment of the original (collective) unconscious mental structure. The 
latter is, therefore, not unrelated to the former, as Jung holds, but 
wholly organized with it as its very core.
The inheritance by the individual as part of his original mental 
structure of certain categories of conception in terms of which he
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apprehends the phenomenal world cannot be doubted. And it is conceivable 
that some sort of structural possibility of symbolical representations 
of the typical needs and relations of the organism may be inherited as 
part of the original mental structure of the individual. If this were 
true we should certainly expect that motherhood would stand as a symbol 
for creation (as indeed it does in the most primitive society) and 
the hero phantasy would serve admirably to symbolize the individual's 
need for independence, achievement, and responsibility. At the present 
state of our knowledge, however, this is a question upon which the 
scientific psychologist may not venture with any certainty to render a 
judgment. Jung's theory of primordial ways of thinking, although not 
completely convincing, is very interesting and suggestive, and it is 
deserving of further investigation by those interested in psychological 
research.
But even if we should grant the existence of the primordial 
ways of thinking for which Jung contends, our view of the unconscious 
would make it necessary for us to depart from Jung 1 s interpretation of 
them at two points. In the first place, we should have to regard them 
as capable of modification and development, just as the instincts are. 
Thus they would be organized as constituents of the total integrated 
mental structure which is signified by the term unconscious. Therefore, 
they would not be uninfluenced by the products of experience, as Jung 
holds, but would be influenced by the total dynamical structure of which 
they are parts. Consequently - and this is our second departure from 
Jung's interpretation - their functioning would not necessarily be 
entirely independent of conscious control, as Jung holds, but might
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proceed according to consciously accepted standards. This is why we 
have insisted above that the aesthetic imagination cannot be adequately 
interpreted in terms of unconscious phantastical formulations. There is 
no reason on earth to suppose that a personally acquired motive (a senti­ 
ment, for example, or an ideal) might not give rise to ideational elab­ 
orations varying all the way from the almost purely phantastic to the 
almost purely scientific.
d. Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion we are now able to draw the 
following conclusion: Jung's restriction of religion to the phantastical 
representations of motives which lie in the unconscious and which are 
unrelated to the products and processes of conscious experience is un­ 
acceptable. Religion involves the pragmatic and artistic types of 
imaginative process as well as fancy. Religion is not merely the formu­ 
lation of myths but an active effort to get into the right relation to 
a power which, though mysterious, is perceived as existent and active 
with respect to important values. It is therefore a very practical 
matter as well as a problem for speculation and artistic representation. 
Even if we should accept Jung's theory of primordial prototypes which 
form the basic structure of our religious conceptions we should still 
have to maintain that both in the life-history of the individual and 




FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY - THE VALUATING ATTITUDE
The views of Ames, King, Leuba, and Coe are presented. They 
all agree that religion is functional in the service of some 
sort of values. King and Ames say that religion is instru­ 
mental in the conservation of the highest social values. Leuba 
says that religion is useful in the preservation and perfection 
of life as a whole. Coe says that religion is functional in 
the completion, unification, and conservation of any values 
whatever. In addition to various difficulties seen in these 
views, individually, the objection is raised against them all 
that they are too subjective and utilitarian. It is urged 
that the Religious Object has an objective reference and that 
satisfactory relationship with Him in highly developed religions 
may become an end in itself. The importance of certain facts 
which the functional school have emphasized is pointed out 
and a statement of religious origins is attempted that gives 
adequate consideration to them all.
Arising from the recognized fruitlessness of structural 
psychology as represented by Wundt, there was, toward the close of 
the nineteenth century, a growing conviction among psychologists 
throughout the Western world that the real problem of psychology is 
the study of mental functions rather than the study of mental structure. 
In its early stage this movement toward "functionalism" was represented 
by such men as James, Stout, Hoeffding, Muensterberg, and Kuelpe. In 
the United States of America it culminated in the development of the 
so-called "functional psychology" under the leadership of Dewey, 
Angell, and Judd.
Functional psychology is the result of following the prag­ 
matic attitude in the study of psychological problems. The functionalist
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is much impressed by the fact of change, of process. He asks not 
what the mind is but what it does; and his explanation of mind is 
formulated in terms of its biological value for survival. Likewise 
in the study of any other process he asks what end it serves, what 
it is good for. And, in the last analysis, its presence is accounted 
for and its value is appraised by reference to its contribution to 
the ongoing process of life.
The emphasis on the genetic explanation and social reference 
of mental functions led naturally, when the functional point of view 
was employed in religious psychology, to the emphasis on the social 
nature, origin, and value of religion. The most eminent representa­ 
tives of functionalism in religious psychology are Irving King, E. S. 
Ames, J. H. Leuba, and G, A. Coe. While it is impossible to take the 
opinions of any one of these men as the view of functionalism with 
regard to a given problem in religious psychology, their views 
have sufficient similarity to enable us to treat them by topics. In 
the present chapter, therefore, we shall devote a section each to 
the psychological source of religion and the origin of the gods and 
add a concluding statement.
56. The Psychological Source of Religion 
The functionalist is not satisfied to explain a conscious 
state or process by analyzing it into its component structural elements 
or contents. He wants to know what end it serves. According to the
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functional point of view mental process arose in the first place be­ 
cause organisms needed to make responses which without it they could 
not make. And even now the tendency is for organisms to develop 
mental activity, particularly at the higher levels, only when spon­ 
taneous, habitual, relatively unconscious responses are inadequate. 
This is the fundamental assumption that underlies Dewey's theory that 
thinking begins with a problem, i.e., a difficulty, and that it is 
directed toward the surmounting of the difficulty. Thinking is 
functional in the solution of problems. For the functionalist every 
mental process is directed toward some end; it subserves some value. 
And its explanation must reveal the processes from which it arises and 
those to which it contributes.
a. Ames - The Consciousness of the Highest Social Values
What then is religion? For the functional psychologist it 
is a kind of mental process, or consciousness. Ames says that it is 
the consciousness of the highest social values. It is the desire 
for individual and social life:
These highest social values appear to embody more 
or less idealized expressions of the most elemental 
and urgent life impulses. Religion expresses 
the desire to obtain life and obtain it abundantly. 
In all the stages the demand is for "daily bread" 
and for companionship and achievement in family 
and community relationships.^
b. King - The Final Meanings of Life
It seems that King would be in perfect agreement with Ames
1. Amesr The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), preface, 
pp. vii-viii, pp. 72, 110, 168.
2. Ibid., preface, p. vii.
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in his conception of what religion is. He begins by saying that 
religion is concerned with the most fundamental values.
The religious attitude may be said to be a 
peculiar organization of mental processes 
about the final meanings of life as they are 
conceived by the individual or the social group. •*•
Religion is an appreciative or a valuating type of consciousness, and
its peculiar differentia lies on the side of the functions served
2 rather than on that of intrinsic psychic content. He says,
The value- judgment is not applied to a content 
as a thing that exists in and of itself, but 
with reference to some
Acts and states of consciousness, including the religious conscious­
ness are to be explained by reference to their setting and function
4 in the general life-process. "
The religious consciousness is regarded as a valuating 
attitude, which means that it "involves an emotional recognition of 
values of some kind, an intellectual tendency to affirm or deny them,
and a positive inclination to act in some way or other with reference
g to them." The religious attitude, however, is the result of par-
7ticipation in group activity.
That the social organization is practically the 
universe, the ne plus ultra of the primitive man's 
life, is a most important point for the develop­ 
ment of religious values out of those of less 
degree... The social body not only is an agent in 
enhancing and rendering permanent the simple values 
brought to consciousness by the growth of inter­ 
mediate activities, it also raises them to the
1. King: The Development of Religion (1910), p. 7.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Ibid., p. 16.
4. Ibid., p. 23.
5. Ibid., p. 30.
6. Ibid., p. 31.
7. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
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highest power. Psychologically, the values 
of the group are not only higher than those 
of the individual, they are genuinely ultimate 
and universal.!
Thus we come to see that man's most fundamental values are the social 
values and that they, by their very importance, produce the religious 
consciousness.
We do not see that there is on this point, therefore, any 
essential difference between Ames and King. For both of them, in 
the last analysis, religion is to be defined as the consciousness of 
(or attitude toward) the highest social values.
c. Leuba - The Use of Superhuman Psychic Powers
Leuba finds difficulty with this consciousness of social 
values as a differentiating mark of religion. King and Ames both 
recognize other forms of social values besides the religious values. 
The religious values are differentiated as a group consisting of 
the highest social values. Leuba ! s criticism of King on this'point 
is equally valid as a criticism of Ames. He says:
Where then is the line to be drawn between those 
(values) that are to be called religious and 
those that are not? Wherever it may be drawn, 
it will mark only a difference of degree between 
religion and the rest of life. The experiences 
on one side of the line will be only of the 
greater value, more permanent, more inclusive, 
than those on the other side. It turns out, then, 
that King has singled out a means of connecting 
together the whole of life, and not one that can 
be used to differentiate any portion of it. 5
Leuba maintains that the differentiating mark of religion 
is the kind of power upon which dependence is felt and the kind of
1- C)p. cit., p. 68.
2. Op. cit., pp. 210, 214.
3. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion (1912), p. 50.
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behaviour which is elicited by that power.
Religion is that part of human experience in 
which man feels himself in relation with powers 
of psychic nature, usually personal powers, and 
makes use of them. In its active forms, it is 
a mode of behavior, aiming, in common with all 
human activities, at the gratification of needs, 
desires, and yearnings. It is. therefore, a 
part of the struggle for life.l
d. Coe - The Revaluation of Values
Coe gives us three valuable criticisms of Leuba ! s view 
of the nature of religion. In the first place, says Coe, Leuba 
considers that in religion man makes use of the psychic powers, with
which he feels himself to be in relation, as mere means toward the
2
achievement of his values which are determined without reference to
the gods, whereas, as a matter of fact, man often adjusts his ends
3 
to what he conceives to be the divine will or the divine nature.
Coe ! s second criticism of Leuba is that "Leuba's definition
presupposes that men have needs, and apparently that these needs are
4 
a constant, while the means used to supply them are variable."
Against this view Coe urges the point that it is the constant re­ 
valuation of values that makes us individuals and organizes us into 
society.
!• Op. cit., p. 52.
2. Op. cit., p. 8. "It is not the needs which are distinctive 
of religion, but the method whereby they are gratified."
3. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), pp. 63-65.
4. Ibid, p. 66.
5. Ibid > p. 68.
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With these two criticisms which Coe directs against Leuba 
we are entirely in agreement. With his third criticism, although 
it is valuable in indicating Coe's view, we must disagree. Coe feels 
that it is unfruitful to define religion by reference to a certain 
content of belief. But Leuba defines religion by reference to the 
powers upon which dependence is felt. And although we disagree with 
Leuba's view as a whole, we shall presently advance reasons in support 
of defining religion partially by reference to content.
At the present, however, let us take note of an important
objection that Coe raises against limiting religion, as King and Ames
g
limit it, to the highest social values. There are values about which
religion is concerned that are not social in the sense in which Ames 
and King use the word. Furthermore, Coe finds that "in the body of
Ames's book, 'highest social values 1 appear again and again to
3 
deliquesce into the social as such."
4 
Coe explains his own conception of religion as follows:
Any reaction may then be considered as religious 
to the extent that it seeks "life" in the sense 
of completion, unification, and conservation of 
values - any values whatever. Religion does not 
introduce any new value; it is an operation upon 
or within all our appreciations. If we are to speak 
of religious value at all, we should think of it as 
the value of values, that is, the value of life 
organizing and completing itself, or seeking a 
destiny, against the discrete values of impulsive 
or unreflective existence. The "new life" that is 
so prominent at different levels of religion gets 
its material from the life that now is. Tribal 
initiations introduce the youth to a "new life"
1. Op. cit., p. 59.
2". Op. cit., pp. 71-72,
3. Op. cit., p. 72.
4. Op. cit., p. 70.
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that is new to him as an individual, but not 
to the tribe. Similarly, Christian regeneration 
simply enthrones such domestic qualities as love. 
Heaven is a projection of joys known on earth, 
and hell merely focuses earthly woes. Even 
communion with God is an extension of love and 
friendship as they are experienced among men.
e« Criticism
The functionalist defines religion in terms of its origin 
and usefulness. His conception of religion is not only fundamental 
to his theory of religious origins but we may say that it is his 
theory of religious origins. In defining religion the functionalist 
points out the psychological source of religion.
The functionalists all agree on the fundamental problem in 
the attempted solution of which arises the religious attitude. It is 
the problem of values. Religion, they all say, is functional in some 
way in the service of some sort of values.
King and Ames say that religion is functional in the con­ 
servation of the highest social values.
Leuba says that religion is functional in the preservation 
and perfection, so far as this depends upon relations with superhuman, 
psychic powers, of the values of life as a whole.
Coe says that religion is functional in the completion, 
unification, and conservation of any values whatever.
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The view of King and Ames was opposed by two serious 
criticisms: (l) religion is, as a matter of fact, functional in 
the service of some values that are not primarily social; and (2) it 
offers no clear basis of differentiating religion from social values 
in general.
To Leuba's view, also, serious objections were raised: 
(1) the gods are not mere means in securing values, but they are often 
determiners of values; and (2) it is not merely the gods who are 
variable, but values are also variable.
To these criticisms made by others we shall now add some 
remarks of our own.
According to Ames ! s view a person is religious according to 
his ability to participate in a social life. He says:
To the psychologist it remains clear that the man 
is genuinely religious in so far as his symbols, 
ceremonials, institutions, and heroes enable him 
to share in a social life. It is also psychologically 
evident that the man who tries to maintain religious 
sentiment apart from social experience is to that 
extent irreligious, whatever he may claim for him­ 
self; while the man who enters thoroughly into the 
social movements of his time is to that extent 
genuinely religious, though he may characterize 
himself quite otherwise.1
According to this estimate we are not at all clear that Jesus and the 
great prophets can be considered religious. They opposed the social 
movements of their times, and they opposed them because they were 
loyal to One who, in their belief, was superior to the social group. 
Religion, today, certainly includes more than social values, unless
1. Ames: The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), p. 358,
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one defines social values in such a way as to include an values. In 
that case to say that religion serves social values means only that 
it is useful for something.
It might be well to approach functional psychology itself 
from a functional point of view, and ask what difficulty gave rise to 
this view of religion. One does not have far to look to discover that 
this view was a protest against an over-emphasis on such non-social 
aspects of religion as is found in rationalism, emotionalism, and 
mysticism, and the corresponding neglect of religion as functional 
in the service of social values.
Such a protest is extremely important for religion. The 
social values should not be neglected. And religion should not be de­ 
fined in such a way as to leave them out. But why should it be 
defined in such a way as to leave out the non-social values? To do 
so is only to repeat the mistake, in the opposite direction, from 
which one is seeking to escape. And in the end science is no better 
off.
We conclude, therefore, that Coe is exactly right in main­ 
taining that religion is concerned with some values that are not 
merely social.
We wish also to emphasize Coe ! s point regarding the religious 
revaluation of values. It cannot be doubted that in primitive society 
man's activities were rigidly circumscribed by custom. But we cannot 
suppose that there was absolutely no freedom at all for the individual. 
Even community affairs have a way of reaching crises in which no 
available custom can be appealed to for guidance. At such times 
individuals, judging not so much by what is as by what ought, to be,
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make decisions that become traditions. And the social activities 
which ensue from the decisions become customs.
Even among primitive men religion to some extent serves a 
critical and reconstructive function and with the development of 
society it does so increasingly. So we agree with Coe that religion 
functions in revaluing values.
This insight also constitutes a valuable criticism of 
Leuba's utilitarianism in religion. Leuba is right in defining religion 
by reference to a Religious Object. But the Religious Object is not
merely a means to be used in getting what man wants. He is always
1 
believed to be in some sense a Determiner of Destiny. In more
highly developed forms of religion he is one upon whom some or all of 
man's most precious values depend; one who revalues man's values, 
making them, by his approval or disapproval, of supreme value or of 
no account; one with whom satisfactory relationship may become the 
dominating value of a man's life - perhaps even of a nation's life.
It is just here that we come upon the distinguishing mark 
of religion, its psychological source, its real differentia. At this 
point we take our position against Coe and the whole functional school. 
Religion is what happens when a person or a group of persons believes 
that a superhuman Determiner of Destiny has assumed a favorable or 
unfavorable attitude toward a value (or values) which is prized by 
that person or group. The business of the Psychology of Religion is 
to study what happens in this situation, i.e., it should study the
Vide supra, sections 20 and 21
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activities (experience and behaviour) of the person or group involved. 
A great deal that is valuable for psychology and for religion can be 
learned by analyzing the contents of the experience as well as by 
observing the usefulness of the resulting attitudes and behaviour. 
It is nothing short of dogmatism to deny facts and discount problems 
because the particular method one has adopted is not suited to their 
treatment.
57. Origin of the Gods
According to the functionalists the gods, also, derive 
from the valuating attitudes of men.
After describing a spirit as an object, sensation, or image 
which attracts the attention forcibly, Ames goes on to explain the 
relation of spirits to religion in the following words:
Religion involves certain spirits, namely, those 
which signify the most important functions and 
interests of the group; those in which the group - 
reacts with the greatest solidarity and intensity.
5 Divinity, he says, is a symbol for the group spirit.
King says that the deity is not the product of a supposed 
faculty of personification but to start with is possibly an actual 
person who is regarded as closely and actively related to some acute 
interest. The process of deification is helped along by: (1) the 
tendency to associate vital interests with the activity of some person 
or animal, (2) the tendency to consider the deity as one of the group, 
(3) the methods of adjustment which are social in character, and
1. Amest The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910), p. 106,
2. Ibid.,p. 109.
3. Ibid.,p. 114.
4. King: The Development of Religion (1910), p. 254.
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(4) the development of the concept by the play of fancy.
As far as psychology is concerned the deity may 
be said to be a value-attitude of a certain kind 
in the consciousness of some individual or 
individuals.^
For the psychologist God ig not a phenomenon. He is not a postulate
nor an elementary factor in the production of the religious life; he
5 is one of the concepts of some religious lives. Since for primitive
man the group is supreme, all the essential elements of the Supreme
4 Being are to be found in the tribal god. The gradual unfolding of
the character of the supreme and all-wise God in human consciousness
5 follows the development of the social consciousness. The character
g of Yahweh was built up rather than revealed.
Leuba considers that there are three general types of 
behaviour in which man may seek to realize his values: (l) he may 
utilize his knowledge of natural causation, (2) he may coerce some 
mysterious impersonal power (mana) to do his bidding, or (5) he may 
cultivate the goodwill of some personal power who thus serves as a 
valuable instrument in the preservation and perfection of his values.
These three types of behaviour may be characterized, respectively, as
7scientific, magical, and religious.
Leuba contends for independent origin of the impersonal and
8 
personal powers. Neither one depends upon the other. He holds that
1. Kingr The Development of Religion (1910), pp. 256-257.
2. Ibid., p. 264.
3. Ibid., p. 267.
4. Ibid., p. 269.
5. Ibid., p. 276.
6. Ibid., p. 277.
7. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion (1912), Ch. I,
8. Ibid., p. 77.
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the idea of non-personal powers arose from the projection of the 
feeling of effort into natural forces. He says that the original
idea of non-personal powers has only one characteristic, namely, it
pis dynamic, it does things." Therefore he objects to Marett f s con­ 
cept of pre-animistic supernatural!sm, and prefers to call the belief
3in non-personal powers "dynamism." Dynamism is the realm of magic;
it is only when belief in personal beings is developed that religion 
comes on the scene.
Leuba derives the ideas of unseen, superhuman beings from 
two sources: (l) the need of accounting for observed phenomena 
(apparitions and various mental aberrations, striking natural
phenomena, problem of creation, etc.), and (2) the affective and moral
4
needs of man. It is only when they become important factors in
the struggle for life that these superhuman beings acquire significance
5 
as real gods. Leuba adds, however, that the mere knowledge of unseen
agents that are unrelated to life is a fiction. When man learns by 
science to gain the values for which he previously depended upon a
superhuman agent, then the god acquires new powers such as giving
6 comfort to the worshiper, etc.
Coe denies that projection was a factor in developing the 
idea of God. He says:
The gods are simply realities of experience when 
it is most vivid. If he (early man) could have 
phrased his procedure, he might have said something
!• Op. <Jit., pp. 78 ff.
2. Op. <jit., p. 83.
3. Op. cit., p. 84.
4. Op. cit., Ch. V.
5. Op. cit., p. 111.
6. Op. cit., p. 113.
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like this: "I feel alive most intensely when 
with my tribe I wrestle with some sense of common 
need or rejoice in some common joy. At such moments 
I realize that our feeling is more than ours; it is 
something that overwhelms us; it is shared by those 
beings - ancestors, spirits, nature-powers - that 
are close to us in our struggle to live. They want 
what we want; they work with us to obtain it; and 
they that be with us are stronger than they that be 
against us. n
In short, the genesis of the god-idea is a spontaneous, 
underived conviction that what is most important for 
us is really important, that is, respected and pro­ 
vided for by the reality upon which we depend. For 
early man the world of values is the real world.^
It is hardly necessary to add anything by way of further 
appraisal of the views of Ames and King. We content ourselves by 
reiterating that Divinity is not a symbol for a spirit within, but for 
an objective element in the situation without, that has a bearing on 
our values. Such objective element may be present at any mental 
level; it may exist as a quality of a perceived situation, or it may 
characterize one f s mature philosophy as a reasoned conviction that the 
Universe is on the whole friendly and in some sense responsive to man.
We shall now briefly consider Leuba's derivation of non- 
personal powers from the projection of the feeling of effort into 
natural forces. In a previous section of the present work (section 24, 
Chapter IV)>, we have been at some pains to show that man perceives 
dynamic processes as having direction, that when they persistently 
menace his values he perceives in them animus and intent, and that such 
perception of apparent attitudes constitutes the rudiments out of which 
spontaneous personification may develop. In our view, projection is
1. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), p. 106,
253,
not necessarily involved in any one of these processes and probably 
is not at all involved in the perception of a dynamic process either 
as having direction or as expressing intention. As Leuba's view is 
supported only by inconsequential and unconvincing data from child 
psychology there is no good reason either for changing our views or 
for discussing the question at great length.
It has an important bearing, however, upon Leuba ! s dis­ 
tinction between magic and religion. Leuba holds that it is only 
when the idea of unseen personal beings is sufficiently advanced for 
man to use these beings in the pursuit of his values that religion 
comes upon the scene; when man uses impersonal powers he is engaging 
in magic. This means, if Leuba is right, that the whole realm of 
pre-animistic supernaturalism discovered by Marett rightly belongs 
to the domain of magic and not to that of religion.
We cannot believe that Leuba is right. Throughout the whole 
of the present work our thesis has been that religion exists whenever 
and wherever men both believe that a mysterious (hence uncontrollable) 
superhuman power is thaumaturgically operative either for or against 
their values, and seek a satisfactory adjustment as a result. Such a 
power need not be personal, as Leuba claims. The mysterious power 
which is manifest in pre-animistic supernaturalism would be quite 
adequate, under the proper conditions, to stimulate the religious 
experience. From the nuclei of sentiments and group practices arising 
out of many such rudimentary religious experiences, the gods have grown,
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With two reservations we are therefore able to agree with 
Coe's statement that "the genesis of the god-idea is a spontaneous, 
underived conviction that what is most important for us is really 
important, that is, respected and provided for by the reality upon 
which we depend." Our first reservation is that we must include 
this cosmic reference and appraisal of our values in our conception 
of religion, as Coe does not. Our second reservation is that the 
reality upon which man depends is not by any means always understood 
to be favorable to the values to which man at a given time finds him­ 
self devoted. His conviction that his most important values are 
respected and provided for by the reality on which he depends, is 
the result of a long racial experience in which man has, probably 
more often than not, found his values at a given time in opposition 
to the real values. And through suffering he has gained a new in­ 
sight and made progress.
58. Concluding Statement
In spite of the limitations of the functional point of view 
in the study of the nature and origin of religion, its use has resulted 
in some notable contributions to our knowledge of these problems.
These contributions have resulted mainly from the emphasis 
placed by the functionalists upon the importance of the following facts: 
(1) Religion is intimately concerned with values. (2) In primitive 
society practically all the values of which man was conscious were
1. Coe: The Psychology of Religion (1916), p. 106,
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values which were shared in common by all the members of a group. 
(3) There was no differentiation of the group life of primitive man 
into functional institutions, such as political, economic, educational, 
and religious institutions, designed to subserve and conserve specific 
types of value. (4) In primitive society man was practically without 
any knowledge of the objective conditions that affected his most 
precious values. Consequently (5) he had practically no means on his 
own account of effecting the achievement or conservation of his values. 
(6) Man gradually developed an increasing knowledge of and control 
over the conditions affecting some of his values. (7) With this 
development, institutions dealing with known and controllable values 
were differentiated out of the common social life and religion took 
its place as one institution among others. (8) There was also the 
development in man of new appreciations and values, including the 
idealization of the self and of society and the tendency to work for 
the realization of things as they ought to be. (9) For the preserva­ 
tion and perfection of his values man has nearly always sought to 
employ the assistance of superhuman powers, usually personal powers.
While all these facts are recognized in a general way by 
the authors whose views we are studying in the present chapter, none 
of them in framing a definition of religion has given full consideration 
to all these facts. Ames and King give attention primarily to the 
first three. Leuba is principally impressed by the importance of 
numbers 1, 4, 5, and 9. Coe emphasizes numbers 1, 6, 7, and 8.
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We shall now attempt a statement that gives due consideration 
to all these important facts which the members of the functional school 
emphasize, and some others for which we have contended.
Religion is concerned with values. In primitive societies 
it is largely concerned with social values. It is active in the 
revaluation of values. Religious activity (behaviour and experience) 
arises in a situation in which the values of an individual or group 
are felt to be appraised, in the sense that an attitude is taken toward 
them, by a power higher than the individual or group concerned, upon 
whom the individual or group is dependent. The appraisal by the 
Religious Object may take the form of disapproval or of approval. In 
the developing life of man in an imperfect world man is more generally 
conscious of disapproval than of approval. This consciousness of 
superhuman approval or disapproval of man ! s intentions, desires and 
values, results in activity which aims at appropriate adjustment. This 
activity of adjustment, according to the values involved and the 
attitude of the Religious Object, may be directed either inward or 
outward and thus issue in either subjective or objective results.
If the attitude of the appraising superhuman power is felt to 
be that of disapprobation or destructive intent, the precarious situation, 
in which man finds himself or the things which he prizes, normally 
becomes the stimulus for a subjectively unpleasant state of tension 
which may be described as the sorrow phase of religious emotion. This 
state of tension operates as a motive initiating and sustaining efforts 
on the part of the religious subject to achieve a satisfactory relation-
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ship with the Religious Object. These efforts at religious adjust­ 
ment may be relatively uncritical or critical.
The uncritical attempt at religious adjustment is directed 
toward changing the attitude of the Religious Object from one of dis­ 
approval to one of approval either by objective acts of a propitiatory 
character or by subjective acts of a renunciatory kind. The opposition 
of values between the Religious Object and the religious subject may be 
so intense that the latter ! s renunciatory activity takes the form of 
what Marett calls humility, moping, being cast down for a season. Such 
a conflict may finally issue in relinquishment and extrusion from one's 
self the offending desire, intention, past deed, or value and the un­ 
questioning acceptance as one ! s own the values evinced by the Religious 
Object. The deprivation thus suffered may at its worst lead to self- 
pity, melancholia, or more serious forms of neurasthenic and psychotic 
mental illness. The relatively uncritical efforts at religious adjust­ 
ment are characteristic of the perceptual and ideational levels of 
mental activity and it is not surprising that we find them prominent in 
the lives of relatively undeveloped individuals and groups.
The more critical attempt at religious adjustment is inquisi­ 
tive and appreciative in character. It is the effort to understand 
what it is that is valued by the Religious Object and how one may achieve, 
conserve, and enjoy that which is most real and valuable. Such an 
attitude of searching leads inevitably to new insight: (1) into the 
character of the Religious Object; or (2) into the relative importance 
of one's previously accepted values; or (3) into entirely new values; 
or (4) into the manner in which one ought to seek the achievement of
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his values. At its best, the final result of this attitude is the 
conscious self-realization of one's high destiny as the friend of 
God - as one who knows, loves, and does the will of God as far as 
he is able at any given moment but who also seeks more knowledge, 
more love, and more power.
When the attitude of the Religious Object is felt to be, 
from whatever cause, one of approbation, the feeling of well-being 
which this sense of approval arouses may be called the joy phase of 
religious emotion. Approved by the Religious Object, one feels 
"strong and wise and glad and good."
Joyous religious emotion also has its critical and uncritical 
phases. As uncritical it is almost entirely retrospective in character 
tending to celebrate and exalt the past. If one feels that he has 
the approval of the Religious Object there is a tendency, at the un­ 
critical levels of mind, to feel that his present ideas, practices, 
values, and personal worth are exalted and confirmed. At its worst 
this may take the form of self-righteous complacency, or of dogmatic, 
unreasoning zeal in persuading or compelling others to accept one's 
own formulas of thought and standards of action.
Or again at the uncritical level the religious subject's 
joyous sense of Divine approval may find expression primarily in 
exalting the goodness of God and the sense of gratitude to him for his 
goodness. Instead of the self-tendencies being exalted, as in the 
cases just mentioned, here we have an example of genuine subjection.
The joy phase of religious emotion, when it finds expression 
at the critical (conceptual) level of mental life, looks forward and
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issues in activity of an intelligent sort. Such activity will aim at 
the realization, conservation, and perfection of the values that one 
believes to have Divine approval, and it will vary in form according 
to the necessities of the situation in which it is operative. It may 
take the form of attempted self-reconstruction and self-improvement in 
the interest of values understood and loved but as yet unrealized; or 
of attempted reconstruction of the physical environment in the interest 
of beauty as when one plants a garden, in the interest of health as 
when a community drains its swamps, etc., or in the interest of worship 
as when people cooperate in building a temple or a cathedral, or in 
the interest of economic well-being in various ways, or in the interest 
of any value whatever that is of sufficient importance to receive cosmic 
approval. Another example of intelligent religious activity arising 
from the Divine approval of values is the attempted education of others, 
in the sense of influencing them to understand and appreciate the 
values to which an individual or group is religiously devoted, and of 
enlisting them in the service of those values. And a final illustration 
is the effort to reconstruct social institutions, at any level of 
society, in the interest of the authentic values which have the 
approval of the Religious Object.
The sorrow phase and the joy phase of religious emotion are 
but moments in the complete religious experience, as the examination 
of the ritual of developed religions readily shows. The ritual is in­ 
tended to guide the worshiper»s experience in the following sequence: 
(1) the consciousness of the Holy God's presence, (2) the sense of his
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own unholiness and sin, (3) the sense of God's forgiveness - atone­ 
ment - thanksgiving, (4) illumination regarding God's will, and his 
own values, (5) the dedication of himself to carry out the new 
insight, (6) the dedication expressed in activity.
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Chapter IX 
COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY - THE SACRED
The views of Emile Durkheim as representative of collective psychology 
are given chief consideration. Durkheim defines religion in terms 
of beliefs and practices related to sacred things. He regards totemism 
as the simplest form of religion, the totem being only a symbol for 
the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination in the 
visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem. It is 
in the effervescence of the clan celebration that the sense of sacred- 
ness is aroused and projected upon the totem as visible symbol. 
Objections are raised against Durkheim 1 a major premise, the social 
mind, and his identification of the religious object as the symbol for 
the group. The conclusion is that sharing common activities with other 
individuals is the chief means by which the developing individual 
gains new concepts, develops sentiments and attitudes, and forms habits 
with respect to the objects and powers which his fellowmen have learned 
to regard as sacred. But the source of the sacred is the mysterious, 
dangerous, uncontrollable power which concerns the welfare not .merely 
of the individual but of the group as well.
The title of this chapter indicates at once that it is
/ 
concerned with the French School of Sociology of which Emile Durkheim
was the leader. It is not intended to ignore the existence of the 
German School of collective or folk psychology whose distinguished 
representative was Wilhelm Wundt. But it has been thought preferable 
to give the central place in the present chapter to the French School 
rather than the German School for the following reasons: (l) Wundt 1 s 
views contribute little, if anything, that is new to the solution of 
the problem of religious origins; (2) Durkheim more consistently and 
emphatically represents the collective point of view in explaining the 
origin of religion than does Wundt who wavers between individual and
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collective explanations; (3) although their conclusions regarding 
religious origins are different, there is a great similarity between 
their fundamental psychological premises, so that the criticisms which 
are directed against Durkheim»s theory of the collective mind and the 
compounding of mental states to form more complex psychological entities 
apply with equal force against the views of Wundt; and (4) Durkheim ! s 
influence in current social psychology, including the psychology of 
religion, is very strong, while that of Wundt is relatively unimportant.
59. The Sacred and the Profane
Among the later works of Durkheim none has received more 
attention than "Les formes elementaire de la vie religieuse," first 
published in 1912. It is here that one finds a systematic presentation 
of the mature views of Durkheim on the nature and origin of religion and 
it is with this work that we shall, in the present section, be princi­ 
pally concerned.
Durkheim recognizes two kinds of religious phenomena:
(1) beliefs, which are states of opinion and consist in representations,
2and (2) rites, which are determined modes of action. Since rites can
be explained only by reference to the fundamental beliefs which underlie 
them a definition of religious belief is prerequisite to the definition
1. English translation lay J. W. Swain under the title of The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915). All references 
are to the English translation.
2. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 36.
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of religious rite. Now one characteristic which all religious beliefs 
have in common is that they all presuppose the division of all things, 
real and ideal, into two absolutely different classes, the profane and 
the sacred. And "the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either 
representations or systems of representations which express the nature 
of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are attributed to them, 
or their relations with each other and with profane things." Further­ 
more, it is not to be supposed that only the gods are sacred; any object,
?person, rite or belief may have this quality. And, also, the difference
between the profane and the sacred is not to be regarded as only one of
3degree; it is a difference in kind and it is absolute. He says,
In all the history of human thought there exists no 
other example of two categories of things so profoundly 
differentiated or so radically opposed to one another. 
The traditional opposition of good and bad is nothing 
beside this; for the good and the bad are only two 
opposed species of the same class, namely morals, just 
as sickness and health are two different aspects of 
the same order of facts, life, while the sacred and the 
profane have always and everywhere been conceived by 
the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds 
between which there is nothing in common.
This division of the world into two domains, the one con­ 
taining all that is sacred and the other all that is profane, Durkheim
5 holds to be the distinctive trait of religious thought. Of course,
he says, there are secondary species within these two classes that are 
incompatible with one another.
1. Op. cit., p. 37.
2. Op. cit., p. 37.
3. Op. cit., p. 38.
4. Op. cit., p. 38.
5. Op. cit., p. 37.
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But the real characteristic of religious phenomena 
is that they always suppose a bipartite division of 
the whole universe, known and knowable, into two 
classes which embrace all that exists, but which 
radically exclude each other.....Religious beliefs 
are the representations which express the nature 
of sacred things and the relations which they sus­ 
tain, either with each other or with profane things.
Having thus defined religious beliefs, he defines the 
other category of religious phenomena, namely, rites, as "the rules
of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the
gpresence of these sacred objects."
Durkheim considers it possible that a religious belief or 
a religious rite may exist in comparative isolation; but that by the
process of mental fusion beliefs and rites may unite to form a
3 
religion. He says,
When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations 
of coordination or subordination with each other in 
such a way as to form a system having a certain unity, 
but which is not comprised within any other system of 
the same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their 
corresponding rites constitutes a religion.4
These are not complete definitions, however, according to 
Durkheim because they do not enable us to distinguish between magic and
religion. Magic too, has its beliefs and its rites and deals with the
5 sacred. The distinction which Durkheim draws between religion and
magic is that religion unites those who adhere to its beliefs and 
practices into a Church, or sacred group, while magic does not bind
1. Op. cit., pp. 40-41.
2. Op. cit., p. 41.
3. Op. cit., p. 41.
4. Op. cit., p. 41.
5. Op. cit., pp. 42 ff.
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together those who adhere to it. In a word, religion is social; magic 
is individual. There is no Church of magic.
Thus Durkheim arrives at the following definition:
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs 
and practices which unite into one single moral 
community called a Church, all those who adhere 
to them.
And then he adds the following statement:
The second element which thus finds a place in our 
definition is no less essential than the first; for 
by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable 
from that of the Church, it makes it clear that 
religion should be an eminently collective thing.
Rejecting Tylor's animism4 and Max Mueller's naturism,5
Durkheim seeks the origin of religion by studying what he regards as
6 
the most primitive form of the religious life, namely, totemism.
He shows that the idea of force (mana. wakan) underlies the beliefs
and practices of totemism, but holds that the totem is a symbol of
7 
this force and not its source. The collective mind of the clan is
the real source of mana. the totemic principle, or god. The totem, 
he says,
expresses and symbolizes two different sorts of 
things. In the first place, it is the outward and 
visible form of what we have called the totemic 
principle or god. But it is also the symbol of 
the determined society called the clan. It is 
its flag; it is the sign by which each clan dis­ 
tinguishes itself from the others, the visible 
mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything
1. Op. cit., p. 44.
2. Op. cit,, p. 47.
3. Op. cit., p. 47.
4. Op. cit., pp. 48-70.
5. Op. cit., pp. 71-86.
6. Op. cit., pp. 87 ff.
7. Op. cit., p. 205.
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which is a part of the clan under any title what­ 
soever, men, beasts, or things. So if it is at 
once the symbol of the god and of the society, is 
that not because the god and the society are only 
one? How could the emblem of the group have been 
able to become the figure of this quasi-divinity, 
if the group and the divinity were two distinct 
realities? The god of the clan, the totemic 
principle, can therefore be nothing else than the 
clan itself, personified and represented to the 
imagination under the visible form of the animal 
or vegetable which serves as totem.
Durkheim's analysis does not end, however, with the dis­ 
covery that the totemic principle and the clan are the same thing. 
He inquires how the apotheosis of the totem has been made possible 
and how it happened to take place in this fashion.
In answering this inquiry Durkheim seeks to show, first 
of all, that "Society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation 
of the divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them."
In fact he says that to its members a social group is what a god is to
2his worshippers. Evidence of this fact is seen in the moral authority
of the society over its members which, like a god, inspires respect
and automatically causes or inhibits actions without regard for any
3 
consideration relative to their useful or injurious effects. Again,
it is seen in the strengthening and vivifying power of society which 
is operative in a man's life through expressions of esteem, sympathy 
or affection for him on the part of his fellows, and which, like the
approval of a god, inspires him to approach the world with confidence
4 and with the feeling of increased energy. Yet again, the religious
1. Op. cit., p. 206.
2. Op. cit., p. 206.
3. Op. cit., p. 207.
4. Op. cit., pp. 209-211.
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quality of a society is seen in its ability to make sacred both men 
and things which were not so before. Thus it is seen that the 
clan is able to awaken in its members the idea that "outside of them
there exist farces which dominate them and at the same time sustain
2
them, that is to say in fine, religious forces."
Durkheim's second problem in explaining the apotheosis
of the totem is to show how collective action in the clan arouses the
3
"sensation" of sacredness there. The every-day, more or less isolated,
existence of separate families in the totemic society which we are 
studying (the Arunta of Australia) is profane. It is when they come 
together in the great tribal gatherings that the sacred is created and 
conserved. In the excitement of the clan celebrations the participants 
feel themselves to be transported into another world, different from the 
one in which they ordinarily live, the world of the sacred.
It is in the midst of these effervescent social 
environments and out of this effervescence itself 
that the religious idea seems to be born."*
In explaining the apotheosis of the totem, the only prob­ 
lem now remaining for Durkheim is to show how the external forces which 
dominate and exalt the members of the clan are thought of under the form 
of totems, that is to say, in the shape of an animal or plant. This is
accomplished by assuming that the clan has come to be known by the name
5
of an animal or plant which also served as its emblem, and by showing
how, granted this, the group experiences tend to organize themselves
1. Op. cit., pp. 212-214.
2. dp. cit,, p. 214.
3. dp. cit., pp. 214-219.
4. Op. cit., p. 218.
5. Op. cit., pp. 230-234.
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in the mind of each clan member around the idea of the totem which 
thus becomes the objectified symbol of the clan itself. He says,
It is a well-known law that the sentiments aroused 
in us by something spontaneously attach themselves 
to the symbol which represents them.....This trans­ 
ference of sentiments comes simply from the fact 
that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol 
are closely united in our minds; the result is that 
the emotions provoked by the one extend contagiously 
to the other. But this contagion, which takes place 
in every case to a certain degree, is much more com­ 
plete and more marked when the symbol is something 
simple, definite and easily representable, while the 
thing itself, owing to its dimensions, the number of 
its parts and the complexity of their arrangement, is 
difficult to hold in the mind. 2
Having thus established the identity of the totemic 
principle and the clan, Durkheim proceeds to strengthen his position 
by trying to show that the notion of the soul, or sacred part of the
individual, is derived from society. Thus the soul is a derivative
3 from instead of being the source of religious ideas. It is society
incarnated in the individual.
It is through the soul that the idea of personality has
entered into religion, the great tribal god being only an ancestral
4 spirit who finally won a pre-eminent place.
As a summary of Durkheim f s position on the origin of 
religion we quote the following:
Since religious force is nothing other than the 
collective and anonymous force of the clan, and 
since this can be represented in the mind only 
in the form of the totem, the totemic emblem is
1. Op. cit., pp. 219-223.
2. Op. cit., pp. 219-220.
3. Op, cit., Ch. VIII.
4. Op. cit., Ch. EC, esp. p. 295.
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like the visible body of the god. Therefore, it 
is from it that those kindly or dreadful actions 
seem to emanate, which the cult seeks to provoke 
or prevent; consequently, it is to it that the 
cult is addressed. This is the explanation of why 
it holds the first place in the series of sacred 
things.
40. Evaluation of Durkheim f s Theory 
a. Durkheim 1 s Position in Social Psychology 
Tarde (1845-1904) and Durkheim (1858-1917) stand side by 
side as the foremost representatives of modern psycho-sociological 
thought in France. But they represent opposite extremes of 
sociological theory.
Tarde was so impressed with the reality and importance 
of the individual factor in the social process that he 
made the individual his center of operations and kept 
his attention fixed upon the individual mind to the 
almost complete disregard of the collective aspect of 
social life. Durkheim, on the other hand, was equally 
impressed with the reality and importance of the 
collective factor. Accordingly, he made the social 
group the center of his operations, with the result 
that he came out at the other extreme of having prac­ 
tically ignored the individual factor. 2
Prior to the work of Tarde and Durkheim we find the prob­ 
lems of human behaviour studied, on the one hand, by a subjective 
and individual!,stic psychology, and, on the other, lay an objective 
and collectivistic sociology, with practically no common ground 
between them. It was in response to the need of correlating the 
work of psychology and sociology in their investigations of human 
activity and human institutions that the science of social psychology
1. Op. cit., p. 221.
2. Karpf: American Social Psychology (1932), p. 108,
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was developed. Tarde and Durkheim were both pioneers from the side 
of sociology in the development of this new science in France, and
they occupied respectively the "nominalistic" and "realistic" positions
1 
in modern sociology.
b. Durkheim 1 s Fundamental Assumption - The Collective Mind
Durkheim ! s theory of religion is entirely dependent upon
g
the assumption, worked out in his earlier publications, of the
existence of a social mind which is both exterior and superior to 
the individual mind and furnishes the latter with the great mass of 
its representations (ideas, concepts), ways of feeling, and ways of 
acting.
Durkheim pictures the formation of the social mind by 
means of an analogy drawn from the formation of concepts in the 
individual mind. He says that sensations are compounded in the brain 
of molecular modifications, but, once existent, they are not material 
but psychic and spiritual, and compound themselves into more and more 
inclusive syntheses:
Car si les sensations, ce fond premier de la conscience 
individuelle, ne peuvent s'expliquer que^par 1'etat du 
cerveaux et des organes - autrement, d f ou viendraient- 
elles? - une fois qu1 elles existent, elles se composent 
entre elles d f apres des lois dont ni la morphologic ni 
la physiologic cerebrale ne suffisent a rendre compte. ̂  
De la viennent les images, et les images, se groupant a 
leur tour, deviennent les concepts, et, a mesure que des 
etats nouveaux se sourajoutent ainsi aux anciens, comme 
ils sont separes par de plus nombreux intermedia! res de 
cette base organique sur laquelle, pourtant, repose toute
1. Karpf: American Social Psychology (1952).^p. 109.
2. Cf., Representations individuelleg—e± reprftSftnt.fi +.1 on a 
collectives (1898).
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la vie mentale, ils en sont aussi moins immediatement 
dependants. Cependant, ils ne laissent pas d'etre 
psychiques; c'est meme en eux que peuvent le mieux 
s ! observer les attributs caracteristiques de la 
mentalite.l
Now, says Durkheim, just as the psychic life of the 
individual has a physiological substratum but is not inherent in it, 
so the social mind has for its substratum a group of associated 
individual minds but extends beyond them:
Or si I 1 on ne voit rien d 1 extraordinaire a ce que les 
representations individuelles, produites par les 
actions et les reactions echangees entre les elements 
nerveux, ne soient pas inherentes a ces elements, 
qu'y a-t-il de surprenant a ce que les representations 
collectives, produites par les actions et les reactions 
echangees entre les consciences elementaires dont est 
faite la societe, ne derivent pas directment de ces 
dernieres et, par suite, les debordent? Le rapport 
qui, dans cette conception, unit le substrat social £ 
la vie sociale est de tous points analogue a celui 
qu'on doit admettre entre le substrat physiologique et 
la vie psychique des individus, si I 1 on ne veut pas 
nier toute psychologic propreraent dite.
Thus the analogy is clearly drawn between the relation of the repre­ 
sentation in the individual mind to the functioning brain cells and 
the relation of the representations in the social mind to the 
individuals in the social group.
Since the collective representations are not derived from 
individuals taken in isolation but from their convergence and union
they are exterior to the individual mind, and hence cannot be of any
5one mind.
1. Representations individuelles et representations .collectives,, 
Rev. de met. et de mor., vol. 6, 1898, p. 300.
2. Ibid., p. 294.
3. Ibid., p. 295; The Elementary Forms of jbhe Religious. _L_if0. (1917),
pp. 434 ff.
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The nature of the concept...bespeaks its origin. 
If it is common to all it is the work of the 
community. Since it hears the word of no par­ 
ticular mind, it is clear that it was elaborated 
by a unique intelligence, where all others meet 
each other, and after a fashion, come to nourish 
themselves.....Every time that we are in the 
presence of a type of thought or action which is 
imposed uniformly upon particular wills or in­ 
telligences, this pressure exercised over the 
individual betrays the intervention of the group. 1
Collective representations are thus said to possess the property of 
"exteriority" because they come to the individual mind from outside it.
We should note, however, that just as images may unite to 
produce concepts in the individual mind, several collective repre­ 
sentations may unite in the social mind into other collective
9
representations of a higher, more purely social kind. This theory 
is important for the development of religion as the following quotation 
will show:
Elles ont le pouvoir de s'appeler, de se repousser, de 
former entre elles des syntheses de toutes sortes, qui 
sont determinees par leurs affinites naturelles et non 
par l f £ta;b du milieu au sein duquel elles evoluent. Par 
consequent, les representations nouvelles, qui sont le 
produit de ces syntheses, sont de me*me nature: elles ont 
pour causes prochaines d f autres representations collectives, 
non tel ou tel caractere de la structure sociale. C'est dans 
I 1 evolution religieuse que se trouvent peut-ebre les plus 
frappants examples de ce phenomene. Sans doute, il est 
impossible de comprendre comment le pantheon grec ou romain 
s'est forme, si 1'on ne connait la constitution de la cite, 
la maniere dont les clans primitifs se sont peu a peu con- 
fondus les uns dans les autres, dont la famille patriarcale
/ <z
s'est organisee, etc. 0
We have already had occasion to discuss the "superiority,"
4 
or constraining power, of the collective representations. Society
1. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 434.
2. Ibid., p. 424; cf. GehlkelEmile Durkheim 1 s Contributions to 
Sociological Theory (1915), p. 32.
3. Representations individuelles et representations collectives 
(1898), pp. 299-300.
4. Vide supra, section 39.
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is infinitely superior to the individual in extension in time 
(permanence), in extension in space (size), in number, and, due to
its hierarchical position, in authority. Whatever appertains to it
2 is sacred; nil other things are profane.
The collective representations, however, while they come
to the individual from the outside, are at the same time internal to
5 the individual mind. He says:
The collective force is not entirely outside of us; it 
does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, 
since society cannot exist except in and through individual 
consciousnesses, this force must also penetrate us and 
organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral 
part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated 
and magnified.
Even the categories of thought have a social origin. In fact, as 
Gehlke shows, Durkheim regards the mind as the collective consciousness 
incarnated in the individual. For that reason it is opposed to body, 
which is the basis of individuality, and thus the duality of man, the
source and the solution of the mind-body problem, is found in the anti-
g thesis of society and the individual. We may summarize Durkheim 1 s
view of the relation between the social mind and the individual mind 
in the following words of Gehlke:
The individual mind furnishes the sensation elements, 
the impulses to activity, the emotional tendencies, and 
some representations (though these latter are neither 
many nor important); the social mind furnishes the great
1. Gehlke: Emile Durkheim*s Contributions to Sociological Theory
(1915), pp. 36-39.
2. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915),
pp. 206 ff.
3. Durkheim: De la division du travail social (1893), p. 99.
4. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), 
p. 209. cf. also, pp. 221, 224, 423, 435.
5. Ibid., pp. 17 ff.
6. Gehlke: op. cit., p. 44.
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mass of the representations, of the ways of feeling 
and the ways of acting. These social representations 
must exist within the individual mind, but their origin 
is outside of the individual mind, to which they come 
with force, impressive because of the varied superiority 
of the source whence they spring, over the source of 
the individual representations. In its most extreme 
form this view makes of the mind or soul (ame) of the 
individual merely the incarnation of the social mind in 
the individual.1
Criticism
Our criticism is directed, in the first place, against 
Durkheim 1 s doctrine of the existence of a collective mind and its 
pre-eminence over the individual mind.
This doctrine is based on the theory that the more complex 
mental contents are formed by the compounding of simpler mental states.
William James calls it the "mind-stuff theory" and devotes a chapter
2in the "Principles" to its criticism. Against it he raises two
objections: first, he says, in effect, that any given mental state or
process is an immediate psychic fact which corresponds simply and
3 totally to complicated cortical activity as a whole.
There are no unperceived units of mind-stuff preceding 
and composing the full consciousness. The latter is 
itself an immediate psychic fact and bears an immediate 
relation to the neural state which is its unconditional 
accompaniment.....We cannot mix feelings as such, though 
we may mix the objects we feel, and from their mixture 
get new feelings.^
But a second and still more fatal objection to this theory is, James 
says, that it is illogical, because it leaves out the essential feature
1. Gehlke: op. cit., p. 54.
2. James: Principles of Psychology (1890), p. 157,
3. Ibid., pp. 155-158.
4. Ibid., p. 157.
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of all the combinations that we actually know, namely, that they are 
effects upon some entity other than themselves.
No possible number of entities (call them as you like, 
whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) 
can sum themselves together. Each remains, in the sum, 
what it always was; and the sum itself exists only for 
a bystander who happens to overlook the units and to 
apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the 
shape of some other effect on an entity external to the 
sum itself.
James's protest against atomistic associationism in 
psychology and his emphasis on functional relationships has borne 
fruit in recent psychological theory. Psychology today is interested 
not in the compounding of mental elements but in an organism as a 
whole responding to a situation as a whole.
But unless the fusion of mental elements is possible the 
existence of the social or collective mind in the way in which Durkheim 
conceives it is impossible.
Our second objection to Durkheim1 s doctrine of the collec­ 
tive mind is that the analogy which he draws between the collective 
mind and the individual mind is not real. By the aid of the following 
schematic summary let us recall the essentials of that analogy. 
Within the individual mind;
By their interaction, many brain-cells produce a sensation. 
By their interaction and combination, many sensations pro­ 
duce an image; many images produce a concept; many concepts 
produce a representation. 
Within the social mind:
By their interaction and combination, many individual
1. Ibid., pp. 158-162.
2. Ibid., pp. 158-159.
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representations produce a social representation of a
1 
higher, more purely social kind.
We have seen, however, that, in Durkheim's thought, the 
individual mind is actually the incarnation of the collective conscious­ 
ness. Even the categories of thought such as space, time, and causation 
are social representations. But, says Gehlke,
if the scope of the individual mind be confined to the 
narrow limits given by our author, where are the individual 
representations out of which, by the process of fusion and 
blending, the social representations are to be compounded? 
Is it fair to call such an elementary complexus of psychic 
processes a "mind," in the sense of a system of repre­ 
sentations?
Again, when the brain-cells interact to produce a sensation, 
presumably the sensation is perceptible as sensation only to the mind 
as a whole and not to the individual brain-cells. But the collective 
representation, although it is the result of the interaction and com­ 
bination in the social mind of individual representations, is yet present 
in the consciousness of the individual and only there. The only real 
likeness between the individual and social representations is in the 
fact that they are both combinations of less inclusive elements.
Finally, the analogy is based on a view which is too 
intellectual!stic. Levy-Bruhl points out that a representation is 
generally thought of as an intellectual or cognitive phenomenon, but 
the collective representations of primitives also have emotional and 
motor accompaniments which have to be taken into account. In order to
1. Adapted from Gehlke: op. cit., p. 32,
2. Gehlke: op. cit., p. 45; cf. p. 97.
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retain the term in the study of primitive life, therefore, its 
accepted meaning has to be modified accordingly.
The representation is, par excellence f an intellectual 
or cognitive phenomenon. It is not in this way that 
we are to understand the collective representations of 
primitives.....By this state of mental activity in 
primitives we must understand something which is not a 
purely intellectual or cognitive phenomenon, but a more 
complex one, in which what is really "representation" 
to us is found blended with other elements of an emotional 
or motor character, coloured and imbued by them, and 
therefore implying a different attitude with regard to 
the objects represented.^
If this view of Levy-Bruhl's is correct, as it certainly 
must be, it is very difficult to see how collective representations of 
this character could be formed by the compounding of purely cognitive 
individual representations.
The third and final objection which we shall urge against 
Durkheim's doctrine of the collective mind is its inadequate treat­ 
ment of the individual as a causative factor in the social process.
Durkheim regards everything that is not individual in the 
biological sense as social. Therefore while the necessities for social 
change are mediated to the collective consciousness by means of the 
sensations of the individuals who compose its substratum, all social 
change and social control are derived from the collective consciousness 
and not from the individual. The doctrine of instinct is thus
opposed because it negates Durkheim's principle of the exteriority of
2social representations. The other characteristic of social represen­ 
tations, namely, their constraint over the individual, is regarded by
1. Levy-Bruhl: Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures 
(1910), tr. Clare, How Natures Think (1926), p. 36.
2. Durkheim: Les regies de la me'thode sociologique (1895), pp. 124, 
128; cf. also, Gehlke: op. cit., pp. 66-68.
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Durkheim as inconsistent with the notion of self-control, and hence 
the latter is interpreted by him as only a means whereby the social 
constraint acts in the individual. Thus the individual is eliminated 
as an originative center of social phenomena, and the collective or
social mind is left as the single psychic source of the new in social
2
life.
In refutation of this view the results of the psychological 
study of individual differences seem to be conclusive. As Gehlke says:
The strongest case against a purely social causation 
theory is that presented by the study of the genius. 
Whether we accept the Durkheimian major premise or not, 
the genius is an unanswerable argument against barring 
the individual as a causal factor in the social life..... 
The genius, is, consistently with Durkheim's most recent 
statements, only a superior kind of mould for the 
reception of social representations...His mental content 
is entirely derived from the social mind of the group... 
This view...is for practical reasons untenable. To 
admit that a "genius" exists, means nothing unless it 
means that he has originative power in society.'^
Where shall we find the social group that incarnated its tendencies in 
Gallileo, or Plato, or the prophets, or Jesus?
Of course all these persons possessed certain representa­ 
tions, ways of feeling, and ways of acting, in common with other men of 
their times. But to say that they added nothing new is to deny them 
genius.
Furthermore, to deny the existence in the individual of 
inherited tendencies, and of inherited powers of self-restraint is 
simply to deny the existence of elementary, observable facts which are
basic to the science of psychology and the existence of which the
4 
success of scientific psychology puts beyond question.
1. Durkheim: ibid., p. 125.
2. Durkheim: ibid., pp. 124-125. cf. also Gehlke: op. cit.,
YV« CQ^CQpp. 68-69.
3. Gehlke: op. cit., pp. 98-99.
4. Vide supra, sections 2, 3, 9, 13.
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We do not wish to deny, but on the contrary we are ready 
to affirm, that, even in the most primitive societies of human beings, 
the developing personality of every individual is immensely influenced 
by the ideas, sentiments, and customs held in common by other members 
of the social group. We do, however, reject the hypostatization of 
these ideas, sentiments, and customs, thus converting them into a social 
mind which is the exterior and superior source of all that can be rightly 
called the individual mind.
In our criticism of Durkheim1 s theory of the origin of 
religion we have thus far been occupied with his fundamental doctrine 
of the social or collective mind. We now turn our attention to the 
antithesis which he draws between the sacred and the profane and his 
identification of religion with the sacred.
In the first place, the difference which Durkheim professes 
to find between the sacred and the profane is vastly overdrawn. He him­ 
self says that while there is an absolute difference between the categories 
of the sacred and the profane, at the same time there are, within the 
category of the sacred, all degrees of sacredness.
It must not be lost to view that there are sacred things 
of every degree, and that there are some in relation to 
which man feels relatively at his ease.
If this is the case, then, presumably, there are all degrees of profane- 
ness within the category of the profane and there must be some things 
in this category in relation to which man feels relatively ill at ease.
1. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), p. 48.
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Durkheim does not say that this is so but he does not deny it. 
Reason, however, dictates it and, so far as the writer is concerned, 
introspection confirms it.
Now if by saying that the difference between these two 
categories is absolute, Durkheim means that between the most sacred 
and the most utterly profane things there is a very wide - even an 
absolute - difference we should not urge any serious objection. But 
there does not seem to be any absolute distinction in kind between the 
least sacred and least profane things. To divide the whole universe, 
known and knowable, into two absolutely disparate realms of the sacred 
and the profane seems not only unjustifiable but unintelligible. For 
if the distinction between these two categories is as clear and certain 
as Durkheim says it is then one should be able to identify any object, 
without hesitation and with perfect certainty, as belonging to one or 
the other of these categories. But one has only to read the history 
of the disputes incident to the formation of the canon of sacred 
writings which compose the Bible to learn that this is not so. If it 
be objected that this was due to the influence of conflicting groups 
then we can only resort to introspection. In that case, at least so 
far as the writer is concerned, there simply does not exist any 
absolute difference in kind between the least sacred and least profane 
things.
Let us suppose that it may be different in primitive 
societies. Levy-Bruhl tells us that there is a great difference be­ 
tween the mind of the primitive and the mind of the civilized, white
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1 
man. Karpf argues convincingly that this difference is one of degree
2 
rather than a difference in kind. Now it must either be or not be a
difference in kind. If it is and the distinction between the sacred 
and the profane is for the primitive absolute, then Durkheim's definition 
of religion is valid for the primitive but not for the civilized, white 
man. If the difference between the mind of the primitive and that of 
the civilized man is not a difference in kind then Durkheim's definition 
is valid for neither.
Our second objection to Durkheim 1 s identification of religion 
with the sacred is that it practically ignores the distinction between 
magic and religion. It is true that he distinguishes between magic
and religion by the fact that religion binds together those who adhere
3to it while magic does not. But this distinction is really fruitless
as far as Durkheim 1 s researches go. He practically ignores it and 
regards as the characteristic mark of religion the fact that it is 
derived from an exterior and superior sacred group and not that it 
creates such a group.
We have already supported a psychological distinction be-
4 tween magic and religion as against a sociological one such as this of
Durkheim's. The psychological distinction is based on the attitude of 
the worshipper rather than on the social results of his practice.
The third and final objection that we shall urge against 
Durkheim's theory of the identity of religion and the sacred is concerned
1. Levy-Bruhl: How Natives Think (1926), Part I.
2. Karpf: American Social Psychology, (1932), pp. 132-133.
3. Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), 
pp. 42 ff. cf. supra, section 39.
4. Vide supra, section 30, pp. 175 ff.
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with the origin of the idea of the sacred in the mind of the individual.
Durkheim says, in effect, that in the effervescent social 
environment of the clan celebration the social mind becomes incarnate 
in the individual in the form of a renewed respect for and loyalty to 
the clan-symbol, the totem. The totem, the god, and the clan are one. 
What we are really face to face with here is a philosophy and psychology 
of education. And the crucial point at issue is whether through inter­ 
action with his physical and social environment the individual grows 
and develops as an individual or whether he merely shares in the 
processes of an exterior and superior group mind.
Here we must choose sides. We have given our reasons for 
rejecting the social mindj we take our stand with those who hold by 
the reality of the individual and his possibilities for development in 
accordance with his native endowment and the opportunities offered by 
his physical and social environment.
When it is said, therefore, that the totem, is the symbol 
for both the clan and the god of the clan, we do not draw the conclusion, 
as Durkheim does, that the clan and the god are one and the same thing. 
We say rather that the idea of the totem is the central core of a senti­ 
ment and that around it are gathered the feelings of the individual for 
his group and for some mysterious and respected power which others be­ 
lieve in and in the presence of which they walk circumspectly. There 
is not a single fact in Durkheim f s "Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life" which cannot be satisfactorily explained from this point of view.
1. Vide;Supra, Chapter II.
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d. Conclusion
Our conclusion may be stated briefly: the group is not 
the source of the sacred, but, in the developing life of the individual, 
the experience of sharing common activities with other individuals is 
the chief means (l) by which the individual becomes aware of the dis­ 
coveries that have been made with regard to the things and powers which 
his fellowmen regard as sacred5 (2) by which the individual develops 
emotional dispositions (sentiments or attitudes) toward these sacred 
objects and powers; and (3) by which the individual forms habits of 
dealing with these objects and powers or of behaving in their presence.
In a sense, it is true that the group is the source of 
the individuals ideas, sentiments, and habits - in a word, of the 
individual's mind. It is true in something like the same sense that 
it is true to say that the individual's physical environment is the 
source of his body. That is to say that the environment supplies the 
material for our bodies, and society, which is our mental environment, 
supplies the larger part of the content of our minds. But each 
physical body, although it is modified by its chemical and physical 
relations with the physical environment (by eating, states of tension 
in work, etc.), forms itself more or less according to its own pattern. 
And each individual mind also forms itself according to its own pattern 
of interests, values, etc. It is recognized that in primitive society 
individual interests have small chance of expression but even where 
custom is most rigid not all men are alike. Thus through individual
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differences changes arise in the social institutions that mould 
individuals and in turn are moulded by individuals. Potentiality is 
exclusively possessed by neither the individual nor the group. The 
oak is not wholly in the acorn; but it is also in the soil, and 
moisture, and sunlight, though not in these, either, without the 
acorn. Likewise the adult member of the clan is not created by the 
group, nor by the child without sharing the life of the group. The 
potentiality is in the total situation. The child brings with him the 
capacity to respect the sacred and society teaches him what to respect.
But from this fact we have no right to draw the conclusion 
that society can only teach respect for itself. In fact it is not 
the case that the social is always the sacred. Language is not re­ 
garded as sacred; neither are the thousand and one skills and senti­ 
ments that fill the daily life in the profane world. Yet these all 
come from the group. It is only the ideas, sentiments, and practices 
that have to do with a power that is mysterious, dangerous, uncon­ 
trollable, that the feeling of sacredness enters the mind. Thus we 
come back again to the primitive supernatural!sm of Marett.
The group mediates the knowledge of the sacred; but it 
does not create it. The sacred has to do with man's relations, as he 
conceives them, to his total environment - not merely the individual's 








Having come to the end of our study it is worth while to 
inquire whether the data that we have discovered may justify some con­ 
clusions regarding the following problems:
1. For the purposes of religious psychology, how is religion 
most adequately conceived?
2. What is the most primitive form of religion?
3. When, where, from what sources, and under what circum­ 
stances did this primitive form of religion first appear in the history 
of the human race?
4. What place had the individual in the origin of religion 
in the race?
5. What distinguishable trends are noticeable in the develop­ 
ment of religion in the race?
6. What is the most elementary form of religion in the 
individual?
7. What is the source of religion in the individual?
8. What trends are noticeable in the developing religious 
life of the individual?
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a. The Definition of Religion
In Chapter III we defined religion as consisting primarily 
of the activities of individuals or communities through which they seek 
a satisfying adjustment to a Religious Object, and secondarily, of the
conserved products of those activities in the form of mental dispositions
1 
and social institutions. The term Religious Object was interpreted as
meaning an object which the religious person believes to be external to 
him and to other men and not completely to be identified with nature in
its purely mechanical aspects, and upon which he believes some or all of
g his most precious values to depend.
It is possible to raise the objection that this conception of 
the religious object is too animistic to escape the criticism which
Marett directs against animism in supporting his theory of pre-animistic
5
supernaturalism. It must be admitted that the terms "Determiner of
Destiny" and "Religious Object" may be interpreted in such a way as to 
open our definition to this objection. However, no such animistic inter­ 
pretation is stated or implied by the writer, but on the contrary the 
explicit interpretation given above is entirely in accord with Marett f s 
theory of pre-animistic religion, or tabu-mana. It was intended in the 
definition of religion and throughout the report of the study which has
been made to emphasize the objective element in the situation in which
4 religious experience and behaviour take place. This objective element
must be powerful, it must be to some extent mysterious and hence inescapable,
1. Vide supra, p. 93.
2. Vide supra, pp. 100-101.
3. Vide supra, pp. 169 ff.
4. Vide supra, section 25, pp. 120 ff. Cf. p. 252.
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and it must at least appear to maintain for some appreciable time a 
directly favorable or unfavorable bearing on some important value of 
the person or community who is, for the time being, the religious sub­ 
ject. Given these qualifications the religious object may be a stone, 
or a storm, or a vaguely conceived supernatural power such as mana, or 
a spirit of almost any kind, or the God and Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ. Therefore, this conception of religion is not inconsistent with 
primitive supernatural!sm. In fact it gives us the basis on which the 
origin of the concept of mana itself might possibly be explained, since 
the notion of mana is, presumably, an abstraction from much experience 
with concrete situations in which various elements seemed to have a 
powerful bearing on important values.
With these qualifications in mind we are ready to re-phrase 
our definition in somewhat simpler terms, but without changing it in any 
essential way, as follows: religion consists primarily of those activities 
of persons or communities of persons through which they seek a satisfactory 
relationship with a Religious Object, and secondarily of the conserved 
mental and social products of those activities.
b. The Most Primitive Form of Religion 
In the light of our research it is probable that the most 
primitive form of religion was a community activity rather than the 
experience and behaviour of some individual person isolated from his 
group. The evidence seems to be fairly conclusive that the individual
1. Vide supra, p. 93.
2. Vide supra, pp. 283 ff.
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with his own set of values and responsibilities distinct from those of 
the community whose life he shared emerged rather late in the phylo- 
genetic history of man. It therefore seems logical to suppose that the 
earliest form of religion that ever existed involved some sort of social 
community of human beings as a group.
The religious activity of such a group would conform to 
either one of two general types depending upon whether the welfare of 
the group was threatened or served by some mysterious power which man
could not control and from which he could not escape. Religious activity
1 
of the first type would involve the consciousness that all was not well
with the community because some element of the environment, on which the 
group welfare partially or wholly depended, had set in motion thaumaturgic 
evil influences in the direction of actual or impending group disaster; 
and, in such a case, the community would give themselves up, in solemn 
assembly, to some sort of propitiatory behaviour to express their 
emotions of sorrow and fear in the face of present and prospective
affliction and of hope for the mitigation of evil or avoidance of
2
destruction. In religious activity of the second type there would be
the group consciousness of some extraordinary good fortune conceived of as 
resulting from the favorable influence of some mysterious and powerful 
element of the environmentj and in this case the community would give 
themselves up to such acts of celebration as might express their emotions 
of elation and gratitude.
1. Cf. supra, pp. 256 ff.
2. Cf. supra, pp. 258 ff.
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The most primitive form of religion, then, would be either
(1) a community activity of propitiation motivated by the consciousness 
that the community welfare was threatened by some mysterious, uncon­ 
trollable power from which (or whom) no escape was possible, or
(2) a community activity of celebration motivated by the experience of 
some extraordinary good fortune.
These represent, respectively, the sorrow phase and joy 
phase of emotion, the states of tension and release, humility and 
exaltation. It is possible that in certain rare situations they might 
be connected together as integral parts of one community religious 
activity and such a form of religion would be as primitive as either 
one of its component parts considered separately. For example, a total 
eclipse of the sun might stimulate a community of primitive men to 
propitiatory activity. But, since an eclipse lasts only a few minutes, 
relief from the unpleasant situation would soon follow, and sorrow would 
be turned into joy, propitiation into celebration. In general, however, 
this would not be the case, but the consciousness of impending disaster 
would continue for a considerable length of time and relief would come 
so slowly, as, for example, in the advent of Spring, that it would be 
regarded as an entirely different experience and the result of the 
advent of some new influence of a beneficent type.
1. Cf. supra, pp. 54, 259 f.
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c. The Origin of Religion in the Race
The activity of any organism depends upon both subjective and 
objective factors; upon the state of the organism itself, and upon the 
influences in the organism's effective environment. Thus it is obvious 
that in order to understand the primitive forms of religion which we have 
just described it is necessary to inquire with some care into the nature 
of the subjective and objective factors upon which they depend.
The subjective factors upon which the most primitive form of 
religion would depend are the native and acquired dispositions of primi­ 
tive man. That is to say that they are his instincts, sentiments, 
attitudes, habits. Each of these dispositions has for its object the 
achievement or conservation of some value and is represented in conscious­ 
ness at the perceptual level as an impulse, at the ideational level as 
a desire.
The objective factors are the conditions in the environment 
which thwart primitive man's efforts to achieve and conserve the values 
which operate as the goals of his impulses and desires. Or else they 
are conditions which facilitate far beyond his hopes the achievement and 
conservation of his values. Such conditions require an adjustment to 
the emergency which they create. And if the conditions are regarded as 
the result of the influence of a religious object such as we have 
described above, the activity of making the adjustment demanded by the 
circumstances is religious.
!• Vide supra, p. 6 ff. 
2. Vide supra, p. 68.
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Our view is, in essence, that religion in its most original 
and primitive form arose out of an emergency in which a community of 
persons found it necessary to come to terms with mysterious, powerful, 
inescapable forces which menaced or served the goals of their native 
or acquired dispositions in such extreme fashion that their habitual 
modes of response no longer availed to gain them satisfaction. The 
community life was in progress along ordinary lines when it was interrupted 
by the influence of some mysterious, inescapable power in such a way that 
the attention of the community was shifted from the matter in hand to the 
source of the interruption and the activity changed into an attempt to 
achieve a satisfactory relationship with the mysterious intervening 
power - such was the situation in which the most primitive form of 
religion must have come into being.
The values involved might have been of any kind whatever, such 
as food, health, security, etc. It is only necessary that they should 
have been regarded as of great importance.
The nature of the emergency might have been equally varied, 
ranging through a great number of possibilities such as famine, pestilence, 
an earthquake, an eclipse of the sun, a hurricane, the change of the 
seasons, birth, death, the discovery of an intoxicating liquid, the dis­ 
covery of an oasis in the desert, the sudden appearance of game in great 
abundance in the vicinity, the beginning of seasonal rains, etc. The 
only requisite is that it must have been of sufficiently mysterious and 
impressive character to make impossible its attribution to ordinary 
influences.
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The mysterious and powerful influence to which the presence 
of the emergency was attributed likewise might have been conceived of 
in one of many possible forms. Almost certainly it would be associated 
Trith and symbolized by some unusual element of the environment, or some 
strange event that had recently happened. Thus any strange or uncanny 
object or animal might easily come to be regarded as a source of 
mysterious power of great consequence to the primitive community and 
hence occupy the position of religious object in the most primitive form 
of religion. Whether motherhood and birth were sufficiently mysterious 
and impressive to stimulate the primitive community to religious activity 
with the mother regarded as the religious object it is difficult to say,
but there is no good reason to deny that in some communities the most
1 
primitive form of religion might have developed in this way. It is
not impossible, either, that in some communities of primitive men a
vaguely conceived, supernatural, spiritual being might have served as
2 
religious object in the most primitive form of religion. A situation
in which this might possibly have happened would be a severe thunder­ 
storm in which members of the community were killed by lightning, while 
their companions were unharmed. This is a very remote possibility, 
however, and the most primitive form of religion might never have in­ 
volved such a religious object. Likewise, it is not probable that an 
unattached, generalized idea of power such as mana or wakan was the 
religious object in the most primitive form of religion. Such an idea 
of mysterious, wonder-working power was certainly present and directed
1. Vide supra, p. 219 f.
2. Vide supra, section 20, esp. p. 122,
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toward man or his values, but probably always objectified in something 
which was regarded as its source. The religious object in the most 
primitive form of religion was probably always concrete.
While we can give concerning the most primitive form of 
religion no accurate account of the values threatened, or the nature of 
the threatening situation, and no description of the religious object 
beyond the fact that it was mysterious, powerful, and directly concerned 
with the most precious values of primitive man, we can describe with 
some assurance and accuracy the subjective dispositions involved in man' s 
response to the religious object. Where the emergency which gave rise 
to the most primitive form of religion was unfavorable to man 1 s values 
his attitude toward the religious object would be that of awe, and 
would involve the dispositions of escape, observation, and self-abasement, 
with corresponding tendencies toward the emotions of fear, wonder, 
feeling small (negative self-feeling), and sorrow because of present or 
prospective loss. Depending upon the relative strength of the several 
component parts this complex disposition would lead to propitiatory 
behaviour of various kinds. If the emergency were of a favorable kind 
the attitude toward the religious object would be that of gratitude, and 
would involve the dispositions of service (parental instinct) and self- 
abasement, with the corresponding tendencies toward the emotions of 
tenderness, feeling small (negative self-feeling), and elation because 
of unexpected good-fortune. And this complex disposition would lead 
naturally to activities of celebration.
1. Vide supra, pp. 101, 111 ff., 159, 184.
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In answer to the question when and where the most primitive 
type of religion first appeared among men the only reply is that it 
appeared whenever and wherever in the developing life of man the conditions 
described above were fulfilled. That is to say that there was no one
great beginning of religion in the race before which religion was not and
1 
after which religion forever was, but religion in the primitive form
described above must have originated independently in many places in the 
world and at many times during the racial history of man. Propitiation 
as a type of religious activity might have preceded celebration, but of 
that there is no certainty.
d. The Place of the Individual in the Racial 
Origin of Religion
In its most primitive form religion was probably not the dis­ 
covery of some gifted individual who in turn shared the discovery with 
his group, but it probably was, in the first instance, a spontaneous 
group activity such as we have described. This is not to deny that in 
the overt activities of propitiation and celebration one person might 
have taken the initiative. But it is to affirm that the most primitive 
form of religious activity was a community activity in the sense that 
the values involved were shared in common by a community of persons, and 
the religious activities were participated in by the members of the
community. This does not mean that there was in operation any group
o 
Bind that was exterior and superior to the individual minds involved,
1. Cf. supra, pp. 172 ff.
2. Cf. supra, section 40b, pp. 270 ff.
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but simply that the most primitive form of religion was a cooperative 
activity. The two possible opportunities for individual initiative 
would have been in identifying some element in the environment as the 
religious object and in taking the lead in the activities of propitiation 
and celebration.
e. Trends in Racial Religious Development
Activity such as we have described as the most primitive form 
of religion would inevitably leave its traces in the community life in 
the form of dispositions in the members of the community to repeat the 
activity in subsequently encountered situations that were identical or 
similar. The activity being often thus repeated, the disposition would- 
be strengthened and the activity would become established as a community 
rite or ceremony.
Chance or intentional variations in religious rites would 
inevitably occur and, if they proved to be more satisfactory than the 
hitherto prevailing customs, would be perpetuated. Chance variations 
might occur as a result (l) of differences between the situations 
stimulating the religious dispositions of the community members, (2) of 
differences between the moods of the community at different times, or 
(3) of contact with other communities with different practices. The 
stamping in of successful chance variations is due to trial and success, 
and is subject to the psychological laws which apply to learning at 
this level. By far the most significant advances in the development of
1. Vide supra, pp. 92 ff., 96 ff.
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religion have not been due, however, to chance learning at the level of 
trial and success, but to creative learning at the higher levels of 
insight and reflective thought. At these levels intentional variations
have been introduced into the development of religion, and they have
g always involved the leadership of influential individuals who have
shared the results of their superior insight and creative thought with 
the other members of the community. Thus the great advances in the 
developing religious life of man have been due to the men of insight, the 
prophets, who knew by intuition and cried, "Thus saith the Lord," and to 
the men of creative thought, the philosophers and scientists, who have 
laboriously puzzled out some of the riddles of the universe, thus enabling 
men to order their lives more nearly in accordance with reality.
If we should compare a relatively primitive form of religion 
with a highly developed form such as Christianity we should find many 
great differences between them and these would serve to indicate some of 
the most important trends of religious development in the race. In the 
following summary we shall attempt such a comparison, classifying the 
trends of religious development under five general headings according to 
their relationship to the five elements of religion.
I. Trends in the development of the conception of the religious object.
1. Many religious objects -^ One inclusive religious object.
2. Power having direction -* Person having purpose.
5. Wonder-worker, periodically active in intervention -? Law-abiding, 
	constantly active in sustaining the universe.
4. Local and transcendent -> Omnipresent and immanent.
5. Limited in power -> All-powerful or self-lira!ted.
6. Imperfect and fragmentary knowledge -> Perfect wisdom.
7. Arbitrary and inconsistent -» Morally dependable, good.
8. The all-terrible -» The all-loving.
1. Cf. supra, pp. 62 ff., 103 ff.
2. Cf. supra, pp. 277 f.
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II. Trends in the developing conception of values involved in religion.
1. Material -^ Spiritual.
2. Immediate •> Ultimate.
3. Objects of impulse (perceptual level) + Objectives of Purpose 
(conceptual level).
4. Recognition of intrinsic values only ^ Recognition of 
instrumental values also.
III. Trend in the development of religious emotions.
1. Disconnected awe and gratitude -^ Reverent devotion.
IV. Trends in the development of plans of achieving right relationship 
to the religious object.
1. Giving up things, sacrifice ^ Giving up desire, holiness.
2. Conformity with custom -» Self-directing morality.
3. Fear, involving separation, taboo -> Love, involving mystical 
union.
4. Wonder, issuing in revelation -? Investigation, issuing in 
discovery.
5. Inactive dependence upon God -> Active cooperation with God.
6. Communication through mediation of priest -^ Direct communi­ 
cation through prayer.
V. Trends in the development of the conserved products of religious 
activity.
1. In society:
Spontaneous, undifferentiated ceremony -^ Social institution 
with a definite program and executive officials.
2. In the individual:
Sentiment -* Ideal.
f. The Most Elementary Form of Religion 
in the Individual
The kind of experience and behaviour that we have described 
as the most primitive form of religious activity was, presumably, in the 
beginning, also the most elementary form of religion in the individual. 
In even the most primitive society today, however, it would be impossible 
for any normal individual to engage in religious activity of such pristine
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character. His religious experience and behaviour could not be unaffected, 
as the most primitive form of religion must of necessity have been, by 
religious ideas, sentiments, and habits, previously acquired by sharing 
the life of the group. Consequently, there is a very great difference be­ 
tween the most elementary form of religion in a normal individual today 
and the most primitive form of religion in the race. The difference is 
due to the fact that the patterns of the present-day individual's religious 
ideas, feelings, and actions are derived, through formal or informal 
education, from society.
In learning a language and through informal communication with 
other persons a child in any society becomes acquainted in some degree 
with the conceptions of the religious object that are prevalent in that 
society. Likewise, by means of suggestion, he shares the emotional 
responses of others to the religious object. And, through imitation, he 
learns to behave as others about him behave in their religious activities. 
For this reason, religious experience and behaviour on their first 
appearance in individuals living in contemporary society may be extremely 
complex, or quite simple, according to the kind of religious environment 
in which the individuals develop them.
The most elementary form of individual religious activity in 
contemporary society, therefore, while conforming to the general pattern 
of adjustment to a religious object, differs, nevertheless, from the 
most primitive form of religion in the race because it always represents 
a considerable, and may represent a very great, social development in the 
concept of the religious object, the values involved, the complexity of
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emotional response, and the plan of adjustment to the religious object.
g. The Origin of Religion in the Individual 
We shall first call attention to two important differences 
between the conditions underlying the first appearance of religion in 
the individual member of a relatively primitive society and those under­ 
lying the beginnings of religion in the individual member of contemporary 
Western society, and afterwards we shall restrict ourselves to the dis­ 
cussion of the latter.
In a primitive tribal society where religion has undergone 
some development, a child is almost certain to be awakened to his first 
religious experience and to engage in his first religious behaviour by 
sharing the religious activities of his tribe. In such a case the 
religious experience will be largely if not wholly determined by the 
operation of suggestion and sympathy, and the religious behaviour by 
imitation. In a word, the tribesman "gets" religion by sharing in its 
social expression. Furthermore all the persons who share in the tribal 
ceremonies probably "get" religion. But it is very different in con­ 
temporary Western society. Some children are awakened to religious 
experience and are stimulated to religious behaviour by participating in 
the ceremonies of worship carried on by their respective churches. But 
our worship is often so far removed from the experience of children 
that, although it is impressive, it does not actually awaken the 
consciousness of God 1 s presence and the need for getting into a more
1. Cf. supra, p. 40,
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satisfactory relationship with him. The more complex religion becomes 
the less efficient becomes traditional ceremony to generate it. Thus, 
while the tribal ceremony is a highly effective means of reproducing 
the primitive religion which it represents, the traditional ceremonies 
of Christian worship in the West are not nearly so efficient in re­ 
producing the religion of which they purport to be the social expression. 
Of those who participate in them, therefore, many are not by them intro­ 
duced to religion, or if to religion, then to religion of a very 
elementary sort.
A second difference between the beginnings of religion in 
the individual member of primitive society and in the contemporary 
Western individual is that while the primitive tribesman is introduced 
to religion by an official ceremony of the tribe, the Western individual 
may be introduced to religion by another individual, for example, a 
parent, or teacher, or friend. Or having failed of introduction by 
either the church or another individual he may encounter alone some 
situation which stimulates in him the sense of God 1 s presence and in 
turn leads on to the kind of experience and behaviour which his con­ 
ception of God and the fitness of the situation demand.
In contemporary Western society an individual may be awakened 
to his first religious experience and engage in his first religious be­ 
haviour by participating in the religious activities of some group of 
Christian people. In such a case the objective factors underlying the
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beginnings of religion in the individual are largely social in
1 
character. The consciousness of the presence of the religious
object is not mediated, as in the most primitive form of religion in 
the race, by some great emergency in which one's psychological equil­ 
ibrium is upset and one 1 s values are threatened, but by the ideas and 
attitudes of one 1 s companions, the symbols used in worship, the 
behaviour in which the realization of values is sought. Where the sense 
of the reality of God's presence is absent from the consciousness of the 
more experienced participants the religious activity degenerates to 
empty formality and becomes ineffective in awakening religious experience 
in those who are strangers to religion. This, of course, is not to 
affirm that such activities or observances are unimportant. They may 
indeed mediate a fine appreciation of some social values. But the 
point to be insisted upon is that unless they stimulate in consciousness 
the sense of God's presence and the need for a more satisfactory re­ 
lationship with him they are not genuine religious observances and they 
cannot serve to introduce religiously inexperienced persons to religion. 
In groups of Christian people the religious activities, which 
we have just described as possible objective factors in the beginnings 
of religion in individual members of contemporary Western society, may 
take many forms. One form, following the priestly tradition, may con­ 
sist mainly in ritualistic observances of worship. Or another form may 
exalt the prophetic function of preaching. Or a third may be princi­ 
pally made up of emotional excitement. Or a fourth may emphasize the
1. Of. supra, pp. 282-284.
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obligations of Christianity with respect to social service. But, what­ 
ever the program of adjustment to the religious object may be, the 
situation in which a group attempts to carry out that program furnishes 
the objective factors which may stimulate the beginnings of religion in 
a religiously inexperienced member of the group.
The subjective factors in the beginning of religion in an 
individual are the native tendencies, the sentiments, the ideals, the 
knowledges, and the habits - in a word, the whole mental equipment, 
native and acquired - of the person in whom it begins. But it is possible 
to be much more specific than this. We shall therefore proceed, in more 
analytic fashion, to point out, (1) the principal subjective factors 
which set the stage, as it were, upon which religious experience and 
behaviour appear for the first time, and (2) the most important sub­ 
jective factors that are involved in the actual religious experience and 
behaviour themselves. Of the former, certain factors, principally 
cognitive in character, are partly derived from past experience, and partly 
mediated by the situation presented to consciousness at the time. These 
may be indicated as follows: (l) conception and appreciation of values 
(this may involve sentiments, ideals and purposes); (2) conception of 
the nature of the religious object, and of his attitude toward the wor­ 
shiper and the worshiper's values; and (3) conception of some plan or 
means by which the worshiper may effect a more satisfactory relationship 
with the religious object. In addition to these cognitive factors, 
certain other subjective factors of a preparatory kind are operative in 
setting the stage for the appearance of religion. We refer to critical
1. Of. supra, pp. 93-94,
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insight and the tendencies of suggestion, sympathy, and imitation. It 
is by means of these that the cognitive factors just mentioned are in 
part mediated by the situation present in consciousness at the time of 
the religious awakening.
The subjective factors that are involved in the actual 
religious experience and behaviour are those dispositions which make 
up awe, humility, exaltation, gratitude, love, and dedication. These 
may be blended in many ways, according to the way in which God's charac­ 
ter and religious values are interpreted, thus making possible among 
different Christian groups an almost infinite variety of results. 
In Christian worship at its best, however, all these elements are 
generally to be found harmoniously organized and succeeding one another 
according to the following order of experience and behaviour: 
(1) the consciousness of God's presence (awe); (2) the sense of man's 
shortcoming and spiritual inadequacy (humility); (3) the sense of 
God's forgiveness and renewal of man; (4) the feeling of gratitude and 
joyous exaltation in God's favor; (5) enlightenment regarding God's 
will; (6) a more complete dedication of the self to the will of God; 
(7) conduct in accordance ?dth the foregoing experience.
Many persons are not awakened to their first religious ex­ 
perience and behaviour by participation in the religious activities of 
some group of Christian people, however, but by some personal crisis 
which demands an adjustment of the religious kind. The sudden death
1. Cf. supra, p. 61.
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of a loved one may serve as an example. The crisis may be faced alone 
or with a friend. The subjective and objective factors would be about 
the same in either case. The objective factor would be the total 
emergency situation. The subjective factors would be different from 
those analyzed above in two principal ways: (l) critical insight would 
probably become relatively more important while sympathy, suggestion, 
•end imitation would play relatively minor roles; (2) the sense of loss 
and profound sorrow would color the whole of one's experience. But if 
the crisis stimulated the beginnings of real Christian religious ex­ 
perience and behaviour some organization of the subjective elements 
which we have discussed above would be inevitable.
And these same subjective factors, at whatever level of 
development they may have attained, are involved in the introduction 
of a small child to religion by the mother who teaches him to pray, 
and in the awakening of religion in some older person by a severe moral 
conflict that results in conversion.
h. Trends in Individual, Religious Development
Religious experience and behaviour leave their traces in 
the individual in the form of mental dispositions which make it easier 
for subsequent similar situations to awaken in the individual similar 
experience and behaviour. The religious disposition in its simplest 
form is the rudimentary sentiment which is the conserved product of 
the individual 1 s first religious activity. Such a rudimentary sentiment
1. Cf. supra, section 21, pp. 96 ff.
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develops in strength ty being repeatedly activated under favorable 
conditions and ensuing in satisfactory results, i.e., according to 
the laws of learning. It grows in quality by the reinterpretation of 
its ideational core, the reorganization of its associated emotions, 
and the redirection of its conative impulses. That is to say that it 
develops in quality by ceasing to be merely a sentiment and becoming, 
through the guidance of conscious intelligence and choice, an ideal, 
having at its command the cognitive resourcefulness, the emotional 
richness, and the conative power of the whole organized self.
42. Application s
Concerning the study which we have now completed there re­ 
mains only the necessity of setting forth in the briefest manner its 
significance for the psychology of religion and for the theory of 
religious education.
a-. Religious Origins and the Psychology 
of Religion
The problem of religious origins cannot be studied in 
isolation because any satisfactory theory of the origin of religion 
must rest upon a satisfactory conception of religion and must serve 
as the basis of a satisfactory theory of religious development. 
Taken together these problems make up no inconsiderable part of the
1. Cf. supra, section 22, pp. 103 ff.
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psychology of religion. Thus, if our conclusions are sound, we may 
justly lay claim to modest contributions toward the solution of the 
following problems in religious psychology: (l) the psychological 
conception of religion; (2) the origin of religion in the race; 
(3) the origin of religion in the individual; (4) the development of 
religion in the race; (5) the development of religion in the individual. 
Of course, we have hardly dealt even in the most general way with some 
of the specific problems of religious psychology, such as the psychology 
of the various Christian beliefs and the psychology of mysticism, but 
we believe that the point of view which has been developed would prove 
to be as fruitful in illuminating these problems as it has been in the 
study of the problems of religious origins and development.
b« Religious, Origins, and Religious, Education 
If our emphasis on the objectivity of the religious object 
is sound, and if we are right in defining the essence of religion as 
the activity of seeking a satisfactory relationship with the religious 
object, then the religious education of the young will consist in pre­ 
paring them for this activity and arranging their environment in such 
fashion as is most likely to stimulate its occurrence. In Christian 
education this means: (1) progressive and continuous training in 
Christian conceptions (a) of values, (b) of God, (c) of the way in 
which one finds the most satisfactory relationship with God; (2) pro­ 
viding the opportunity for children to share in Christian worship and 
Christian service of a kind that is meaningful to persons of their
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age and stage of development; (S) providing wise counselors for grow­ 
ing children so that when the children are baffled by problems beyond 
their powers they may appeal to their counselors for Christian guidance; 
and (4) encouraging older children gradually to assume responsibility 




Since a part of Chapter VI (section 30) of the present 
work is devoted to the discussion of pre-animistic religion and 
includes a criticism of Dr. Edward B. Tylor's theory of animism as 
the earliest form of religion, it is desirable to add here a more 
complete statement of Dr. Tylor's views than was possible in the 
seventh chapter.
Animism is defined by Tylor as "the belief in Spiritual
Beings." He says that animism, so understood, embodies "the very
2 essence of Spiritualistic as opposed to Materialistic philosophy,"
3 and has the same meaning as Spiritualism in its wider acceptation.
The two great dogmas of animism (concerning souls and 
spirits) are stated by Tylor as follows:
Animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts 
of one consistent doctrine; firsl, concerning souls 
of individual creatures, capable of continued exis­ 
tence after the death or destruction of the body; 
second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank 
of powerful deities. Spiritual beings are held to 
affect or control the events of the material world, 
and man's life here and hereafter; and it being con­ 
sidered that they hold intercourse with men, and 
receive pleasure or displeasure from human actions, 
the belief in their existence leads naturally, and 
it might almost be said inevitably, sooner or later 
to active reverence and propitiation.4
As to origins, the notion of souls seems to grow out of man's 
interest in two groups of biological problems, namely, (l) what is it
1. Tylor: Primitive Culture (1871), Vol. I, p. 424.
2. Ibid., p. 425.
3. Ibid., p. 426.
4. Ibid., pp. 426-427.
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that makes the difference between a living body and a dead one? and 
(2) what are those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions? In 
answer to these questions "the ancient savage philosophers" probably, 
as a first step, concluded that man has belonging to him a life and a 
phantom, and, as a second step, combined the life and the phantom into 
the notion of a ghost-soul. This ghost-soul Tylor defines as follows:
It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature 
a sort of vapour, film, or shadow; the cause of life 
and thought in the individual it animates; independently 
possessing the personal consciousness and volition of 
its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving 
the body far behind, to flash swiftly from place to 
place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also mani­ 
festing physical power, and especially appearing to men 
waking or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body 
which bears its likeness; continuing to exist and appear 
to men after the death of that body; able to enter into, 
possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, 
and even of things.
And, having derived the notion of soul from its prototypes the dream- 
image and trance-image, primitive man, reasoning by analogy, pro­ 
ceeded not only to attribute souls to animals, plants and things, but 
also to people his world with unembodied spirits.
It seems as though the conception of a human soul, 
when once attained by man, served as a type or model 
on which he framed not only his ideas of other souls 
of lower grade, but also his ideas of spiritual 
beings in general, from the tiniest elf that sports 
in the long grass up to the heavenly Creator and 
Ruler of the world, the Great Spirit.
1. Op. cit., p. 428.
2. Op. cit., p. 429.
3. Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 110.
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APPENDIX II
MAGIC, MANA, AND TABOO 
A Critical Comparison of the Views of Frazer and Marett
In "The Golden Bough" Dr. J. G. Frazer expresses the view 
that magic and religion are absolutely different and that an age of 
magic everywhere antedated an age of religion. In opposition to this 
view Dr. R. R. Marett maintains that magic and religion were both 
differentiated out of a common plasm, supernaturalism, and that under 
certain circumstances magic may develop into religion.
Dr. Frazer regards taboo as negative magic. Marett believes 
that taboo (tabu) is rightly regarded as negative mana and that tabu 
and mana, regarded as negative and positive supernaturalism, compose 
the common plasm of crude beliefs about the awful and occult out of 
which both magic and religion were differentiated.
Dr. Frazer's view of magic may be stated briefly as follows: 
Magic is fundamentally based on the laws of association of ideas, 
namely, the law of similarity and the law of contact. Charms based on
the law of similarity are called homoeopathic or imitative magicj those
1 
based on the law of contact, contagious magic. But although these
laws underlie the origin and development of magic the primitive magician 
knows magic only on its practical side; "he never analyzes the processes
on which his practice is based, never reflects on the abstract principles
g involved in his actions." For him magic is always an art, never a
1. The Golden Bough (1911), Vol. I, p. 52.
2. ' .Ibid., p. 55.
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science. As an art practical magic takes two forms, positive magic or 
sorcery and negative magic or taboo. Both sorcery and taboo follow
the sympathetic principle, whereby things are assumed to act on each
2 
other at a distance through a secret sympathy, and each may accordingly
be subdivided into homoeopathic and contagious types of magic practice. 
The fatal flaw of magic lies in its mistaken application of the "two 
great fundamental laws of thought, namely, the association of ideas by
similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space and
5 
time." Legitimately applied they yield science; illegitimately
applied they yield magic, the bastard sister of science. The main
differences between magic and religion are: (l) magic, like science,
4 
assumes the uniformity of nature while religion assumes the order of
5 6 
nature to be elastic and variable; (2) magic aims to control while
7 3 
religion seeks to propitiate; (3) magic regards nature as impersonal,
9while religion deals with superhuman personal agencies or spirits.
An age of religion has everywhere been preceded by an age of magic when
10 
religion was not and the change from magic to religion was brought
about by the realization on the part of the superior intelligences of 
the failure of magic and through the substitution for it of a faith in
higher powers upon whom man is dependent, and whom he is bound to
3.1 
reverence and propitiate.
1. Op. cit., p. 113.
2. Op. cit., p. 54.
5. Op. cit., pp. 221-222.
4. Op. cit., pp. 220-221.
5. Op. cit., p. 224.
6. Op. cit., p. 225.
7. Op. cit., p. 222.
8. Op. cit., p. 220.
9. Op. cit., pp. 222 ff.
10. Op. cit., pp. 234, 237.
11. Op. cit., pp. 237 ff.
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If the great world went on its way without the 
help of him (the primitive philosopher) or his 
fellows, it must surely be because there were 
other beings, like himself, but far stronger, 
who, unseen themselves, directed its course and 
brought about all the varied series of events 
which he had hitherto believed to be dependent 
on his own magic..... To these mighty beings, 
whose handiwork he traced in all the gorgeous 
and varied pageantry of nature, man now 
addressed himself, humbly confessing his de­ 
pendence on their invisible power, and beseeching 
them of their mercy to furnish him with all good 
things, to defend him from perils and dangers by 
which our mortal life is compassed about on every 
hand, and finally to bring his immortal spirit, 
freed from the burden of the body, to some 
happier world, beyond the reach of pain and sorrow, 
where he might rest with them and with the spirits 
of good men in joy and felicity forever.
When one reads such words as these (and they are typical of 
Frazer f s treatment) one is not surprised that the objection is made to 
his account of magic and religion that it is too intellectual!stic. It 
would seem that Marett is nearer the truth when he says that man does 
not think out his religion but dances it out instead. That is to say, 
we must take some account of the emotional factor in religious origins. 
Of Frazer's theory Marett says:
Pure ratiocination seems to be credited with an 
effectiveness without parallel in early culture. 
Almost as well say that, when man found he could 
not make big enough bags with the throwing stick 
he sat down and excogitated the bow-and-arrow.
Again, it is only to be expected that Marett might justly 
object to Frazer's theory of the associationalist origin of magic. 
This type of psychology has so long been discredited among scientists 
the world over that no one today would think of accepting the view
1. Op. cit., pp. 237-238.
2. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 34.
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that magic is deducible from the so-called "laws of association." 
Those who inquire into the origin either of magic or of religion 
will do well to follow Marett's working principle of expecting 
theory to grow out of practice and not the other way about.
Besides these objections, Marett points out that while 
Frazer's classification of magic is convenient for analysis it does 
not directly subserve genesis, because certain types of magic that 
do not fit into Frazer's classification are nevertheless of connate 
psychological origin with "imitative" and "contagious" magical 
practices.
Furthermore, mere imitativeness, for example, is not magic
but the spell or uttered "must" tends to embody the very heart and
5
soul of the magical transaction. Since the spell involves an occult
projection of will that somehow finds its way to another will and 
dominates it, magic is seen to be not the primitive equivalent of
natural science, as Frazer claims. Magic is not natural science but
4 occult science; and the efficacy of magic is due not to mechanical
causation but to the operation of non-mechanical power - a psychic
5 
force, a manifestation of personal agency, mana.
The projective act which is the heart of magic is by the 
operator perceived to be no ordinary act of willing but the process 
is manifestly occult and super-normal. Now the "historical genesis 
of religion should be sought in the awe caused in man's mind by the
1. Marett: Threshold of Religion (1914), p. 59,
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 47-54.
4. Ibid., p. 49.
5. Ibid., p. 50.
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perception of the supernatural, that is, supernormal, as it occurs
1 
within him and about him." Of course the occult as revealed in
magic is not the only form of supernatural manifestation known to man, 
but magical occultism colors primitive supernatural!sm to a marked 
extent by its contribution of the notion of mana, which on its inner 
side is just this seemingly mysterious power of putting the magical 
act through, and which is attributed by way of explanation to super­ 
natural agencies of every kind. In this way magic readily passes into
religion since supernaturalism provides a raw material common to
2 
them both.
Again, the mana may be transferred from its true vehicle, 
the spell, to the symbol or instrument and the latter personified and
deified. And concurrently with this process of personification and
? 
deification of the instrument the spell evolves into prayer.
Finally, the end that is ordinarily ordered to accommodate
itself to the desire prefigured in the magical act may be personified
4 
and supplicated instead of commanded.
We may conclude, then, that "because it equally belongs to
5 the sphere of the occult and supernatural, and because it tends to
be conceived as an affair between wills, magic, though distinct, has
1. Op.,dit., p. 58.
2. Op. cit., pp. 54-62. 
?. dp. cit., pp. 63-68.
4. Op. cit., pp. 68-71.
5. Cf. Otto: The Idea of the Holy (1923). "The point at issue 
is not by means of what class of powers the magical effect was 
produced.. ..but by means of what quality or character in the 
powers.... The quality can be only suggested through that 
unique element of feeling, the feeling of 'uncanniness,' of 
which we have already spoken, whose positive content cannot be 
defined conceptually, and can only be indicated by that mental 
response to it which we called 'shuddering'." pp. 122-123.
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something in common with religion, so that interpenetration and trans­ 
fusion are possible between them."
We now turn to the brief examination of the views of Frazer 
and Marett regarding the nature of taboo.
Seeing that Frazer, as we have already shown, regards taboo 
as negative magic and subject to the sympathetic principle of 
association by similarity and contiguity, the same psychological ob­ 
jections may be rightly urged against his treatment of taboo as have 
been raised against his discussion of magic. As against Frazer 1 s 
doctrine of taboo as a system of abstinences based on the avoidance of 
certain imaginary evil consequences incorrectly calculated on the 
sympathetic principle, Marett advances the view that taboo implicates 
a feeling of the supernatural and mysterious, which as such abounds in 
indefinite and incalculable effects. Even when the penalty is appar­ 
ently determinate and specific, which is by no means always the case, 
an infinite plus of awfulness will be found, on closer examination, to 
attach to it.
Taboo, on my view, belongs, and belongs wholly, 
to the sphere of the magico-religious (i.e., the 
supernatural). Within that sphere, I venture to 
assert, man always feels himself to be in contact 
with powers whose modes of action transcend the 
ordinary and calculable. Though he does not on 
that account desist from attempting to exploit 
these powers, yet it is with no assurance of 
limited liability that he enters on the under­ 
taking. In short, dealings with whatever has 
mystic power are conducted at an infinite risk5 
and taboo but embodies the resolution to take no 
unnecessary risks of this indefinite kind."
1. Maretts op. cit., p. 30
2. Op. cit., p. 79.
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Strengthening his argument with many illustrations,
Marett argues convincingly that taboo is a mystic affair and shows
1 
the failure of the sympathetic principle. To break a taboo is
to set in motion against oneself mana or mystic wonder-working power 
in one form or another; but the particular form it will take re­ 
mains mysterious and incalculable. The taboo on contact with women, 
strangers and kings is not due to the fear of the transmission of 
weakness, contagious from without, or kingliness, respectively, but 
because these persons have mana. "Thus instead of terming taboo a
negative magic, it would be truer to describe it as a negative
2 
mana."
1. Marett: op. cit., Ch. III.




A Brief Sketch of Freud's Psychological Theory
In the present work we have been interested primarily in 
theories of the origin of religion. But since there are important 
differences between the opinions of two leaders of the psycho­ 
analytic school (Freud and Jung) regarding this problem and since 
these differences of opinion are traceable to fundamental differences 
between them in psychological theory it is desirable to add supple­ 
ments treating of their respective theories. In the present essay we 
shall attempt to sketch Freud's general psychological theory as it 
bears on his theory of religious origins. Criticism is reserved for 
the main body of the work, Chapter VII.
Psychoanalytic theory began to take its present form as a 
result of investigations into hysteria made by Dr. Josef Breuer and 
Dr. Sigmund Freud of Vienna. They found that some abnormal symptoms 
could be cured by reviving by means of hypnosis emotionally colored 
memories of a painful character which were generally inaccessible to 
the normal waking self. This fact suggests several theories which 
later psychoanalytic investigations have supported and elaborated. It 
suggests that possibly no experience is ever forgotten but that all of 
a person 1 s experiences are preserved in memory even though they may
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be temporarily or permanently inaccessible to consciousness except by 
the use of a special method of revival (the unconscious). It suggests 
that experiences may be and often are forgotten because of their 
painful character (repression, the pleasure principle). It suggests 
that an emotionally-toned memory (complex) may express itself unknown 
to and independent of the conscious self through the surrogate form of 
symptoms (resistance, censor). And it suggests that such abnormal 
symptoms may be cured by bringing into consciousness the emotionally 
toned ideas which give rise to them and the redirection of their 
energy into normal and fruitful channels (transference, sublimation, 
re-education).
Further investigations by Freud revealed the possibility of 
reviving forgotten experiences without resorting to hypnosis. If 
the patient was led to assume a non-critical attitude and freely speak 
whatever came to his mind, holding nothing back, it was found that 
again and again in the course of a long conversation regarding his 
life and conditions he would make indirect references to these emotional 
experiences which formed the basis of his disturbing symptoms. To 
this method of revival is given the name free association. The results 
of the method suggest that the affective element (later, psychic energy, 
libido) of an emotionally-toned, painful memory (complex) because of 
its strong tendency to enforce attention from consciousness compels 
these revelations while the tendency of the self to deny entrance of 
painful ideas into consciousness (resistance) constrains these 
revelations to take the form of indirect allusions.
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Taking a hint from Charcot, Freud evidently looked for, 
and certainly believed that he found, the repressed complexes of 
his hysterical patients to have an erotic or sexual basis. It was 
somewhat surprising, however, to find that these repressed com­ 
plexes generally arose out of experiences which could be dated in 
very early childhood. This fact suggested that, contrary to generally 
accepted theory, the behaviour of children even in their early years 
is motivated and characterized to a remarkable extent by the sexual 
motive. It also pointed to the possibility of an infantile sexual 
trauma of sufficiently painful character to account for its re­ 
pression and the formation of the complex.
The theory of the infantile sexual trauma was later given 
up in favor of the more general theory of infantilism of sexuality it­ 
self and it was conjectured that the sexual traumas referred to early 
childhood by the patient were not actual occurrences but existed only 
in the phantasies of the patient. These interesting inductions stimu­ 
lated Freud to make a more thorough investigation into the nature of
the child's sexuality the results of which he published under the title
1 
of, "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex." In his investigations
Freud found an amazing variety of infantile activities which although 
not comparable to the expressions of normal adult sexuality he never­ 
theless regarded as essentially sexual in character and because in 
many ways they resembled perversions found in abnormal adults he some­ 
times refers to them under the collective name of the "polymorphous 
perverse."
1. Tr. A. A. Brill (1950)
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It should be noted here that it is not possible to under­ 
stand Freud unless one keeps in mind his peculiar, and many think un­ 
fair, usage of the word sex. He makes no essential distinction between 
sexuality and love. Whatever we love or love to do is loved or en­ 
joyed because of the operation of the sexual motive. All tender 
feelings and emotions, all sensuous and spontaneous pleasure, have an 
erotic origin. Sexual character is ascribed to every experience of 
which these form even but a component part. In fact it is a funda­ 
mental assumption of Freud's that all activity is motivated from within, 
and in his earlier works he recognizes just two types of motivation, 
namely, the self-instincts, which he calls ego, and the sexual in­ 
stincts, to which he gives the name libido. This primary polarity 
does not satisfy his later speculative tendencies, however, and 
apparently for two reasons: the self can and often does become the 
object of love as in narcissism, and it does not account for death. In 
his later works, therefore, Freud enlarges the libido conception by
including in it the self-preserving instincts and in "Beyond the
1 
Pleasure Principle" rechristens this expanded conception, giving it
the name "Eros, the all-sustaining." He then gives up the dualistic 
polarity of ego and libido as a comprehensive conception of human 
motivation in favor of even a sharper dualistic conception of life- 
instinct (eros) and death-instinct. It is not to be understood, 
however, that the life-instinct has lost its essential character of 
sexuality. Nor is it to be supposed that Freud has given up the 
fundamental dualism of ego and libido when these concepts are employed 
in the properly restricted fields of their application.
1. Tr. C. J. M. Hubback (1922)
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Libido in the service of reproduction is only one form of 
sexuality, and a very extensively developed form at that. There are 
many more primitive forms (sucking is the most primitive) and it is 
possible for some components of libido to be arrested in an early 
stage of development, while others work themselves out to completion. 
This arrest of a partial impulse in an early stage of development is 
called a fixation. It is also possible for even those components 
which have achieved a high degree of progress to turn backward to 
earlier stages. This second danger of development by stages is called 
regression.
When libido is attached to an idea and is expelled from 
consciousness through repression or when through repression libido 
is denied entrance into consciousness, such frustrated motive being 
guided by unconscious psychological processes tends to find expression 
by means of phantasies, dreams, or irrational activities called 
symptoms•
The most important of such repressed complexes is called 
by Freud the Oedipus complex, after the hero of Greek tragedy who was 
destined by fate to kill his father and marry his mother. Freud con­ 
tends that infantile sexuality generates the incestuous desire in the 
infant son to displace the father in the affections of the mother, 
or, more crudely, to murder the father and take the mother to wife. 
Freud recognizes the Oedipus complex as the nuclear complex of every 
neurosis and it is also from this surprising psychological source that 
he derives not only art and philosophy but morality and religion as
well.
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The extreme importance of the Oedipus complex in Freud's 
theory can be seen from the following summary of his views on the un­ 
conscious. In his early works he assumes a polarity between the 
conscious and unconscious, which was practically parallel with the 
polaristic conception of ego and libido. But that the ego was at 
least partly unconscious became evident from the observation that, 
while resistance was a function of ego, patients undergoing analysis 
were unconscious of their resistances. Thus the contrast between 
conscious and unconscious was seen to be an antithesis between what 
may be called the surface of the psyche which is in touch with the 
environment and the interior of the psyche which has no direct contact 
with the environment. To the interior depths of the psyche is now 
given the name the i^ or id while the ego, though it has developed out 
of the id and so far as it is unconscious still remains merged with 
it, is primarily conceived as comprising the surface of the psyche 
which is in touch with the environment. The id includes the under­ 
lying motives (life-instincts and death-instincts) of all activity 
whatsoever. Whenever these motives become conscious they take the 
form of particular desires, and when for any reason they are repressed 
by the ego they return to the id. The ego is the mediating agent of 
adjustment between the id and the world. Its function is to initiate 
such changes in the environment as will release the instinctive drives 
of the id in a pleasurable manner and, where that is not possible, to 
control the id in compliance with the world's demands. The id is 
governed by the pleasure principle and the ego by the reality principle, 
The ego, very weak at first, is often thwarted in its efforts to carry
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out the urges arising out of the id. But its defeats are the source 
of its progress for when the ego is forced to give up some love-object 
it identifies itself with the preserved image of that object and thus 
achieves its organization and adjustment to reality by appropriating 
the character of what it has to renounce. The id remains forever 
primitive and unorganized.
One important fact does not seem to fit very well into this 
scheme. It is the extreme sense of guilt felt by many of the psycho­ 
analyst's patients. This sense of guilt suggests some sort of 
psychological dictator above the ego that issues commands and estab­ 
lishes prohibitions. Such an entity would correspond roughly to 
what we generally call conscience. Freud assumes the existence of 
this governing principle and to it gives the name super-ego or ego- 
ideal. Consistently with his fundamental assumption of unconscious 
motivation of all activity Freud holds that these categorical imperatives 
are not derived by the super-ego from observation and judgment of the 
environment but that they issue from the inscrutable interior depths 
of the psyche. They are derived from the id and its internal conflicts. 
Unlike the ego which is developed to some extent in animals by their 
contest with environment, the super-ego is to be found only in man. 
As might be expected of a tendency of recent phylogenetic origin only 
its archaic rudiments are inherited. And, again in contrast with the 
ego, its individual development is the outcome not of a contest with 
environment but of a prolonged human infancy and childhood with the 
consequent delay and frustration which the libido must undergo in its
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progress from infantile sexual forms to its proper function in adult 
sexual life of motivating reproductive activities.
From this point it may be well to glance once more at the 
concept of the Oedipus complex. The male infant's libido attaches 
itself to the mother and receives encouragement for a time until 
weaning, correction and punishment bring on difficulties. By this 
time, however, the child will have become attached to the father also 
so that he now regularly identifies himself with the father, takes 
the father as an ideal, and seeks in all things to imitate him. But 
now he finds that he cannot and must not do everything which the 
father does. Particularly he must not love the mother as his father 
does. Thus the father comes to be at one and the same time both 
adored ideal and hated rival, and the son, denied his love-object 
and ravaged by ambivalent and contradictory emotions with respect 
to his father, passes through the fires of terrible inner conflict. 
Freud thinks this conflict generally comes to a head about the fourth 
or fifth year, when the libido having passed through several infantile 
stages becomes concentrated on the genital organs. Now in the face 
of stern opposition from both parents the only course left open to 
him is renouncement and repression. This he heroically accomplishes
*
by a more complete identification with the father in which his desire 
to be like his father is strengthened while at the same time he 
accepts as his own the prohibition not to slay the father nor covet 
the father's wife, i.e., his mother. These three laws, identification
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with the father, and the prohibitions against patricide and incest, 
adopted by the boy are the core of his super-ego.
This very simple scheme is immensely complicated by the 
introduction of the notion of the bisexuality of the child. Freud 
believes that the boy's libido may choose the father as love object 
along with the mother. In this case the mother becomes to some 
extent the ideal and rival and has a part to play in the super-ego. 
It may and sometimes does turn out that the boy 1 s identification with 
the mother is stronger than his identification with the father. 
Wherever this happens his character develops a feminine quality.
With suitable substitutions the same diagram may be used 





Some Important Differences Between the General Theories
of Freud and Jung
Another leader of the psychoanalytic movement, Dr. C. G. 
Jung, head of the Zurich school, has given a very different account 
of the origin of religion from that advocated by Freud. The 
differences between the views of these two men are rooted in funda­ 
mental differences in psychological theory. In Appendix III we 
have sketched Freud 1 s general psychological theory. In the present 
essay we shall confine ourselves to the statement of some important 
differences between the general psychological views of Freud and 
Jung.
Tjie first of these important differences between the 
psychological theories of Jung and Freud concerns the conception of 
the libido. Libido as a dynamic concept denoting the perceived mani­ 
festations of "psychic energy" is accepted by both Freud and Jung. 
And although Freud uses the term "instinct" along with the term 
"libido" he confines himself exclusively to sexuality, as we have 
shown, and we regard Jung's statement that "the sexual definition of 
energy as a specific instinctive force is quite sufficient for his 
purpose," is quite justified. Jung, however, is unwilling to
1. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 31.
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define libido exclusively in terms of sexuality.
In general psychological theory....it is impossible 
to use sexuality, that is, one specific instinct, 
as an explanatory concept, since psychical energy- 
transformation is not merely a matter of sexual 
dynamics. 1
In fact, Jung not only refuses to describe psychic energy, which is
the fundamental concept in his dynamic theory of mind, as sexual
p in character but ascribes to it no quality whatever.~ He regards it
as only quantitative like the concept of energy in physics. It is 
merely energy, not force, nor purpose. But he realizes that its per­ 
ceived manifestations will always have direction, i.e., they will be 
regarded as forces. And to these forces or manifestations he gives 
the inclusive name of libido.
Since the applied theory of energy immediately becomes 
hypostasized on perceptual grounds into the forces of 
the mind (instincts, affects, and other dynamic 
processes), the perceived manifestation of psychic 
energy is in my opinion excellently characterized by 
the word 'libido 1 ; inasmuch as similar perceptions 
(Anschauungen) have always made use of like terras^, as, 
for example, Schopenhauer's 'will', the horme ( O 
of Aristotle, the eros ('hate' and 'love') of the 
elements, or the elan vital of Bergson.
A second divergence of Jung's psychological theory from
that of Freud follows logically from the first; he rejects the dogma
4
of infantile sexuality. In those manifestations of libido in child­ 
hood to which Freud gives the name of "polymorphous perverse" Jung
1. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology. pp. 31-32,
2. Jung: Psychological Types, pp. 571-572.
3. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 32.
4. Ibid.,pp. 339-340.
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sees only the forerunners of later developed sexuality. He divides 
the life of the individual human being into three stages. The pre- 
sexual stage of the child extends from birth to the third or fourth 
year; the pre-pubertal stage next ensues extending to puberty; and 
at puberty the stage of maturity begins. During the first stage 
libido is occupied chiefly in the function of nutrition and gradually 
moves from exclusive service in this function into new avenues which
successively open up until the final appearance of the sexual function
g 
at puberty. If libido is retarded or arrested in any stage of its
manifestation a "fixation" may result which leads to a neurosis or 
at least to a weakness of character.
One of the most important of these childish manifestations 
of the libido takes the form of phantasy-making by which the child can
create a world that yields the satisfaction and enjoyment which the
3 
real world denies. But normally, too, he passes out of this stage
into maturity where the libido is fully directed toward the adaptation 
to reality.
But it often happens that this phase of phantasy-making is 
not relinquished, so that when, in later life, difficulty is en­ 
countered by such retarded persons, satisfaction is sought in a world 
of phantasy rather than in successful adjustment to the actual 
situation which is being inadequately faced. This condition is called 
"introversion." When libido is introverted it is concerned with the 
past and its reminiscences.
1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 58,
2. Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 148-149.
3! Ibid.,pp. 21-25.
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Of all the past influences which introverted libido 
utilizes in the creation of phantasy the most powerful and important 
is that of the parents. In the explanation of their influence upon 
the child* s life we come upon a third important difference between 
the views of Freud and Jung. Unlike Freud who insists that an 
emotional tie with the real parents (the Oedipus complex) is all- 
powerful in the developing life of the individual, Jung holds that 
not the real parents but only a subjective and distorted image 
(imago) of them and of actual past situations concerning them forms 
the center of man's phantasy-creating activities. 1 Consequently 
Jung sees in Freud's "Oedipus complex" only a symbol for (l) the 
childish longing to revert to the love and protection of the parents, 
and (2) the conflict which this craving evokes. The jealousy so 
often exhibited regarding the mother is at first connected only with 
his dependence upon her as the source of food, of comfort, and of 
protection. It is only with the development of the sexual powers 
that the child's devotion to the mother (or, in the case of girls 
to the father) takes on sexual characteristics.
Concomitantly with the attainment of maturity the child is 
normally freed gore or less gradually from domination by and depen­ 
dence upon the parents and achieves independence both in governing
his life and in making his way in the world. But this is not done
g 
without severe inner conflict. His attempt to achieve an inde-
1. Psychology of the Unconscious f pp. 335-336, Cf. also p 463
2. Ibid.,p. 196.
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pendent existence in the world of reality is not without its 
difficulties, and, rather than face them, he is often sorely tempted 
to retreat to his former state of dependence upon his parents. This 
condition sets the stage for the severest of subjective struggles 
where one's budding independent self is in mortal conflict with one's 
infantile dependent self and where only the sacrifice of the latter 
makes possible the life of the former. 1 This struggle often gives 
rise to the unconscious phantasy of self-sacrifice which symbolizes 
the sacrifice of childish tendencies (or self) in order to free 
libido for the fulfilment of the mature self in the real world. 2
Jung suggests that there is a parallel between the phan-
tastical, mythological thinking of antiquity and the similar thinking
g 
of children. Contrasting directed thinking which gives rise to
science with phantastical thinking which creates dreams and myths, 
he shows how the former is a recent modern acquisition of mankind 
while the latter represents the immature soul life of the people. 
Ontogenesis corresponds to phylogenesis in psychology as well as in 
biology. Not satisfied with demonstrating a rough correspondence 
between the psychological development of the individual and the sane 
life of the race, however, Jung insists that the unconscious of the 
present-day man coins its symbols as was done in the most remote past.
5
Here we come upon a fourth difference between the psychology 
of Jung and Freud which it is necessary for us to recognize. Freud
1. Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 390-391.
2. Ibid,, pp. 478-479.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Ibid., p. 28.
5. Ibid., p. 202.
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describes the psyche as including the conscious, the foreconscious 
or preconscious, and the unconscious. Jung distinguishes three 
mental levels: consciousness, the personal unconscious, and the 
collective unconscious. Freud and Jung agree in defining conscious­ 
ness as awareness. Jung f s concept of the personal unconscious, 
however, includes all that Freud means by the foreconscious with some 
considerable additions.
The personal unconscious consists of all those 
contents that have become unconscious, either 
because, their intensity being lost, they were 
forgotten, or because consciousness has been 
withdrawn from them, i.e., so-called repression. 
Finally, this layer contains those elements - 
partly sense perceptions - which on account 
of too little intensity have never reached 
consciousness, and yet in some way have gained 
access into the psyche.^
The subliminal impressions indicated above are not taken account of 
by Freud, while material repressed from consciousness, which is here 
identified by Jung with the personal unconscious, is regarded by
Freud as belonging not to the foreconscious but to the unconscious.
2
So with one slight exception we may say with Northridge that
Jung ! s personal unconscious, therefore, may be 
said to contain (l) all that is involved in the 
Freudian fore-conscious; (2) all that is in­ 
volved in the Freudian unconscious.
Our exception has to do with the instincts, and we shall speak of
it again in our discussion of Jung's conception of the collective
3
unconscious. He says:
1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 110.
2. Northridge: Modern Theories of the Unconscious (1924), p. 144.
3. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 110.
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The collective unconscious, being an inheritance 
of the possibilities of ideas, is not individual 
but generally human, generally animal even, and 
represents the real foundations of the individual 
soul.
This whole psychic organism corresponds 
exactly to the body, which, though constantly 
showing individual variation, is none the less 
in all essential features the general human body, 
which in its development and structure still pre­ 
serves those elements that connect it with 
invertebrate animals and finally with protozoa. 
Theoretically it should be possible to shell out 
of the collective unconscious not only the 
psychology of the worm, but even that of the 
individual cell.
The collective unconscious, therefore, contains primordial ways of 
acting, which is the way he defines instincts, and primordial ways 
of thinking, i.e., primordial images, archetypes.
Whether this represents an essential departure from Freud's 
views is not clear from the literature - not nearly so clear as 
Northridge indicates. Freud certainly speaks of instincts along with 
libido and in "Totem and Taboo" he bases his whole conclusion on 
the assumption of a sort of racial memory as we pointed out in our 
discussion of that volume. Fortunately, however, a conclusion on 
this question is not necessary for our investigation and we shall pass 
on with the observation that at least it is to Jung and not to Freud 
that we must go for an explanation and development of the concept 
of the collective unconscious.
It is the notion of archetypes or primordial images that 
concerns us most in Jung's theory of the collective unconscious.
1. Vide supra, section 33, c.
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Archetypes are symbolical ways of apprehending objects or of 
visualizing situations and as such are part of the general inheri­ 
tance of men from their most remote ancestors.
The primordial image or archetype is a figure, 
whether it be a daemon, man, or process, that 
repeats itself in the course of history wherever 
creative phantasy is freely manifested. 
Essentially, therefore, it is a mythological 
figure. If we subject these images to a closer 
investigation, we discover them to be the formulated 
resultants of countless typical experiences of 
our ancestors. They are, as it were, the psychic 
residua of numberless experiences of the same type. 
They depict millions of individual experiences 
in the average, presenting a kind of picture of 
the psychic life distributed and projected into 
the manifold shapes of the mythological pandemonium.
I term the image primordial when it possesses an 
archaic character. I speak of its archaic character 
when the image is in striking unison with familiar 
mythological motives..... A Personal image has neither 
archaic character nor collective significance, but 
expresses contents of the personal unconscious and 
a personally conditioned, conscious situation. The 
primordial image.... is always collective, i.e., 
it is at least common to entire nations or epochs. 
In all probability the most important mythological 
motives are common to all times and races.^
1. Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 246.
2. Psychological Types, pp. 555-556.
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